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Divorce Industry “Honest Services Fraud”: Kickbacks, Referrals, Bribery, and Extortion. California Coalition’s Expanded Racketeering Complaint Details the Crimes

Last week California Coalition for Families and Children filed its

P1 89 - CCFC FAC v 7 FINAL signed

Amended Racketeering and Civil Rights complaint in federal court, adding City Attorney Jan Goldsmith, Assistant City Attorney Emily GarsonJudge Michael Groch, San Diego Superior Court Counsel Kristine Nesthus, and adding charges for obstruction of justice against a group of Superior Court judges led by the San Diego County Bar Association and its insurer, Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, in thwarting California Coalitions’ Complaint in this action.  It alleges numerous felonies under state and federal law, including extortion, bribery, fraud, false arrest, and civil rights crimes under 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 241, 371—which are federal felonies by themselves.

The complaint also expanded on the details of the “honest services fraud” schemes operated by divorce lawyers.  These schemes, which involve illegal kickback and behind the scenes dealing between attorneys, service providers, psychologists, and judges, are illegal under the federal criminal code, 18 U.S.C. § 1346.

“Many people think that fraud is a one-on-one transaction, such as when a consumer purchases counterfeit goods.  But under federal law, fraud is defined much more broadly, to include any transaction in which the seller is somehow benefited from providing dishonest services.”  Says Colbern Stuart, President of California Coalition.

Honest Services Fraud under Federal Law

“Honest Services Fraud” includes transactions in which a seller is receiving a behind-the-scene “kickback”, or compensation of any kind for a referral that wrongfully influences the referrer.

If Company A sells you goods or services, then refers you to company B, you expect that referral to be unbiased—in essence Company A is representing to you that they’re recommending company B solely because Company B is a good company.  However, if Company B is paying Company A for the referral, or offering something else of value–a “kickback”—as happens very often today—Company A must disclose that relationship to you as the buyer.  If they don’t, they’ve committed fraud, and if you’re harmed by Company B, company A may be liable to you.

“These referral networks are vast and well-entrenched in the divorce industry.” Says Stuart.  Because the industry is a ‘closed society’, competition by outsiders is artificially limited by referrals from lawyers to preferred accountants, to psychologists, to mediators.  “The network is as vast as the divorce litigant’s bank account.”  “Litigants usually don’t realize the services they’re being sold are entirely unnecessary or outright fraudulent until it’s too late.  They come to a divorce lawyer angry at a spouse, greedy, or frightened—whatever blinding emotion at hand.”  Says Stuart.  For such litigants, the divorce lawyer remedy may be more deadly than the disease.  “Divorce lawyers know litigants are vulnerable, but rather than save them, they walk them into the trap.  It’s outrageous and its plainly fraud, but it happens every day.” Says Stuart.

California Coalition’s First Amended Complaint sets forth the Domestic Dispute Industry Honest Services Fraud in its Racketeering Counts.  “You may recognize this pattern of referrals and “you scratch my back” cooperation—sometimes even between the adverse attorneys working to disadvantage their clients.  If you do, you may have a racketeering claim against your attorney, your ex-spouse’s attorney, and maybe even your ex.” Says Stuart.  “We suggest that divorce litigants check to see if these types of scenarios are happening to them-is your divorce lawyer telling you things like “that’s how it’s done” in divorce court, or “there’s nothing you can do?”  Is he or she telling you the Constitution doesn’t apply?” Is she suggesting you go to a paid service provider for something you can get in court for free?  If so, you’re in danger of being defrauded, and once you’re in it, there’s no easy way out.” Says Stuart.

“Black Hat” Operatives in the Domestic Dispute Industry Criminal Enterprise

On the other end many divorce lawyers promote themselves as ‘black hat’ operatives—those who can use the dysfunction to your advantage.  “These are the bad guys we’re in process of exterminating.” Says Stuart.  Hiring an attorney to sue for revenge or out

Bierer Big

Marilyn Bierer, “Black Hat” Domestic Dispute Industry Operative

of any emotion including fear is extremely dangerous.  “Backfire is common and always harmful, even deadly.  Sadly, attorneys simply won’t stop you from hurting yourself, and you won’t know that you’re doing so until it’s too late.”  Say Stuart.  “We’re going to balance that equation out. As we move forward anyone, who has signed up a client to use illegal tactics that fall into our gun-sights, that lawyer just signed his own death warrant.” Says Stuart.

“Courts, institutions, and prosecutors have tolerated this illegal behavior for far too long.  RICO empowers victims of fraud to fend for themselves, and offers enhanced damages of three times actual loss, plus costs and attorneys fees.  We put those extraordinarily powerful statutes to work against bad lawyers and evil clients.”  Says Stuart.

“These are crimes. These people belong in prison.  The U.S. Attorney for this District Laura Duffy won’t do her job to enforce the criminal law.  The District Attorney Bonnie Dumanis won’t do her job to enforce the criminal law. In my opinion, they probably belong in prison for tolerating such widespread and outrageous behavior damaging kids and families, but that’s not my business.  They won’t put the industry under, we will.  And with RICO’s injunctive remedies, we can. If we can recover some hardship money for parents and kids who’ve been injured along the way, even better. ”  Says Stuart.

If your attorney is recommending to do things you know are illegal—such as lie under oath, fabricate evidence, or exaggeration, you may be committing racketeering by cooperating.  “We have a client whose lawyer advised ‘if you don’t do it to them, they’ll do it to you.’  That sadly is not uncommon, and the likelihood often begins the cycle that leads to a “messy divorce” and personal destruction.  Nobody on the inside has the spine to stop it.  We do.”  Say Stuart. “We’re establishing precedents that enable clients who’ve been duped by their own attorneys or their spouse’s attorneys to fire back—with thermonuclear weaponry of federal law racketeering mail fraud, extortion, bribery, and honest services fraud charges.  With the precedents established, other litigants can follow our path and use them to combat fraud in other jurisdictions.  We hope the herculean efforts we’re undertaking in San Diego will benefit parents and divorce industry litigants nationwide.”  Says Stuart.

California Coalition’s complaint details how the industry is entrenched, with government lawyers, prosecutors, and judges squarely in the divorce industry’s pocket.  “We don’t expect to see real change industry-wide until heads roll.  But that’s the kind of battle we enjoy most.  We’re blessed to have capable minds, eager hands, and some extremely powerful federal laws to keep wind in our sails.”

 From California Coalition’s Amended Complaint:

RACKETEERING COUNT 2
18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d)
Honest Services Fraud
18 U.S.C. § 1346
Against All RICO Defendants

1031. This is a Count asserting numerous Claims for relief under RICO section 1962 (c) and (d), based upon predicate crimes actionable under 18 U.S.C. § 1346 for Honest Services Fraud, against defendants as identified per Claim in this Count.

1032. All prior paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated as if set forth in full.

General Allegations to Racketeering Count 2

1033. Defendants engaged in one or more SAD by and in conjunction with the ENTERPRISES to deprive Plaintiffs of the intangible right of honest services.

1034. On information and belief, Defendants, and each of them, support and promote one another in perpetrating each SAD actionable fraud, bribery and/or kickbacks, wherein a quid pro quo (monetary, preferential referral, business referral, and/or some other form of benefit) is provided to or from each RICO defendant, and including such benefits to or from persons unknown to Plaintiffs, to assure that Plaintiffs in their PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES would be effectively punished, silenced, discredited, and rendered ineffective as an effectively competing alternative vehicle offering reasonable and realistic forms of professional quality services to counsel and advise individual parents and guardians addressing family law, child custody, and domestic relations issues.

1035. In the case of DOYNE and BLANCHET, these quid-pro-quo exchanges are backed up with use of one or another SAD, such as “that’s just how it is” or extortion such as “if you ever want to see your son again ….” which are enabled by the abuse of process tools of The Pit and DDIJO abstention/enforcement of illegal DVILS ORDERS.  In STUART’S case, additional muscle was provided by SDCBA’S security guards, and ultimately the familial relationships between STUART ASSAULT COORDINATORS and CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS.

1036. The    fraudulent quid-pro-quo ignores ethical PROFESSIONAL DUTIES of loyalty and zealous advocacy among putative opponent lawyers, and judicial officials who disregard their ethical duties enforce law.  In doing so, Defendants effectively re-define their opponents to be their own clients, take those who should be their opponents as collaborators, and pursue the collaborators’ joint interests above their clients’.

1037. DDICE operatives do so by collaborating with opposing counsel and state interests under color of law to extort, defraud, and abuse their own clients, whom they refer to as “Litigants Behaving Badly” in a grotesque and reprehensible criminal enterprise conducted with full knowledge, consent, and contribution from public and private servants alike.

1038. Such conduct constitutes the deprivation of the intangible personal property right to receive ‘honest-services’ for purposes of 18 U.S.C.  §§ 1341, 1343, and 1346.

1039. As an actual and proximate result, Plaintiffs have been damaged or injured in a nature and amount to be proven at trial.

The “Honest Services Fraud Scheme” of Sharon Blanchet, Ashworth Blanchet Christenson & Kalemkiarian, Jeff Fritz of Basie and Fritz, and Dr. Stephen Doyne

The kickback and extortion scheme between Sharon Blanchet, Ashworth Blanchet Christenson & Kalemkiarian, Jeff Fritz of Basie and Fritz, and Dr. Stephen Doyne is described elsewhere in the complaint:

COUNT 11
DOYNE TERRORISM
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Cal. Const. art. I, § 26
Against DOYNE, DOYNE, INC., BLANCHET, ABC&K,
WOHLFEIL, SCHALL

808.   This is a Count alleging breach of contract, fraud, extortion, bribery and abuse of process centered on the actions of Defendants DOYNE (DOYNE TERRORISM) acting under color of law, and related deprivations of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Cal. Const. art. I, § 26 against DOYNE, DOYNE, INC., BLANCHET, ABC&K, WOHLFEIL, and SCHALL (DOYNE TERRORISM Defendants).

Common Allegations

809.   On or about April 10, 2008, Defendant WOHFEIL recommended and offered to oversee Defendant DOYNE to “mediate” custody issues in the Stuart Dissolution.

810.   Concurrent with WOHLFEIL’S recommendation, BLANCHET also made representations and warranties regarding DOYNE and DOYNE INC. as set forth in Exhibit 14 and incorporated herein by reference.

811.   Collectively, WOLFEIL and BLANCHET’S recommendations and referral communicated to STUART that DOYNE and DOYNE INC. DOYNE INC. was a trustworthy, competent mediator.

812.   Based upon WOHLFEIL’S recommendation and agreement to oversee, and BLANCHET’S representations and warranties, STUART contacted DOYNE INC.

813.   Between about April, 2008 and September 12, 2008, STUART and DOYNE, INC. conducted oral negotiations, entered agreements, and executed a written contract (STUART- DOYNE CONTRACTS).

814.   During these negotiations and agreements, DOYNE and DOYNE, INC. made representations, promises, and warranties to STUART as follows:

A. That DOYNE was only authorized and would only act to “mediate”, and could not perform a custody evaluation, therapy, “forensic investigation” “analysis” or “evaluation” or act as a witness in court;

B. That DOYNE would not permit ex parte contact, and would take no action or recommendation except as authorized by the court or the parties;

C. That DOYNE would base his reasoning and actions on actual evidence and law;

D. That all parties would be afforded notice and opportunity to be heard before DOYNE took any action or made any recommendations regarding the matter;

E. That DOYNE INC. was an alternative to court and governmental intervention, safer, more private, and less expensive than court, but with the same procedural safeguards;

F. That DOYNE would “quickly” work toward 50/50 custody, that it would only take “a few sessions”, and that his fees and expenses would not exceed the initial $5,000 retainer;

G. That the DOYNE INC. mediation process would be completed in “a month or two”;

H. That DOYNE’s contact with the court would be in the form of a written report which both parties would have an opportunity to review, comment on, contest, supplement, and collaborate over before submission to the court;

I. That DOYNE’S had no authority to take actions or make judgments, but only to work toward cooperative solutions;

J. That DOYNE would not recommend any solution that would harm, burden, or obstruct any party, and that he was “honest, fair, and completely competent” to perform mediation services.

815.   These representations were false when made.

816.   As described more fully in Exhibits 22 and 23, DOYNE INC breached the contracts and representations by committing extortion, abuse of process, and by failing to abide by each of the above referenced promises, his PROFESSIONAL DUTIES, including duties of disclosure, loyalty, honesty, and good faith, as well as breaching one or more provision of the written contract.

817.   Specifically:

A. DOYNE extended the mediation for months, insisting on weekly sessions to address issues he had not been authorized to “mediate”;

B. DOYNE was not only unable to resolve even minor issues successfully, he welcomed and encouraged both parties to bring up new issues unrelated to child custody, effectively attempting to insert himself as an arbiter for all disputes—real or imagined—between the parties; and by otherwise extended the mediation to increase his fees;

C. DOYNE refused to investigate STUART’s Claims and evidence that MS. STUART was abusing their son, Croix Stuart.

D. DOYNE exceeded his authority in filing false and misleading reports with San Diego County child protective services alleging that Plaintiff had “held his son upside down over a balcony” when DOYNE in fact knew and later admitted, that claim was untrue;

E. That San Diego County Child Protective Services had performed an investigation of DOYNE’s allegations against Plaintiff and found DOYNE’s allegation to be false;

F. Because of DOYNE’s false and misleading letters and report to San Diego Child Protective Services, DOYNE caused the removal of Plaintiff’s son Croix Stuart from Plaintiff’s shared custody and awarded sole custody to Petitioner Ms. Stuart;

G. That DOYNE repeatedly ignored or failed to follow up on Plaintiff’s concerns that Croix Stuart was being abused, manipulated, and alienated by Petitioner Ms. Stuart;

H. That DOYNE was forcing Plaintiff to pay for services of DOYNE which Plaintiff objected to, did not request, and were wasteful and unnecessary; and

I. That DOYNE effectively held Stuart’s son hostage, dangling his custody decisions between the couple, increasing adversarial hostilities, strife, and conflict, in order increase his fees in the case;

J. That DOYNE was in fact unauthorized to perform any work on the matter as he was ineligible, unqualified, and had failed to establish his eligibility by appropriate procedure; and

K. Further breaches of each representation elsewhere identified.

DOYNE, DOYNE, INC. Terrorism

818.   In response to these breaches, in February or March 1, 2009, STUART terminated DOYNE’S services.

819.   In addition to complaining to and firing DOYNE, Plaintiff also filed formal complaints with DOYNE’s landlord, Scripps Memorial Hospital, the State of California Board of Psychology, the FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS in the DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE and FFRRESA.  On information and belief DOYNE knew of these complaints.

820.   A true and correct copy letters to and concerning DOYNE relating to these allegations are referenced as Exhibits 22-23.

821.   In response to STUART’S objections and reports detailed above, DOYNE INC. retaliated against STUART by committing the following acts against STUART:

A.      Committing perjury in a hearing relating to the STUART’S son, Croix Stuart;

B.      Continuing to file false reports and encourage the (false) investigation of his initial report against STUART;

C.      Continuing to demand STUART pay DOYNE and DONE INC. for services not rendered or fraudulently rendered;

D.      Attempting to intimidate, distress, harm, defraud, extort, and rob Stuart;

E.      Requesting a bribe; and

F.      Participating in the STUART ASSAULT.

DOYNE’S Attempted Bribery and Extortion

822.   In May, 2009, DOYNE telephoned STUART at home requesting that STUART pay DOYNE for services he falsely claimed to have provided.

823.   DOYNE advised STUART that he had sent STUART several invoices which STUART had not paid; STUART had advised DOYNE previously that he would no longer pay DOYNE, INC.’S services or invoices.

824.   DOYNE advised STUART that he “should come current” and that if he did so, DOYNE would “work with you” to “get more time with your son.”

825.   Given DOYNE’S pattern and history of professional incompetence, fraud, breach of contract, deprivation of rights, false CPS report, overbilling, and other CULPABLE conduct as alleged herein, STUART was horrified at what he regarded as predatory behavior and an extortive threat to commit further acts of perjury, abuse of process, and manipulation regarding custody of STUART’s son if STUART did not “come current.”

826.   He was further extremely distressed that DOYNE then maintained a relationship with his Croix Stuart and Lynn Stuart as a therapist, and would inflict further harm or commit further facilitation of Ms. Stuart’s child abuse if STUART did not comply with DOYNE’s demand for a bribe.

827.   STUART refused to pay DOYNE further, but was horrified, traumatized, and severely distressed as a result of DOYNE’S behavior.

828.   Understanding that DOYNE remained as a witness in STUART’S family law matter, and based upon his past history of abuse of process, false testimony, and abuse of process, he could easily retaliate against STUART for any action he took regarding his conduct, STUART was intimidated, terrified, oppressed and under duress, prohibiting him from taking formal action on such conduct, constituting duress, fraud, and undue influence.

829.   STUART was also defrauded by DOYNE and BLANCHET as elsewhere alleged in understanding the nature and extent of the enterprise and conspiratorial relationships between DOYNE, DOYNE, INC. and BLANCHET, CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS, and each STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR, and their successive duress and undue influence also elsewhere alleged.

830.   As a result of such fraud, duress, undue influence, breach of fiduciary and other PROFESSIONAL DUTIES, STUART has been oppressed, deterred, and unwillingly delayed to initiate this Action until August 20, 2013.

Sharon Blanchet, Ashworth, Blanchet, Kristensen & Kalemkarian, Facing Racketeering Charges, Fraud, Extortion

Sharon Blanchet-Ringleader of Doyne, Fritz, Honest Services Fraud

San Diego Divorce Attorneys Conduct the Orchestra

Sadly, the ringleaders of the show are the divorce attorneys—those who have the closest relationship to the clients.  The sad fact is clients in divorce court are often not the sharpest tools in the shed.  Add to that blinding emotion, and you have easy targets for mediocre lawyers to send their kids to Berkley.  “It’s a reaper’s field for every Aesop’s fable you’ve ever heard.  This is what Sunday School was supposed to prepare you for.  Sadly, most people must not have been listening.”  Say Stuart.

“The solution is easier than most people realize.” Says Stuart. “But for some it’s tough.  It starts with a big dose of humility. We sow the seeds of our own destruction by enabling the deadly sins—avarice, pride, greed, animus—it sounds old fashioned but its even more relevant today.  If you come to divorce court with the intent of getting rich by duping someone, or ruining someone’s life, your evil motives are just as likely to destroy you.”   “Divorce litigants are blind to the costs of the process—they regularly pay thousands of dollars for some “control” victory.  If you’re the aggressor here, you’re the problem, and soon enough your problem will devour you.”  Say Stuart.  “Once you start with your own fallibility, you can forgive others–including your ex-spouse.  Once you forgive, you clear your head from much of the emotion, and can hopefully make better decisions by avoiding the deadly sins that lead to your demise, and divorce lawyer riches.”

Family Court Racketeering Suit Expands to Name San Diego City Attorney Jan Goldsmith for Use of City Prosecutors to Protect Local Divorce Industry Abuse

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The COALITION’S Amended Complaint Expands to Include Jan Goldsmith and Emily Garson for Prosecutorial Misconduct

January 9, 2014—San Diego, CA—Today California Coalition for Families and Children expands their Racketeering lawsuit in federal court to detail San Diego City Attorney Jan Goldsmith’s use of  City Attorney’s Office’s resources to prosecute critics of the divorce industry.  The federal complaint details Goldsmith’s and Assistant City Attorney Emily Garson’s misconduct in criminal proceedings against the Coalition and it’s President, Colbern Stuart, jailing him on false charges.

Assistant City Attorney Garson’s behavior is simply criminal-far beyond what prosecutors are permitted. The City’s own documents show she manufactured evidence and testimony.” Says Coalition President Colbern Stuart. Stuart was arrested while protesting with other parent members of the Coalition at an April, 2010 family law seminar hosted by the San Diego County Bar Association.

City Attorney Jan Goldsmith is a former Family Court judge, and his wife, Christine Goldsmith, is a sitting judge and Defendant in the Coalition lawsuit.  “Goldsmith’s prosecution of the case reeks of conflict of interest.  He staffed the case with a young prosecutor who apparently didn’t understand the depth of the illegal conduct she was being asked to perform. Obstruction of justice by a prosecutor is a serious felony—a clear and egregious violation of law and ethics rules.”  says Stuart. “There’s no excuse for such behavior. She’s breaking the law to protect ravenous divorce lawyers. It’s simply disgraceful.”

“At the very least, it shows extremely poor judgment, but more accurately widespread disregard for the law among those sworn to up hold the law in the City Attorney’s Office.  God save us when this egregious misconduct becomes tolerable behavior.”  says Stuart.

From the Amended Complaint:

 GROCH’S Order and GARSON’S numerous acts of punishment and prosecution of protected speech commentary against the City Attorney, and GARSON’S perjury and subornation of perjury constitute deprivations of STUART’S rights secured under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and related provisions of the Constitution of the State of California. Whether shielded from civil accountability or otherwise, the felonies represent a deplorable pattern of contempt of law. They are also RICO predicate crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) and (B), as detailed below.

GARSON lacked probable cause to initiate the People v. Stuart matter. Her sworn declarations as a complaining witness in doing so are crimes—felonies under federal law—several and severe. STUART has endured years in persecution as a result of such outrageous behavior. He re-appears today to redress those acts for himself and, he prays, thousands of others who have suffered similar and even more outrageous insults, violations, deprivations, and injuries under the indecency of those who today occupy offices of honor, yet who regularly debase those offices while driven by motives no one, perhaps not even they themselves, could honor.

That failure, combined with [The Commission on Judicial Performance’s] impotence to swiftly punish the same in deterrence, makes the act of entrusting a complaint to BATTSON and SIMI at outrageous risk of constitutional injury by county judicial officers behaving as a steerage-fare gallery of feckless petit-tyran, perversely immunized under the honor of patriots to indulge frolic, whimsy, and caprice. What shame a profession of reason today endures.

Under BATTSON and SIMI’S habituated tolerance for judicial misconduct, disregard of ethical canons and constitutional restrictions on abuse of authority, the mere act of identifying a litigant in an investigation subjects her to jeopardy by officer complained of or the officer’s colleagues acting in lockstep sympathy.

More at WeightierMatter.com

Federal District Court Denies San Diego Superior Court Judges’ Request for $10,000 Sanctions Against Parents; Grants Leave to Amend Complaint

December 23, 2013–San Diego, CA   United States District Court Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo granted and denied motions in the racketeering lawsuit brought by families against San Diego Superior Court judges and the California Commission on Judicial Performance.  The District Court’s ruling denied the Family Court judges’ request to sanction parents for filing the lawsuit, and denied their motion to dismiss the case entirely, giving Plaintiff permission to amend the Complaint to address the Family Court judges’ criticism of how the Complaint was pled.

Read More at WeightierMatter.com

San Diego Superior Court Counsel Kristine Nesthus, Assistant City Attorney Emily Garson Accused of Obstruction of Justice/Perjury in Ongoing Racketeering Litigation

CCFC Seeking Perjury Sanctions Against San Diego Superior Court Counsel Kristine Nesthus, City Attorney’s Office Assistant City Attorney Emily Garson for Obstruction of Justice, Perjury.

Coverage and pleading files now available at Weightier Matter.

San Diego Families File Opposition to Judges Request for $10,000 Sanctions Award

San Diego Families File Opposition to Judges Request for $10,000 Sanctions Award

From Weightier Matter: San Diego Parents Counter Judges Motion for Sanctions. Read the entire story at http://www.WeightierMatter.com

Courtesey of Weightier Matter:

December 5, 2013–SAN DIEGO–  Today San Diego families respond to Family Court judges and Presiding Judge Robert Trentacosta seeking $10,000 in sanctions from San Diego families for attempting to alert the court to fraud.

San Diego Family Court judges are asking a federal district court to force parents to pay over $10,000 to the court’s attorneys as punishment for filing a lawsuit in federal court.

Today CCFC filed its Opposition to the Judges motion, requesting that the Court deny the Judges’ motion and award sanctions against Judges Robert Trentacosta, Lorna Alksne, Lisa Schall, Joel Wohlfeil, and others, for playing “hard ball” with parents and children victims of Family Court.  “When we sued them, we expected them to file the ordinary–‘we didn’t do it’ response, but a demand that families pay $10,000 fine?  That’s a slap in the face.”   Says California Coalition for Families and Children President, Cole Stuart.  “These guys are over the top.”  Says Stuart.  From the Opposition:

Seeking Rule 11 sanctions concurrent with a motion in order to “leverage” the motion is prohibited—indeed itself sanctionable—litigation conduct.  Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F2d 479 (3rd Cir. 1987).   Sanctions are inappropriate where there exists legitimate controversy.   Committee Notes on Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 146 FRD 401, 590 (1993).  Simply “adding” a request for sanctions without addressing the Rule 11 certification issues is itself sanctionable conduct: “The use of Rule 11 … has become part of the so-called ‘hardball’ litigation techniques espoused by some firms and their clients. Those practitioners are cautioned that they invite retribution from courts which are far from enchanted with such abusive conduct.”  Gaiardo, supra at 485.

“We weren’t thrilled about bringing a lawsuit. Many parents who had been active members of the group have gone into hiding out of fear for reprisal. They still have cases before the Court, and will or years to come.  They’ve told us ‘good luck, we’re with you, but my kids are too important to risk.’  It’s a problem for reform–everyone knows its a disaster, but no one’s able to do anything about it because the judges have so much power and discretion.  They want parents to believe that complaining is a death sentence.”  Says Stuart.  Stuart was jailed last year for protesting Family Court judges at a San Diego County Bar Association meeting, precipitating this lawsuit.

San Diego Family Court judges asked the Court to award sanctions, claiming that the parents’ claims were “frivolous.”   “Frivolous means ‘it’s a piece of garbage’–no merit whatsoever.  In fifteen years practicing law I’ve seen only one court grant such a motion.  It’s heavy artillery for only the worst cases of litigation abuse–or when you really want to put the screws to someone who’s weaker than you.  Most lawyers won’t do it out of respect for their opponents.  I guess that sends us a message.  Clearly these judges are upset.”  Says Stuart.  The judges “double down” with two motions–both seeking serious sanctions.  From the Opposition:

Because The Superior Court has brought its Rule 11 attack on the very same grounds on which it brings the MTD, it effectively “doubles down” on the Motion to Dismiss.  In this case, Plaintiff has opposed the MTD with a Motion to Strike (Dkt#19) and Opposition (Dkt#21) asserting the MTD is meritless and attempting improper procedure.  Where a moving party brings a Rule 11 motion on the same grounds as an affirmative motion, yet fails on the underlying affirmative motion, it cannot be heard to claim that its Rule 11 Motion was filed in good faith—losing the underlying motion is at least prima facia evidence that a concurrently-filed Rule 11 Motion on the same grounds is impermissible “hard ball” attempt to leverage a “debatable” (or in this case meritless) motion.  Gaiardosupra.  Thus, should the Court deny the MTD, counter-sanctions to the Rule 11 Motion for impermissibly bringing the Rule 11 on “debatable” (indeed meritless) grounds are warranted.  By aggressively posing a quick-trigger Rule 11 Motion on top of a meritless Motion to Dismiss, Defendants have stacked their chips quite high.

The judges’ motion claims that they do not collaborate with other entities such as the San Diego Family Justice Center, or the court-appointed psychologists that CCFC also sued.  The judges claim the filing of the motion was “harassment.”

“Yes, we’re claiming that they committed crimes in bilking parents out of their children’s college savings. Yes, that’s serious. But we have proof that they work closely with the unethical divorce lawyers to orchestrate fraud, and we have a right to present that case to a jury.  And not only do they now want to pass the buck, they want to shoot the messenger with a $10,000 fine.”

Some highlights from CCFC’s Motion:

Claims Are Presented to Remedy Injury and Effect Reform–Not to Harass, Delay, Increase Costs, or Other Improper Purpose (Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(1))

The claims of the Complaint are presented not to “harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation” —but to remedy independent injury caused during the course of Plaintiff’s reform efforts, and to cure the systemic affliction which Defendants have proven incapable or unwilling to cure for themselves.  CCFC and the parent community it supports have undertaken extensive efforts prefacing the filing of this lawsuit to effect reform by other means—but such efforts have been unsuccessful, and at times met with violent resistance by present Defendants and their cohorts.  See, Compl. ¶¶124-136; August 20, 2013 Press Release, Stuart Decl. Ex. “A”.  The injury precipitating the STUART ASSAULT and this lawsuit was orchestrated by Defendants precisely to frustrate Plaintiffs’ efforts while engaged in such reform.  Litigation is not a preferred choice, but as with many civil rights struggles in our nation’s history—federal courts are a uniquely appropriate and often the last recourse to defending the interests of an afflicted minority.  Given Defendants’ tactics of abusing color of law police power to silence Plaintiffs’ efforts, remedy for injuries thereby caused are appropriate and uniquely available in this forum.

The Superior Court claims that the inclusion of home addresses of certain Defendants in the Complaint had “no ostensible purpose other than harassment.”  Rule 11 Motion 7:12-14.  This is a misstatement of fact and law.  Averment of where an individual defendant “resides” or “may be found” is an entirely ordinary and required means to establish jurisdiction and venue within a federal district.  28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).  In compliance with this requirement, the Complaint avers the residence address of Defendants Schall, Trentacosta, and Wohlfeil as they were readily available from phone books, online records, online skip-trace searches, or other public resources.  No private records were disclosed.  The practice of averring residence or location of individual defendants to establish jurisdiction and venue is not prohibited by any rule, order, or law—it is required by such.  Plaintiff’s compliance with law and unremarkable practice in doing so in this action is permissible, entirely ordinary, and has obvious appropriate “purpose other than harassment.”

The Superior Court also incorrectly alleges that Plaintiffs “refused to take any steps to correct their violation.”  This assertion is a stunning and demonstrable falsehood.  The Court’s files reflect that as a courtesy to defendant’s bellicose demands that Plaintiff “remove all addresses from the Internet and Court files”, Plaintiffs promptly undertook steps to redact home addresses from the Complaint, removed the unredacted Complaint from it’s publicly-accessible web servers, coordinated the removal of the same from third party servers, and re-filed a redacted version of the Complaint with this Court.  Redacted Complaint, Dkt#8; Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Harassment Restraining Order, Dkt#4.

The remaining allegations of “harassment” motive in the Rule 11 Motion (Rule 11 at 7:17-8:10) do not support The Superior Court’s claim that the Complaint was filed to harass.  The number of times the Complaint had been viewed on the Internet, that the Complaint also included home addresses of other Defendants which have not objected and are not represented by The Superior Court or its counsel, and this Court’s courteous, yet not required, sealing of the original and redacted Complaints—to which no plaintiff objects—are not consistent with an intent to harass—they are the ordinary and expected behavior of civil rights plaintiffs publicizing their efforts to a nationwide community of similarly-situated domestic dispute industry professionals and victim-litigants closely watching this case as an augur of the future of reform.  Further, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant’s post-filing “take-down” demands—coerced by threats of San Diego County Sheriff’s Department Detectives acting without warrant or probable cause—to remove the Complaint from public locations are legally indefensible, and themselves constitute further illegal deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights of free speech and access to courts which will be redressed in due course.  Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s claim that such “take down” activity was illegal and indeed reprehensible state censorship, Plaintiff undertook substantial efforts to accommodate Defendants’ less-than-courteous demands.  See Ex Parte Motion for Emergency Harassment Restraining Order, Dkt#4.

Defendant has not shown a motive of intent to harass sufficient to establish a violation of certification under Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(1), and as such its Motion may be Denied.

The judges accuse CCFC of seeking a change in the law, CCFC responded “We only want you to enforce the law as its written–not as you think it should be.”

The Complaint Seeks No Change, but Enforcement of Law (Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(2))

The Complaint certainly asserts that a change in family law as practiced is in immediate order—but only to conform that practice with existing and longstanding principles of state and federal laws—commercial, health and welfare, and constitutional standards which are flagrantly disregarded by institutionalized Domestic Dispute Industry public and private interests.  To the extent that State laws and practice are inconsistent with federal law, the Complaint properly and in good faith prays for declaratory and prospective relief to conform or invalidate those inconsistent laws and practices.  Should Plaintiffs’ seeking enforcement of the fundamental liberties of some of our most vulnerable citizens be viewed as “harassment” or “bad faith” by present defendants, the proper judgment day for that proposition may and should await the presence of a trier of fact rather than be quelled by improper use of Rule 11 hardball.  See, e.g.,   Plaintiff, and millions of parents and children nationwide, eagerly await that day.

The judges claim that CCFC–dozens of parents, children, professionals, and people who have been around family courts for years-have “no adequate basis in fact” for making the claims of the lawsuit.  CCFC responds:

           Evidentiary Foundation of Plaintiff’s Claims (Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(3)

[CCFC] has conducted extensive investigation and research into each of the factual and legal allegations of the Complaint over a period of many years.  The allegations of the Complaint are not created by a lawyer interpreting a client’s experience—therefore giving rise to the typical Rule 11 “duty to investigate” factual foundations of the client’s claims.  Here, the pro se Plaintiff is the client and witness.  Almost all of the facts in the Complaint are given on personal and professional knowledge and experience.  This experience includes seventeen years practicing law in the States of California, Nevada, and Arizona since 1995, 96, and 97, respectively, and federal districts therein.  Plaintiff’s experience includes litigation, trial, mediation, and arbitration of dozens of matters for a variety of clients, including federal civil rights, commercial fraud, legal malpractice, and similar state-court matters.  Though Plaintiff is not a divorce lawyer, he is familiar with California state practice and procedure generally applicable in all California Superior Courts through seventeen years of litigation experience.

Through his personal experience with his own dissolution litigation and in assisting dozens of similarly-situated parents enduring modern family court malfeasance, fraud, and abuse, he has become an informed observer of family court practices at several levels.  He founded Plaintiff California Coalition for Families and Children to address those common concerns and provide a vehicle for domestic dispute industry reform, education, and engagement toward those ends.  Stuart Decl.   This experience, activism, scholarship, research, and personal observation is described at ¶¶ 71-75, 77-99, 100-101, 110, 113-123.

This case is unusual in that few facts in this case will be in legitimate dispute—Plaintiff accuses widely-known, and increasingly widely despised, practices of public institutions and private industry cohorts.  Except perhaps for an answer to the question “why has such illegal conduct been tolerated for so long?” few legitimate factual issues will arise.

The Family Court judges also attacked CCFC’s claim based on a “conspiracy”–CCFC responded simply “”It seems like they’re expecting that we have to prove a ‘grassy knoll’ CIA compact with the Devil theory.  That’s simply not necessary.  A conspiracy is simply an agreement to do an act that constitutes a crime.  In the case of Family Court–much of the entire operation is a crime, so proving agreement will be as easy as asking to see their pay stubs.”  Say Stuart.  “If you work there-you’re raping families and children. That’s a crime. End of story.”

A conspiracy is an agreement to commit a crime.   Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 1999).  The conspiracy allegations of the Complaint need no creative mind to understand.  A simple walk through defendants own downstairs administrative operations—the Family Law Facilitator Offices (DDI-IACE) which counsels and facilitates illegal DVILS ORDERS, paperwork, and enforcement (Compl. Ex. 1 and Exs. A, B thereto);  an illegal psychology enterprise (DDI-FICE) populated by fraudulent “forensic psychologists”; to the legal communities which they participate in—the San Diego County Bar Association and it’s “Family Law Subsection” (Compl. ¶¶4, 275, Ex. 2) and the “Family Law Community” it serves (Compl. ¶¶71-73, 275-280, 320); to the federally-funded quasi-public “technical support” and leadership corporations it collaborates with on family law policy and operations levels—the San Diego Family Justice Center and National Family Justice Center Alliance (Compl. ¶¶262, 318, RICO Enterprises 2, 3, 4; Compl. Ex. 1); and to its leadership operations of Co-Defendants Judicial Council and Administrative Office of the Courts (Compl. ¶¶10, 13-16; Quest for Justice, infra.).  An insightful public account of the history, evolution, and independent control and operation of these entities is recently available from former California Supreme Court Chief Justice and Chairperson of Defendants AOC and Judicial Counsel Ronald M. George, entitled ChiefThe Quest for Justice in California (2013).[1]  Chief Justice George explicitly details how these defendants have established themselves to be free from the “micromanagement” of legislators, who “don’t understand” how to administer justice. Id. at 453-454.  For theater fans, A feature-length documentary entitled “DivorceCorp” (www.divorcecorp.com) to be released nationwide on January 10, 2014 graphically describes the Domestic Dispute Industry Criminal Enterprise detailed in the Complaint.  The Divorce Industry, it seems, is enjoying a new day in the sun.[2]

Defendants no doubt will assert that the accused operations, though highly coordinated, are not illegal.  Plaintiff will be prepared to present that case to a trier of fact at the appropriate time.  For purposes of the Complaint, however, the above allegations of coordinated action to accomplish an allegedly illegal purpose satisfy any relevant pleading standard for pleading “conspiracy.”


[1] Supportive details describing the operation of these entities in collaboration with their enterprise co-defendants is located at pp. 303-318, 380-81, Chapter 14, pp. 448-459, 622-624, 660-665, 752-785.

[2] “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67, (1976); L. Tarango Trucking v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 202 F.R.D. 614, 620 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Fair Political Practices Com. v. Suitt, 90 Cal. App. 3d 125, 132, 153 Cal. Rptr. 311, 316 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Original publication: L. Brandeis, Other People’s Money at 62 (National Home Library Foundation ed.  1933)

CCFC explained to the District Court that they were a parents’ organization run by volunteers and donations–and that the judges’ requesting a sanction of $10,000 would demolish their organization.  “Not only do they want us to go away, they want to teach us a lesson for bringing up the point at all.  These are judges–bullying parents and kids who’ve been beaten already been beaten up by Family Court.  And they say ‘Didn’t like that? Perfect, here’s some more trouble and humiliation.”

Any award of sanctions must evaluate a sanctioned party’s ability to pay.  Christian v. Mattel, Inc. (9th Cir. 2002) 286 F3d 1118, 1125, fn. 4.  Rule 11 sanctions should not be used to chill creative advocacy, or legitimate causes asserted in good faith.  See, e.g.Chase v. Auerbach, 1994 WL 590588, *2 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 26, 1994) (rejecting the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions on a litigant for advancing a novel legal theory in attempting to move an action to federal court to consolidate case with another pending case); Committee Notes on Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 146 FRD 401, 587 (1993) (explaining that replacing the 1983 version of the rule’s standard of “good faith” with the 1993 term “nonfrivilous” was not intended to raise the bar on “creative advocacy” brought in good faith which might be “chilled” by a higher standard).

Though Plaintiffs vigorously deny that sanctions against Plaintiff are appropriate and assert precisely the opposite request for relief, any sanction award against plaintiffs in this case would be unjust.  Plaintiffs are a public benefit corporation and their members and advocates which, in the course of attempts to facilitate the reform of voracious criminal enterprises, have fallen victims to the illegal tactics of those very enterprises.  Stuart Decl. ¶¶.  It would be difficult to exaggerate the devastating impact of Defendants’ illegal activities on the resources available to Plaintiffs to continue their reform efforts, including this litigation.  CCFC is not a commercial operation—it has no revenue other than donations and the generous goodwill of many dedicated volunteers.  It is a community of victims of these very defendants’ heinous acts of fraud and abuse, who have formed to recover their losses, but more importantly to prevent that same harm from befalling others unaware of the maze of horrors that awaits them once they step behind Defendants’ doors.  Stuart Decl. ¶¶X.

The Complaint details Plaintiffs’ efforts in seeking attention and assistance to remedy and reform an industry few deny to be a notorious dystopia, yet almost none have the  knowledge, concern, or courage required to attend.  Government agencies, politicians, and the commercial and pro bono legal community have universally respond “yes, it’s a mess, but we don’t know how to fix it.”  Present Defendants have responded with offers to absorb even more resources in wastefully returning to the lawless maze of family court, or more often responded not at all. Stuart Decl.

As the intended benefactors of that dystopia—parents and children—who’ve instead of benefiting from that system have fallen victim to it, we have valuable input of what is wrong and how to fix it.  Yet Plaintiffs’ wealth of experience, knowledge, and suggestions is not equaled by a wealth of material resources to implement them.   Like most family court litigants, CCFC members left family courts with little more than harrowing nightmares and a very bitter taste in their mouths which, though highly motivating, are accompanied by a debilitating fear of further legal reprisal or financial victimization by the very defendants present here.  By anticompetitive means—including the violent means deployed against Plaintiffs detailed in the Complaint—Defendants have effectively monopolized or blockaded all venues for effecting reform through state-level machinery—courts, judges, lawyers, bureaucrats, and psychologists collaborate to police a poisonous toll-based maze they themselves built which outrageously extracts wealth from unsuspecting families by artifice, trick, and deceit.  Stuart Decl.

That wealth and power, initially earned by the honest hands and brows of parents working to provide for their children, has by trick and device been converted into the hands of some of San Diego’s strongest law firms, hired to defend the schemes that pay their bills—and today returns to a new scene to use impermissible “hardball” Rule 11 litigation tactics pick those pockets yet again, by means of new rules in a new courthouse.  Plaintiff prays for a new awakening to a new, healthier day for plaintiffs and defendants alike.  “If we desire respect for the law, then we must first make the law respectable.”  L. Brandeis, Other People’s Money (National Home Library Foundation ed. 1933).

Any award of sanctions against Plaintiffs in this case would only further the perpetration of what will be proven to be a shameful and fraudulent abuse of knowledge of public processes and institutions, public police power, and tainted wealth by those operating under a public license, oath, and duty to protect those in their care.  Sanctions would be an affront not only to a meager pocketbook, but to the courage, dignity, and public spirit of parents and children nationwide, who having no recourse to defenders such as those they face, have barely the means to defend themselves.  A sanction against these Plaintiffs in this action would be a sanction against equal justice itself.

                                                                                                                                  Conclusion

The Superior Court’s Rule 11 Motion is almost entirely unwarranted by existing law, structurally incomprehensible, and wildly off-target.  It impermissibly seeks relief for Co-Defendants not present in the Motion, argues their case but not its own, pleads to the wrong legal standards and only summarily acknowledges the correct ones, and is infected with the same meritless arguments of the MTD and inadmissible, impertinent, and scandalous evidence that work is based upon. The Rule 11 Motion is itself an inappropriate litigation “hard ball” double down tactic by those intimately familiar with such schemes and tools of prevailing in high-stakes litigation games, making sanctions against The Superior Court for its unfaithful litigation conduct in the present Motion appropriate.  The Superior Court has chosen the stakes of the table it sits at.  It should not be permitted to walk away from the accounting.

The hearing on the judges’ Motion for Sanctions is scheduled for December 19, 2013, in United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

Judges Seek Dismissal of Racketeering Lawsuit–CCFC Responds to Judges’ Motion: “A clearer case of bad faith litigation conduct would be difficult to make.”

Judge Michael Groch and Family Justice Center Alliance members disclaim any collaboration

Judge Michael Groch and Family Justice Center Alliance members deny collaboration.

“It was recognized that certain members of the judiciary were instruments of oppression and were partially responsible for the wrongs to be remedied. The parade of cases coming to this Court shows that a similar condition now obtains in some of the States. Some state courts have been instruments of suppression of civil rights. The methods may have changed; the means may have become more subtle; but the wrong to be remedied still exists.”

–         Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)

Maybe some things really never change.

It’s a good thing one of them is truth.  And we’ve been up to no good lately pointing that out to, well, judges who can’t seem to fish it out of a “bucket of mud.”

We’re here to help. In their recently filed motion to dismiss CCFC’s federal racketeering lawsuit, judges Robert Trentacosta, Lisa Schall, Lorna Alksne, Christine Goldsmith, Jeannie Lowe, William McAdam, Edlene McKenzie, and Joel Wohlfeil disclaim any association, affiliation, or support with the San Diego Family Law Community–including the County Bar, the Family Law Subsection, the City of San Diego’s in-house domestic dispute advocacy program-the San Diego Family Justice Center, the Family Law Facilitator’s Offices, or the court’s own in-house trained, supervised, and appointed psychological evaluator enterprise, including Stephen Doyne, Lori Love, and Robert Simon.  “No affiliation whatsoever” the judges’ lawyers Mattew Green and James Gilpin of Best, Best & Krieger claim.

We responded on Friday November 8, 2013 with an Opposition and motion to strike of our own, and exhibits in support.

Some highlights below.

The Superior Court’s “move along nothing here to see” command came in the form of a motion to dismiss CCFC’s federal lawsuit alleging Racketeering and civil rights crimes against hundreds of thousands of county residents.

Great minds at work here–perhaps our county’s most proclaimed jurists. What legal rationale did they use to ask the District Court to throw the lawsuit out?

“It’s a bucket of mud”

“Defendants, with some prolixity, assail the Complaint as “incomprehensible rambling” (MTD 1, 10:2), “of the magnitude of War and Peace” (MTD 2), “bucket of mud,” “sprawling,” “incomprehensible,” “confusing, distracting, ambiguous, and unintelligible” (MTD 9), “confusing and conclusory” (MTD 10), and that a reader must “try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud[,]”.  Yet the Complaint’s length and complexity cannot be accused as a defect of pleading; the statutes it is brought under are notoriously complex and perhaps confusing even to the accomplished jurists present in this litigation. ”

“One civil rights conspiracy statute asserted, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1), (2), and (3) is drafted as a single sentence of 590 words in six paragraphs. It has been generously assailed by Justice John Paul Stevens as “somewhat difficult to parse.” Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724, 103 S. Ct. 1483, 1486, 75 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1983).  RICO too has been bewailed as “arcane,” “tormented,” “complicated,” “agonizingly difficult” and “fraught with arcane mysteries.” Bryant v. Yellow Freight Sys., 989 F. Supp. 966, 968 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Macy’s E., Inc. v. Emergency Envtl. Servs., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“arcane eccentricities of RICO jurisprudence”); Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 677 (4th Cir. 1989) (a “tormented statute”); Sadighi v. Daghighfekr, 36 F. Supp. 2d 267 (D.S.C. 1999) (noting statute’s “torment”); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 465 (1990); Cent. Distribs. of Beer [,] Inc. v. Conn., 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir. 1993) (“one of the most complex statutes ever enacted by Congress”); Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1435 (7th Cir. 1990) (“a complex statute”); Murray v. Midwest Real Estate Inv. Co., No. 98C1569, 1998 WL 919694, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1998) (“exceedingly complicated”).

Without doubt, the asserted statutes are complex—honed power tools to enable citizens to combat collusion by public and private officers wielding the devastating potential of state police power and private wealth to leverage racketeering and civil rights crimes.”

If that doesn’t work, they have a fall-back:

“We’re judges–we’re immune from these charges!”

Well, since they think that’s the case, it certainly explains a lot, but sorry to say the United States Congress and United States Supreme Court disagree:

“Like the complex criminal enterprises RICO and the civil rights statutes are intended to extinguish, the Complaint is by design complex.  The “heavy artillery of federal law” RICO mechanisms are targeted to combat only complex organizations.  United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 800 (9th Cir. 1999)). The statement of findings that prefaces the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 reveals that Congress enacted RICO to redress “a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America’s economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption” using “social exploitation” deriving “money and power . . . increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business . . . and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes.” The breadth of the “organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation’s economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens.” Congress intended RICO to supplement state laws under which “organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact. 84 Stat. 922–923.” U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-89 (1981). ”

“Four decades of caselaw have confirmed Congress’ intent that RICO is not targeted toward mom-n-pop backroom scams, but to inoculate erstwhile legitimate enterprises, including unions, public corporations, mass market retailers, and public institutions such as law enforcement, political office, and the courts—including one case identifying Defendant San Diego Superior Court itself.  See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 243, 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2903, 106 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1989) (telecommunications corporations); Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 260, 114 S. Ct. 798, 805, 127 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1994) (civil rights organizations); Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 546 (9th Cir. 2007) (Microsoft Corporation and Best Buy software retailing operations); Vierria v. California Highway Patrol, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1240 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 30 F. Supp. 2d 673, 694 (D. Del. 1998); U.S. v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1981) (civil courts); United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793 (1999) (the “San Diego Superior Court”).”

Other judges agree:

“It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery.”

– Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)

“This Court has never suggested that the policy considerations which compel civil immunity for certain governmental officials also place them beyond the reach of the criminal law. Even judges, cloaked with absolute civil immunity for centuries, could be punished criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional rights on the strength of 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal analog of § 1983.”

– Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976)

And it’s not just judges that want to be excused from criminal behavior, they say also their staff.

“Our Court Executive Officer, Michael Roddy, is just like a judge, so he doesn’t have to follow the law either.”

CCFC Responds:

“Defendant RODDY claims quasi-judicial immunity (MTD IV.E), yet such a defense is clearly unavailable. RODDY is an administrator, not a judicial official, and the allegations of the Complaint do not allege any acts by RODDY requiring judicial discretion, application of facts to law, or acts intimately involved with the judicial process. Whatever Mr. Roddy’s general responsibilities as an administrator of the Superior Court operations may be, the Complaint alleges his responsibility for a private commercial forensic psychology enterprise and the family law facilitator, domestic violence clinics and paperwork, and related court operations.  Compl. ¶¶ 11, 12, 23, 94, 96, 140, 275, 281, 318, Count 5, ENTERPRISES 1-4.  These are not “tasks [which] are an essential part of the operation of the courts and the judicial process.” (MTD 12:9).  See, Forrester, Antoine, Zolin, supra; Pomerantz v. County of Los Angeles, 674 F.2d 1288, 1291 (9th Cir.1982).  To the extent that RODDY’S “precise acts” accused in the Complaint are within RODDY’S job description, they are administrative functions, possibly authorized, and therefore possibly eligible for a qualified immunity not relevant at this stage. ”

The Complaint also names the Family Justice Center, The County of San Diego, the Family Law Facilitator’s Offices, and the Administrative Office of the Courts, for collaborating with the judges themselves in illegal activity. The judge’s response?

“We’re not related” “Completely independent”

We found otherwise:

“To plead to these statutes, the Complaint must detail the complex and diverse duties, acts, and enterprises harming plaintiffs and impacting a wide class of U.S. citizens numbering in the millions.  The Complaint asserts 32 distinct civil causes of action and 32 related indictable federal felonies, 27 categories of “predicate crimes” and 13 RICO Claims for Relief, based on seven “Schemes and Artifices to Defraud” under nine federal mail, wire, bank, and honest services fraud criminal statutes, including related obstruction of justice, and witness tampering and retaliation.  It asserts two counts for prospective relief including a Motion for a Harassment Restraining Order and requests to enjoin enforcement of an entire body of unconstitutional family and criminal law.  The Complaint names 49 distinct public and private entities comprising a nationwide Domestic Dispute Industry Criminal Enterprise (“DDICE”). Even counsel experienced in this rapidly-evolving body of federal civil and criminal law would be understandably paused to comprehend the Complaint’s necessary depth and complexity.”

“It is no fault of Defendants that, despite their relative acumen in the law, they did not immediately grasp the gravity of the statutes posed against them.  Their refusal to pause to comprehend that message before insulting its messenger is far less innocent.”

“But WE didn’t DO anything! Blame someone else!”

Judges consistently deny any responsibility for the treachery of divorce lawyers, psychologists, and others, claiming they “see nothing!”  Is that an excuse?  According to one of our nation’s most respected legal minds–clearly “no.”  Judge Richard Posner from the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit has explained that when a government actor places a citizen in harms way such as, for example, ordering them to purchase the services of a fraudulent psychologist, or requiring them to hire unethical lawyers to access courts, they are just as liable as a tortfeasor who caused the harm.  Judge Posner writes:

“We do not want to pretend that the line between action and inaction, between inflicting and failing to prevent the infliction of harm, is clearer than it is. If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit.”

If one factor is uniform in a continuing series of events that are brought to pass through human intervention, the law would have to have the blindness of indifference rather than the blindness of impartiality not to attribute the uniform factor to man’s purpose. The purpose may not be of evil intent or in conscious disregard of what is conceived to be a binding duty. Prohibited conduct may result from misconception of what duty requires.”
–  Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 293 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)

“The Complaint ignores the Rules–Throw it out!”

Family Court judges attacked the Complaint for failing to follow the rules of civil procedure. They brought a motion, but their motion itself cited law that didn’t apply to the very motion they brought.  They filed fraudlent declarations as if they were presumed to be true.  They submitted evidence given on perjury from another Family Court operative.  I guess they’re accustomed to having their way–law be damned.  Most lawyers would be embarrassed to file papers so off base.  But who wants a reputation as an intelligent lawyer in Family Court when that’s exactly the sort of behavior gets you thrown in jail?

CCFC’s Response:

“[Family Court] Defendants have attempted to introduce immaterial, impertinent, controversial, scandalous, and inadmissible evidence in support of a motion that cannot weigh evidence.  They have submitted a perjurous declaration and foundationless, incomplete, and potentially fraudulent documents—via a request for judicial notice.  They have misunderstood and misrepresented “capacity” and “standing” under both state and federal law. The have requested the wrong relief under the wrong authority. They have refused Plaintiff’s efforts toward informal resolution by withdrawal of the errant pleadings and exhibits, and refused stipulations to resolve pleading matters which are properly and regularly resolved by leave to amend, forcing unnecessary pleading in opposition.”

“Given the lack of merit to the MTD, Plaintiff submits that the MTD was filed to continue the pattern of HARRASSMENT and ABUSE, to cause unnecessary delay, and needlessly increase the litigation costs to Plaintiffs—a pattern identified in the Complaint as HARRASSMENT and ABUSE and demonstrated to be ongoing in the Ex Parte Application for Leave to File a Motion for Harassment Restraining Order (Dkt#4).  Plaintiffs are a parents and children rights and support organization and their advocates who have fallen victim to defendants—an insubordinated Domestic Dispute Industry preying on parents and children through abuse of public resources by private criminal enterprises detailed in the Complaint.  The MTD is but the latest in what will be proven to be a grotesque and shameful abuse of state law police power and color of law authority.”

“A clearer case for failure to reasonably investigate claims and avoidance of bad faith litigation conduct, harassment, delay, and unreasonable inquiry sanctions would be difficult to make.”

“Honor and shame from no condition rise.
Act well your part: there all the honor lies.”
– Alexander Pope

The Family Court judges’ legacy lies before them. Will it be shame through defeat, shame through victory, or honor through obedience to the trust that binds us all?

Our November 22 hearing has been continued to December 19, 2013.   We’ll keep you posted.

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