

1 Colbern C. Stuart III  
EMail: Cole.Stuart@Lexevia.com  
2 4891 Pacific Highway Ste. 102  
San Diego, CA 92110  
3 Telephone: 858-504-0171  
Facsimile: 619-231-9143

4 Dean Browning Webb (pro hac vice pending)  
5 Email: ricoman1968@aol.com  
Law Offices of Dean Browning Webb  
6 515 E 39th St.  
Vancouver, WA 98663-2240  
7 Telephone: 503-629-2176

8 Attorney for Plaintiffs California Coalition for Families and Children, Inc. and  
Lexevia, PC  
9

10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
12

13 CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR  
FAMILIES AND CHILDREN., a  
14 Delaware Corporation, LEXEVIA, PC,  
a California Professional Corporation,  
15 and COLBERN C. STUART, an  
individual,

16 Plaintiffs,

17  
18 vs.  
19

20 SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR  
ASSOCIATION, a California  
21 Corporation; SAN DIEGO COUNTY  
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, a  
22 municipal entity; WILLIAM D. GORE,  
an individual, COUNTY OF SAN  
23 DIEGO, a municipal entity;  
SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO  
24 COUNTY, a municipal entity;  
ROBERT J. TRENTACOSTSA, an  
25 individual; MICHAEL RODDY, an  
individual; JUDICIAL COUNCIL, a  
26 municipal entity; ADMINISTRATIVE  
OFFICE OF THE COURTS, a  
27 municipal entity; TANI G. CANTIL-  
SAKAUYE, an individual;  
28 COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL

Case No. 13cv1944 CAB (BLM)

**REDACTED VERIFIED COMPLAINT  
FOR**

1. VIOLATIONS OF THE CIVIL  
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§  
1983, 1985, 1986);

2. RACKETEERING AND CORRUPT  
ORGANIZATIONS ACT OF 1970 (18  
U.S.C. § 1962);

3. DELARATORY JUDGMENT (28  
U.S.C. § 2201);

3. FALSE ADVERTISING (15 U.S.C. §  
1125);

**4. MOTION FOR HARASSMENT  
PROTECTIVE ORDER (18 U.S.C. §  
1514(b))**

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

COMPLAINT

1 PERFORMANCE, a municipal entity;  
LAWRENCE J. SIMI, an individual;  
2 BRAD BATSON, an individual;  
NATIONAL FAMILY JUSTICE  
3 CENTER ALLIANCE, a California  
Corporation; LISA SCHALL, an  
4 individual; LORNA ALKSNE, an  
individual; OFF DUTY OFFICERS,  
5 INC., a business entity of unknown  
form; CHRISTINE GOLDSMITH, an  
6 individual; JEANNIE LOWE, an  
individual; WILLIAM MCADAM, an  
7 individual; EDLENE MCKENZIE, an  
individual; JOEL WOHLFEIL, an  
8 individual; CAROLE BALDWIN, an  
individual; LAURY BALDWIN, an  
9 individual; BALDWIN AND  
BALDIWN, a California professional  
10 corporation; LARRY CORRIGAN, an  
individual; WILLIAM  
11 HARGRAEVES, an individual;  
HARGRAEVES & TAYLOR, PC, a  
12 California Professional Corporation;  
TERRY CHUCAS, an individual;  
13 MERIDITH LEVIN, an individual;  
ALLEN SLATTERY, INC., a  
14 California Corporation, a Corporation;  
JANIS STOCKS, an individual;  
15 STOCKS & COLBURN, a California  
professional corporation; DR.  
16 STEPHEN DOYNE, an individual;  
DR. STEPHEN DOYNE, INC., a  
17 professional corporation; SUSAN  
GRIFFIN, an individual; DR. LORI  
18 LOVE, an individual; LOVE AND  
ALVAREZ PSYCHOLOGY, INC., a  
19 California corporation; ROBERT A.  
SIMON, PH.D, an individual;  
20 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF  
FORENSIC EXAMINERS  
21 INSTITUTE, a business entity of  
unknown form; ROBERT O'BLOCK,  
22 an individual; LORI CLARK  
VIVIANO, an individual; LAW  
23 OFFICES OF LORI CLARK  
VIVIANO, a business entity of  
24 unknown form; SHARON  
BLANCHET, an individual;  
25 ASHWORTH, BLANCHET,  
KRISTENSEN, &  
26 KALEMENKARIAN, a California  
Professional Corporation; MARILYN  
27 BIERER, an individual; BIERER AND  
ASSOCIATES, a California  
28 Professional Corporation; JEFFREY

COMPLAINT

1 FRITZ, an individual; BASIE AND  
2 FRITZ, a professional corporation,

3 Defendants.

4  
5 Plaintiffs, California Coalition for Families and Children, Inc., Lexevia, PC,  
6 and Colbern C. Stuart allege as follows:

7  
8 **I. JURISDICTION**

9 1. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the following statutes:

10 A. Federal Question Jurisdiction: Title 28 United States Code § 1331;

11 B. Federal Regulation of Commerce Jurisdiction: Title 28 United States Code §  
12 1337;

13 C. Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction: Title 28 U.S.C. 1367(a);

14 D. Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1946: Title 28 United States Code §§  
15 2201-2202;

16 E. Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction: Title 28 United States Code §§ 1367(a)-  
17 (b);

18 F. Section 1964(a) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of  
19 1970 (“RICO”) Title 18 United States Code §§ 1964(a), (b), (c), and (d);

20 G. RICO 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a), (b), and (d); and

21 H. Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and

22 I. The general legal and equitable powers of this Court.  
23

24 2. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) as one or more Defendants are  
25 located or reside in this District, and a substantial part of the events and omissions  
26 giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this District.  
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COMPLAINT

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2 **II. PARTIES**

3 3. Plaintiff Colbern C. Stuart III (STUART) is a citizen of the United States and  
4 at all times relevant hereto a citizen of the state of California, an attorney at law  
5 licensed and admitted to practice in the states of California, Arizona, and Nevada, and  
6 certain United States District Courts therein, President and CEO of Plaintiffs CCFC  
7 and LEXEVIA, and residing and doing business in this District.  
8

9 4. Defendant San Diego County Bar Association (SDCBA) is a corporation  
10 organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, doing business in  
11 this District as an association to support, facilitate, and coordinate the San Diego  
12 County legal industry. “The SDCBA is the region's oldest and largest law-related  
13 organization. The voice for San Diego's diverse legal community, the SDCBA aims  
14 to support and inform the county's lawyers, but also the public and the community.  
15 Programs help clients find qualified lawyers, resolve disputes and educate San  
16 Diegans on their legal rights and responsibilities. The SDCBA, which encompasses  
17 50 unique sections, committees and divisions, strives to provide members with  
18 knowledge and tools to expand and enrich their practices. From over 300 hours of  
19 quality continuing legal education each year, award winning publications, mentor  
20 programs and networking opportunities, to discounted pricing on insurance, office  
21 supplies and more, the SDCBA is dedicated to serving San Diego's lawyers.”  
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27 5. Defendant San Diego County Sherriff’s Department (SDSD) is a division of  
28 the municipality, the County of San Diego. “The San Diego County Sheriff’s

1 Department is the chief law enforcement agency in San Diego County. The  
2 department is comprised of approximately 4,000 employees, both sworn officers and  
3 professional support staff. The department provides general law enforcement,  
4 detention and court services for the people of San Diego County in a service area of  
5 approximately 4,200 square miles. In addition, the department provides specialized  
6 regional services to the entire county, including the incorporated cities and the  
7 unincorporated areas of the county.” The SDSD provides “court security and related  
8 services for the San Diego Superior Court at several locations throughout the  
9 county.”

13 6. Defendant William D. Gore (GORE) is the Sherriff of San Diego County.  
14 GORE is “elected by the residents of San Diego County, is the chief executive of the  
15 department. He manages seven major detention facilities as well as eight major patrol  
16 stations, four patrol substations, a crime laboratory and an array of support operations  
17 necessary to provide full law enforcement coverage for the County of San Diego.”  
18 GORE is sued in his individual and official capacities.

21 7. In such capacities GORE oversees, administers, prepares, and implements all  
22 policies, practices, procedures, and operations of all SDSD facilities, including  
23 policies and procedures regarding “court security and related services,” including  
24 judicial staff and facilities security policies, practices, procedures and operations  
25 complained of herein.  
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1 8. Defendant County of San Diego is a municipal entity existing within and doing  
2 business as the County of San Diego within this District. The County operates the  
3 facilities and certain services at nine San Diego County courthouses; creates and  
4 implements policies, customs, and practices administered by County judicial officers,  
5 administrators, and staff; provides professional legal services and advice to the  
6 citizens of San Diego County, including services related to the practice of ‘family  
7 law’—divorce and paternity, custody and visitation, child support, domestic violence,  
8 restraining orders, self-help services, frequently asked questions, form selection and  
9 advice, and public information regarding court fees, rules, locations, calendars, and  
10 proceedings.  
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14 9. Defendant Superior Court San Diego County (SCSDC) is municipal entity  
15 chartered under and doing business in the County of San Diego. In conjunction with  
16 the County, SCSDC operates facilities and judicial services at nine San Diego County  
17 courthouses; creates and implements judicial policies, customs, and practices  
18 administered by judicial officers, administrators, and staff; and provides professional  
19 legal services and advice to the citizens of San Diego County, including services  
20 related to the practice of ‘family law’—divorce and paternity, custody and visitation,  
21 child support, domestic violence, restraining orders, self-help services, frequently  
22 asked questions, form selection and advice, and public information regarding court  
23 fees, rules, locations, calendars, and proceedings.  
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1 10.SCSDC is part of a network of county courts governed by a 27-member  
2 Judicial Council led by Ms. Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice, California Supreme  
3 Court. The Judicial Council is the policy-making body of the California Courts and  
4 is responsible for ensuring the consistent, independent, impartial and accessible  
5 administration of justice. The Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) is the  
6 support staff of the Judicial Council.  
7

9 11.Defendant Hon. Robert J. Trentacosta (TRENTACOSTA) is the chief  
10 executive officer and Presiding Judge of SDCSC residing at [REDACTED],  
11 La Jolla, CA [REDACTED]. He oversees, administers, prepares, and implements all policies,  
12 practices, procedures, and operations of all SCSDC facilities and operations,  
13 including court security, judicial staff and facilities security, and the policies,  
14 practices, procedures and operations of SCSDC complained of herein. In performing  
15 each of his duties, TRENTACOSTA “receives policy advice from an Executive  
16 Committee of Judges ” He is elected by the citizens of San Diego County, receives  
17 all compensation from San Diego County, oversees jurisdiction only in San Diego  
18 County, and is elected to the position of Presiding Judge by other county judges. He  
19 exercises direct oversight of “day-to-day oversight and administrative management”  
20 provided by the SCSDC Court Executive Officer Mr. Michael Roddy. He is sued in  
21 his individual and official capacities.  
22

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24 12.Defendant Michael Roddy (RODDY) is the Court Executive Officer for the  
25 SCSDC. He administers and manages the “day to day” operation of the SCSDC,  
26 COMPLAINT  
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1 including its family law division, SDDS security, the family law facilitators offices,  
2 operations, services, personnel, and paperwork therein. He is sued in his individual  
3 and official capacities.  
4

5 13. Defendant Judicial Council (CJC) is an entity overseeing the administrative  
6 functions of the California courts, chartered to “survey judicial business and make  
7 recommendations to the courts, make recommendations annually to the Governor and  
8 Legislature, adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, and perform  
9 other functions prescribed by statute.” CA Const. Art. VI, Sec. 6(d). It is not a  
10 subcommittee of the California State Legislature and has no authority to make or  
11 enact state law. Its rulemaking jurisdiction is limited to administrative “judicial  
12 business” and “court administration, practice, and procedure.” It has no jurisdiction  
13 to make rules inconsistent with state or federal law, as any “rules adopted shall not be  
14 inconsistent with statute.” *Id.* It has no authority to perform any “judicial acts” as  
15 that term is defined in *Butz v. Economou*, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) and *Pierson v. Ray*,  
16 386 U.S. 547 (1967).  
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21 14. The CJC operates “under the leadership of the Chief Justice and in accordance  
22 with the California Constitution.” Its operations arm, the Administrative Office of  
23 the Courts (AOC) implements the council’s rules.  
24

25 15. Defendant Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) is the “staff agency” of  
26 the CJC, from which it derives authority. Its officers, including its Administrative  
27 Director, are elected by the CJC. The Administrative Director of the Courts is  
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COMPLAINT



1 accountable to the council and the Chief Justice for the performance of the  
2 Administrative Office of the Courts. The Administrative Director's authority is  
3 limited to accomplishing the council's goals and priorities. A chart depicting the  
4 relationship between the AOC, CJC, and other related defendants herein is attached at  
5 Exhibit 39.  
6

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8 16. The AOC operates the "Judicial Branch of California", which claims to be  
9 "Committed to providing fair and equal access to justice for all Californians." The  
10 Judicial Branch of California operates and oversees the family law facilitator offices  
11 throughout the state of California, providing services and advice for family law  
12 subject matter.  
13

14  
15 17. Defendant Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye (CANTIL-SAKAUYE) is the Chief Justice  
16 of the California Supreme Court and head executive of Defendants AOC, CJC, and  
17 CJP, residing at [REDACTED], Sacramento, CA, [REDACTED]. CANTIL-SAKAUYE  
18 chairs and oversees all functions of the CJC, including the preparation,  
19 administration, and implementation of all rules, forms, policies, practices, procedures,  
20 and operations of the CJC. Her authority includes oversight and control of the  
21 operation of the family law facilitators offices, operations, services, personnel, and  
22 paperwork therein. In such capacity she operates under the same charter,  
23 constitution, jurisdiction, authority, and restrictions as the CJC. She is sued in her  
24 individual and official capacities.  
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1 18. Defendant Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) is an entity with  
2 jurisdiction pursuant to Article VI, § 18 of the California Constitution “responsible  
3 for investigating complaints of judicial misconduct and judicial incapacity and for  
4 disciplining judges. . . . The commission's mandate is to protect the public, enforce  
5 rigorous standards of judicial conduct and maintain public confidence in the integrity  
6 and independence of the judicial system”, including in this District.  
7

9 19. Defendant Lawrence J. Simi (SIMI) is the Chairperson for the CJP  
10 residing at [REDACTED], San Francisco, California, doing business in this this  
11 District as the Chairperson for the CJP. In that capacity he is authorized and  
12 restricted pursuant to the same laws authorizing and restricting the CJP. He is sued  
13 herein his individual and official capacities.  
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16 20. Defendant Brad Batson (BATSON) is an individual employed as an  
17 investigator for DEFENDANT CJP. BATSON at all times herein mentioned was the  
18 representative, agent, and employee of the CJP in addressing the DDIJO  
19 COMPLAINTS I and II and performing the duties of his office in this District. He is  
20 sued herein his individual and official capacities.  
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23 21. Defendant National Family Justice Center Alliance (ALLIANCE) is a  
24 California Corporation doing business in this District at 707 Broadway, Suite 700,  
25 San Diego, CA.  
26

27 22. Defendant Hon. Lisa Schall (SCHALL) is a judge of the SCSDC  
28 residing at [REDACTED], Solana Beach, [REDACTED], and at all times relevant  
COMPLAINT

1 herein exercised jurisdiction within the Family Law Division of the SCSDC in this  
2 District. She is an elected official by the citizens of San Diego County, receives all  
3 compensation from San Diego County, and oversees jurisdiction only in San Diego  
4 County. She is sued in her individual and official capacities.

6 23. Defendant Hon. Lorna Alksne (ALKSNE) is a judge of the SCSDC  
7 residing at [REDACTED] La Jolla, CA [REDACTED], and at all times relevant herein  
8 was the supervision judge for the Family Division of the SCSDC doing business in  
9 this District. In such capacity ALKSNE oversees, administers, prepares, and  
10 implements all policies, practices, procedures, and operations of all SCSDC Family  
11 Law Division operations, including oversight and control of the operation of the  
12 family law facilitators' offices, procedures, policies, forms, and personnel. She is an  
13 elected official by the citizens of San Diego County, receives all compensation from  
14 San Diego County, oversees jurisdiction only in San Diego County, and is elected or  
15 appointed to the position of Supervising Judge, Family Division by other county  
16 judges. Along with TRENTACOSTA and RODDY, at all times relevant herein she  
17 exercised "day-to-day oversight and administrative management" of the family law  
18 facilitators offices, operations, services, personnel, and paperwork therein. She is  
19 sued in her individual and official capacities.

21 24. Defendant Off Duty Officers Inc. is a business organization of unknown form  
22 doing business at all relevant times within this District. Defendants ODO DOES 1  
23 and 2 are employees of ODO (collectively "ODO"). At all relevant times herein,  
24 COMPLAINT

1 ODO acted under contract with one or more other defendants, including SDCBA and  
2 SCSDC to provide security services at the April 15, 2010 SDCBA SEMINAR.

3  
4 25. Defendant Hon. Christine Goldsmith (C. GOLDSMITH) is a judge of the  
5 SCSDC, and at all times relevant herein exercised jurisdiction within the Family Law  
6 Division. She is an elected official by the citizens of San Diego County, receives all  
7 compensation from San Diego County, and oversees jurisdiction only in San Diego  
8 County. She was an organizer and panel member of the SDCBA SEMINAR working  
9 for or on behalf of the SDCBA and at all times relevant herein acted as an agent of  
10 Defendants SDCBA and SCSDC. She is sued in her individual and official capacities.

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13 26. Defendant Hon. Jeannie Lowe (LOWE) is a judge of the SCSDC, and at all  
14 times relevant herein exercised jurisdiction within the Family Law Division. She is  
15 an elected official by the citizens of San Diego County, receives all compensation  
16 from San Diego County, and oversees jurisdiction only in San Diego County. She  
17 was an organizer and panel member of the SDCBA SEMINAR working for or on  
18 behalf of the SDCBA and at all times relevant herein acted as an agent of Defendants  
19 SDCBA and SCSDC. She is sued in her individual and official capacities.

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22 27. Defendant Hon. William McAdam (McADAM) is a judge of the SCSDC, and  
23 at all times relevant herein exercised jurisdiction within the Family Law Division. He  
24 is an elected official by the citizens of San Diego County, receives all compensation  
25 from San Diego County, and oversees jurisdiction only in San Diego County. He was  
26 an organizer and panel member of the SDCBA SEMINAR working for or on behalf  
27  
28 COMPLAINT

1 of the SDCBA and at all times relevant herein acted as an agent of Defendants  
2 SDCBA and SCSDC. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.

3  
4 28. Defendant Hon. Edlene McKenzie (McKENZIE) is a judge of the SCSDC, and  
5 at all times relevant herein exercised jurisdiction within the Family Law Division.  
6 She is an elected official by the citizens of San Diego County, receives all  
7 compensation from San Diego County, and oversees jurisdiction only in San Diego  
8 County. She was an organizer and panel member of the SDCBA SEMINAR working  
9 for or on behalf of the SDCBA and at all times relevant herein acted as an agent of  
10 Defendants SDCBA and SCSDC. She is sued in her individual and official  
11 capacities.  
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14 29.. Defendant Hon. Joel Wohlfeil (WOHLFEIL) is a judge of the SCSDC  
15 residing at [REDACTED] San Diego, CA, and at all times relevant herein  
16 exercised jurisdiction within the Family Law Division of the SCSDC within this  
17 District. He is an elected official by the citizens of San Diego County, receives all  
18 compensation from San Diego County, and oversees jurisdiction only in San Diego  
19 County. He was an organizer and panel member of the SDCBA SEMINAR working  
20 for or on behalf of the SDCBA and at all times relevant herein acted as an agent of  
21 Defendants SDCBA and SCSDC. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.  
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24 30. Defendant Carole Baldwin (C. BALDWIN) is an attorney at law licensed to  
25 practice within the State of California residing and doing business in this District.  
26 She was an organizer and panel member of the SDCBA SEMINAR working for or on  
27  
28 COMPLAINT

1 behalf of the SDCBA and at all times relevant herein acted as an agent of Defendants  
2 SDCBA and Baldwin & Baldwin.

3  
4 31. Defendant Laury Baldwin, CLS-F (L. BALDWIN) is an attorney at law  
5 licensed to practice within the State of California residing and doing business in this  
6 District. He was an organizer and panel member of the SDCBA SEMINAR working  
7 for or on behalf of the SDCBA and at all times relevant herein acted as an agent of  
8 Defendants SDCBA and Baldwin & Baldwin.  
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10  
11 32. Defendant Baldwin & Baldwin is a professional law corporation licensed to  
12 conduct business as a law firm within this District.

13  
14 33. Defendant Larry Corrigan, M.S.W. (CORRIGAN) is a family law professional  
15 licensed to practice within the State of California residing and doing business in this  
16 District. He was an organizer and panel member of the SDCBA SEMINAR working  
17 for or on behalf of the SDCBA and at all times relevant herein acted as an agent of  
18 Defendant SDCBA.  
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20  
21 34. Defendant William Hargreaves, CLS-F (HARGRAEVES) is an attorney at law  
22 licensed to practice within the State of California residing and doing business in this  
23 District. He was an organizer and panel member of the SDCBA SEMINAR working  
24 for or on behalf of the SDCBA and at all times relevant herein acted as an agent of  
25 Defendants SDCBA and Hargraeves & Taylor, PC.  
26

27  
28 35. Defendant Harfraeves & Taylor, PC is a professional law corporation licensed  
to conduct business as a law firm within this District.

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1 36. Defendant Terry Chucas, Esq. (CHUCAS) is an attorney at law licensed to  
2 practice within the State of California residing and doing business in this District. He  
3 was an organizer and panel member of the SDCBA SEMINAR working for or on  
4 behalf of the SDCBA and at all times relevant herein acted as an agent of Defendant  
5 SDCBA.  
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7  
8 37. Defendant Meredith Levin, CLS-F (LEVIN) is an attorney at law licensed to  
9 practice within the State of California residing and doing business in this District.  
10 She was an organizer and panel member of the SDCBA SEMINAR working for or on  
11 behalf of the SDCBA and at all times relevant herein acted as an agent of Defendants  
12 SDCBA and Allen, Slattery, Inc.  
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14 38. Defendant Allen, Slattery, Inc. is a professional law corporation licensed to  
15 conduct business as a law firm within this District.  
16

17 39. Defendant Janis Stocks, CLS-F (STOCKS) is an attorney at law licensed to  
18 practice within the State of California residing and doing business providing forensic  
19 psychology and child custody evaluation/mediation services in this District. She was  
20 an organizer and panel member of the SDCBA SEMINAR working for or on behalf  
21 of the SDCBA and at all times relevant herein acted as an agent of Defendants  
22 SDCBA and Defendant Stocks & Colburn.  
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25 40. Defendant Stocks & Colburn is a professional law corporation licensed to  
26 conduct business as a law firm within this District.  
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1 41. Defendant Dr. Stephen Doyne, Ph.D. (DOYNE) is a psychologist licensed to  
2 practice within the State of California, residing and doing business providing forensic  
3 psychology and child custody evaluation/mediation services in this District. He is  
4 regularly referred business by Defendant SCSDC and performs work in conjunction  
5 with, on behalf of, at the request of, or on referral from other Defendants, including  
6 Defendants SCSDC, ABC&K, FRITZ, BIERER, VIVIANO, and LOVE. In such  
7 capacities he operates as an agent thereof. He was an organizer and panel member of  
8 the SDCBA SEMINAR working for or on behalf of the SDCBA and at all times  
9 relevant herein acted as an agent of Defendants SDCBA and DOYNE, INC. He is  
10 sued in his individual and official capacities.  
11

12 42. Defendant Stephen M. Doyne, a business entity of unknown form, (DOYNE,  
13 INC.) is at all times relevant herein a professional corporation licensed to do business  
14 providing forensic psychology and child custody evaluation/mediation services  
15 within this District. Defendants Doyne and DOYNE INC. shall collectively be  
16 referred to hereafter as DOYNE, INC.  
17

18 43. Defendant Susan Griffin, M.S. (GRIFFIN) is a family law community  
19 professional licensed to practice within the State of California, residing and doing  
20 business providing forensic psychology and child custody evaluation/mediation  
21 services in this District. She was an organizer and panel member of the SDCBA  
22 SEMINAR working for or on behalf of the SDCBA and at all times relevant herein  
23 acted as an agent of Defendants SDCBA.  
24

25 COMPLAINT



1 44. Defendant Lori Love, Ph.D. (LOVE) is a psychologist licensed to practice  
2 within the State of California, providing forensic psychology and child custody  
3 evaluation/mediation services and residing and doing business in this District. She is  
4 regularly referred business by Defendant SCSDC and performs work in conjunction  
5 with, on behalf of, at the request of, or on referral from other Defendants, including  
6 Defendants SCSDC, ABC&K, FRITZ, BIERER, VIVIANO, and DOYNE INC. In  
7 such capacities she operates as an agent thereof. She was an organizer and panel  
8 member of the SDCBA SEMINAR working for or on behalf of the SDCBA and at all  
9 times relevant herein acted as an agent of Defendants SDCBA and defendant Love &  
10 Alvarez Psychology, Inc. She is sued in her individual and official capacities.  
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14 45. Defendant Love & Alvarez Psychology, Inc. (LOVE INC) is a professional  
15 corporation providing forensic psychology and child custody evaluation/mediation  
16 services within this district.  
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18  
19 46. Defendant Robert A. Simon, Ph.D. (SIMON) is a psychologist licensed to  
20 practice within the State of California, residing and doing business providing forensic  
21 psychology and child custody evaluation/mediation services in this District. At all  
22 times relevant herein he acted as an agent of SDCBA.  
23

24 47. Defendants American College of Forensic Examiners, American College of  
25 Forensic Examiners International (ACFEI) is a Missouri corporation with a principle  
26 place of business of at 2750 E. Sunshine St., Springfield, MO. ACEFI advertises and  
27 promotes itself as “the largest forensic science membership association, forensics  
28

COMPLAINT

1 education, credentials, courses, training and membership for forensics examiners”  
2 and conducts such business in this District, including conspiring with other  
3  
4 DEFENDANTS hereinto commit a substantial portion of the acts complained of  
5 herein in this District.

6 48. Defendant Robert O’Block is the founder, President, and CEO of ACEFI and  
7  
8 Publisher of The Forensic Examiner. He is a resident of the State of Missouri and at  
9 all times relevant herein was doing business selling the above products and services  
10 in this district. Defendants O’Block and ACEFI shall collectively be referred to as  
11 “ACEFI, INC.”  
12

13 49. Defendant Lori Clark Viviano, CFLS-F (VIVIANO) is an attorney at law  
14 licensed to practice within the State of California residing and doing business in this  
15 District. At all times relevant herein, she acted as an agent of Defendant The Law  
16 Office of Lori Clark Viviano.  
17

18 50. Defendant The Law Office of Lori Clark Viviano is a professional law  
19 corporation licensed to conduct business as a law firm within this District, VIVIANO  
20 and The Law Offices of Lori Clark Viviano will be hereafter referred to as  
21 VIVIANO, INC.  
22  
23

24 51. Defendant Sharon Blanchet, CLS-F (BLANCHET) is an attorney at law  
25 licensed to practice within the State of California residing and doing business in this  
26 District. At all times relevant herein, she acted as an agent of Defendant ABC&K.  
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1 52. Defendant ABC&K is a professional law corporation licensed to conduct  
2 business as a law firm within this District. Defendants AB&K and BLANCHET will  
3 hereinafter be collectively referred to as BLANCHET.  
4

5 53. Defendant Marilyn Bierer, CLS-F (BIERER) is an attorney at law licensed to  
6 practice within the State of California residing and doing business in this District. At  
7 all times relevant herein, she acted as an agent of Defendant Bierer and Associates.  
8

9 54. Defendant Bierer & Associates is a professional law corporation licensed to  
10 conduct business as a law firm within this District. Defendants Bierer & Associates  
11 and BIERER will hereinafter be collectively referred to as BIERER.  
12

13 55. Defendant Jeffrey Fritz, CLS-F (FRITZ) is an attorney at law licensed to  
14 practice within the State of California residing and doing business in this District. At  
15 all times relevant herein, he acted as an agent of Defendant Basie & Fritz.  
16

17 56. Defendant Basie & Fritz is a professional law corporation licensed to conduct  
18 business as a law firm within this District.  
19

20 57. Defendants SDCBA, SDSO, ODO, C. GOLDSMITH, ALKSNE, SCHALL,  
21 LOWE, McADAM, McKENZIE, WOHLFEIL, L. BALDWIN, C. BALDWIN,  
22 CHUCAS, CORRIGAN, DOYNE, DOYNE INC., GRIFFIN, HARGRAEVES,  
23 LEVIN, LOVE, SIMON, STOCKS and BIERER shall hereinafter be collectively  
24 referred to as STUART ASSAULT COORDINATORS (SAC).  
25

26 58. Defendants GORE, TRENTACOSTS, RODDY, CANTIL-SAKAUYE,  
27 BATSON, ALKSNE, C. GOLDSMITH, LOWE, MCADAM, MCKENZIE,  
28 COMPLAINT

1 WOHLFEIL are employees authorized by statute to perform certain duties under  
2 color of state law, and shall hereinafter be collectively referred to as COLOR OF  
3 LAW DEFNDANTS (COLD).  
4

5 59. Defendants acting in concert with COLD at times acted as agents of and  
6 therefore are at times named as color of law defendants by virtue of their  
7 relationships with COLD as agents, affiliates, co-conspirators, or superiors of COLD,  
8 as more specifically described below.  
9

10 60. Collectively, the above-referenced defendants, operating full or part time as  
11 part of a broader “Family Law Community” of professionals, institutions, entities,  
12 practices, methods, products and services and its ancillary arms shall hereafter be  
13 referred to as the Domestic Dispute Industry (DDI). Litigants within the DDI,  
14 including STUART and those similarly situated, are hereafter referred to as Domestic  
15 Dispute Industry Litigants (DDIL).  
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20 **DOE Defendants:**

21 61. DOE Defendants’ identities are unknown to Plaintiffs and are named by  
22 fictitious names as follows.

23 62. *Enterprise DOES*: DDICE DOES 1-50: Plaintiffs assert civil racketeering  
24 counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (d) based upon DEFENDANTS participation in,  
25 ownership or, or affiliation with one or more criminal enterprises as that term is  
26 defined under 1964(c). Plaintiffs have identified four enterprises, which together are  
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COMPLAINT

1 referred to as the “Domestic Dispute Industry Criminal Enterprise” (“DDICE”). For  
2 purposes of DOE allegations herein, DOES shall be identified according to the  
3 enterprise or segment of the enterprise to which they are related.  
4

5 63.DDIJO DOES: Judges, Commissioners, and other appointed or elected judicial  
6 officials of the Family Law Division of the Superior Court of the State of California,  
7 in and for the respective counties of which they are members, are herein denominated  
8 Domestic Dispute Industry Judicial Officers (“DDIJO”). Unknown DOES which fall  
9 into the DDIJO category shall be denominated DDIJO DOES.  
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12 64.DDIA DOES: Attorneys at law licensed by the California Bar confining  
13 substantially or all of their practice to Family Law shall be denominated as  
14 “Domestic Dispute Industry Advocates” (“DDIA”).  
15

16 65.DDIPS DOES: Professional service providers, including psychologists,  
17 psychiatrists, family-law oriented social workers, “advocates”, child care  
18 professionals, and other professional-level industry workers not falling into the  
19 category of a licensed attorney shall be denominated as “Domestic Dispute Industry  
20 Professional Services” (“DDIPS”).  
21

22 66.DDISO DOES: Professional law enforcement, police, sheriff’s, sheriff’s  
23 deputies, security, or other law enforcement professionals shall be denominated  
24 “Domestic Dispute Industry Security Officers” or (“DDISO”).  
25  
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27 67.DDISW DOES: Professional social workers engaged in the practice of family  
28 law shall be denominated the “Domestic Dispute Industry Social Workers” and

COMPLAINT

1 includes employees and agents of Defendants ALLIANCE, AOC, CJC, and SCSDC  
2 (“DDISW”).  
3

4 68. Upon learning the true names and capacities of the DOE defendants, Plaintiffs  
5 will amend this Complaint as appropriate.

6 69. Plaintiffs are informed, believe, and allege that in doing all of the things  
7 alleged, COLD, and each of them, acted under color of statutes, regulations, customs  
8 and usages of the State of California, County of San Diego, and/or City of San Diego,  
9 and pursuant to the official policies thereof, except as otherwise alleged.  
10

11 70. Plaintiffs are informed, believe and allege that at all times mentioned each  
12 Defendant was the agent, associate, affiliate, co-conspirator, superior and/or  
13 employee of each other defendant and was acting within the course, scope and  
14 purpose of such relationship in each act ascribed to them herein, except as otherwise  
15 alleged.  
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### 19 **III. BACKGROUND**

#### 20 **Plaintiff’s Social and Political Reform, Exercise, Activism, and Support** 21 **and Advocacy for Federal Laws, Institutions, Political Candidates**

22 71. California Coalition for Families and Children’s (CCFC) organizers, officers,  
23 and affiliates are professionals dedicated to improving social, governmental, and  
24 justice system process concerning domestic relations, child rearing, parenting,  
25 constitutional law, child custody, and domestic violence. Many of CCFC’s members  
26 are mothers, fathers, and children who have withstood abundant hardship resulting  
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COMPLAINT

1 from the current practices of what is generally described as the “Family Law  
2 Community.” These injuries and insults include fraudulent, inefficient, harmful, and  
3 even dangerous services; an institutionalized culture of indifference to “clearly-  
4 established” liberties; insults to the autonomy and dignity of parents and children;  
5 extortion, robbery, abuse, and more, delivered at the hands of eager operators within  
6 the family law community.  
7

9 72.CCFC’s has expressed its perception that the present-day suffering of so many  
10 parents and children has and is being wrought within a larger system characterized by  
11 a widespread institutional failure of—indeed contempt for—the rule of law. CCFC  
12 has endeavored to deliver the message that the present family law system increasingly  
13 ignores the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws of the United States in  
14 depriving U.S. Citizens within California of their rights, privileges, and immunities  
15 under U.S. law. California legal institutions such as family courts and the legal  
16 community, professional institutions such as the state bar and psychology boards, and  
17 criminal justice institutions have in the recent decade gradually combined to cultivate  
18 a joint enterprise forum in which widespread “family practice” exceptions to the rule  
19 of law are not only tolerated, but increasingly encouraged. Professional behavior that  
20 would only a few years ago be recognized as unethical, illegal, or otherwise  
21 intolerable by American legal, psychological, law enforcement, or social work  
22 professionals has increasingly achieved acceptance—indeed applause—from  
23 institutional interests which benefit from a joint enterprise enforcing the wisdom of  
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COMPLAINT

1 “who you know is more important than what you know.”<sup>i</sup> In this lawless behavior’s  
2 most crass infestation, California Superior Court Family Division judges are regularly  
3 heard to announce, *in open court*, “I am the law” and proceed to act accordingly with  
4 impunity, indifference, and *without shame*.

6 73.The effect on parents and children seeking social support within this coalescing  
7 “family law” forum has not been as advertised by courts and professionals—a new  
8 healing—but instead a *new affliction*: an “imposed disability”<sup>ii</sup> of de rigueur  
9 deprivation of fundamental rights in the name of “therapeutic jurisprudence” funded  
10 by converting college funds into a bloated ministry of the bar<sup>iii</sup> leaving families and  
11 their children with mere crumbs of their own success.

14 74.Plaintiffs have organized to confront the State of California’s dispossession of  
15 law and reason by engaging those within the Domestic Dispute Industry who  
16 administer the decay—family court judges. An astonishingly vast judicial  
17 administrative bureaucracy, domestic dispute industry attorneys, psychologists, and  
18 other professionals whose nearly imperceptible deliberate indifference to the creeping  
19 deprivations of parental rights is leaving the family cupboard nearly bare.

22 75.PLAINTIFFS’ efforts on behalf of parents and children have included  
23 increasing public and governmental awareness of family rights, representing and  
24 supporting parents and children in exercising and enforcing such rights, lobbying  
25 state and federal policymakers to improve protections for federal rights under state  
26 law, and undertaking litigation, complaints, or other formal and informal

28 COMPLAINT



1 engagements with state and federal authorities to assert, exercise, communicate  
 2 regarding, educate, inform, establish and defend such rights with the goal of enabling  
 3 parental autonomy and empowerment through reform state of California domestic  
 4 dispute laws, practices, and institutions. (“ENGAGEMENT”)  
 5

6  
 7 **Constitution and Laws of the United States: The Family Federal Rights**

8 76. Well-established United States law securing parents’ and children’s civil and  
 9 other rights (Federal Family Rights or “FFR”) which PLAINTIFFS’ exercise,  
 10 enforce, support and advocate for includes:  
 11

12 **Table 1.0 Federal Family Civil Rights**

13 **Federal Family civil and other**

<b>Rights(“FFR”)</b>	<b>Citations</b>
Parent-child autonomy, privacy, freedom of association, belief, thought, and expression are fundamental Constitutional rights: “There is perhaps no more delicate constitutional barrier protecting individual freedom from governmental interference than that which protects against state interference with parental autonomy.” Presumption of Parental Fitness; Parental Autonomy to determine best interests.	<i>Troxel v. Granville</i> , 530 U.S. 57 (2000); <i>Parham v. J. R.</i> , 442 U.S. 584, 602; <i>Reno v. Flores</i> , 507 U.S. 292, 304; <i>Jensen v. Wagner</i> , 603 F. 3d 1182 (2010)
Parenting rights are a liberty interest	<i>Santosky v. Kramer</i> , 455 U.S. 745,

<p>1 protected by due process and equal 2 protection: “[t]he fundamental liberty 3 interest of natural parents in the care, 4 custody, and management of their 5 child”)</p>	<p>753 (1982)</p>
<p>6 Facial invalidity of any state law 7 interfering with a parent’s fundamental 8 rights to parental autonomy. 9 Heightened protection against 10 government interference with certain 11 fundamental rights and liberty 12 interests, including parents’ 13 fundamental right to make decisions 14 concerning the care, custody, and 15 control of their children</p>	<p><i>Washington v. Glucksberg</i>, 521 U.S. 702, 720; <i>Stanley v. Illinois</i>, 405 U.S. 645, 651. Pp. 5—8; <i>Meyer</i> <i>v. Nebraska</i>, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923); <i>Pierce v. Society of</i> <i>Sisters</i>, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); <i>Stanley v. Illinois</i>, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); <i>Wisconsin v. Yoder</i>, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); <i>Quilloin</i> <i>v. Walcott</i>, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); <i>Parham v. J. R.</i>, 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); <i>Santosky v.</i> <i>Kramer</i>, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)</p>
<p>19 “We have recognized on numerous 20 occasions that the relationship between 21 parent and child is constitutionally 22 protected”</p>	<p><i>Quilloin v. Walcott</i>, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)</p>
<p>23 Any state attempt—statutes, laws, 24 rules, acts, policies, procedures, or 25 formwork—to deprive parents of their 26 fundamental parent-child rights is 27 presumed invalid, and must overcome</p>	<p><i>Troxel</i>, <i>supra</i> (Thomas, J., concurring)</p>

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<p>strict scrutiny to be enforceable: “parents have a fundamental constitutional right to rear their children, including the right to determine who shall educate and socialize them. The opinions of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter recognize such a right, but curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of review. I would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights.” “To say the least (and as the Court implied in <i>Pierce</i>), parental choice in such matters is not merely a default rule in the absence of either governmental choice or the government’s designation of an official with the power to choose for whatever reason and in whatever circumstances.”</p>	
<p>“Meyer’s repeatedly recognized right of upbringing would be a sham if it failed to encompass the right to be free of judicially compelled visitation by “any party” at “any time” a judge believed he “could make a ‘better’ decision” than the objecting parent had</p>	<p><i>Troxel</i>, supra, (Souter, J., concurring</p>

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<p>done. The strength of a parent’s interest in controlling a child’s associates is as obvious as the influence of personal associations on the development of the child’s social and moral character. Whether for good or for ill, adults not only influence but may indoctrinate children, and a choice about a child’s social companions is not essentially different from the designation of the adults who will influence the child in school. Even a State’s considered judgment about the preferable political and religious character of schoolteachers is not entitled to prevail over a parent’s choice of private school.”</p>	
<p>Parental Autonomy Prohibits State Interference in the home, values, education, direction, guidance of children absent parental consent: “The “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and “to control the education of their own.”</p>	<p><i>Meyer v. Nebraska</i>, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923)</p>
<p>The rights to be free from state action</p>	<p><i>Parham v. J. R.</i>, 442 U.S. 584, 602</p>

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<p>is one of the “family unit”—i.e., both parents equally, including the rights of children: “Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course”</p>	<p>(1979)</p>
<p>“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations”. “It would be anomalous, then, to subject a parent to any individual judge’s choice of a child’s associates from out of the general population merely because the judge might think himself more enlightened than the child’s parent.” The “liberty of parents and guardians”</p>	<p><i>Pierce v. Society of Sisters</i>, 268 U.S. 510, 534—535 (1925),</p>

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<p>includes the right “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.” “The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”</p>	
<p>There is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”</p>	<p><i>Prince v. Massachusetts</i>, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)</p>
<p>Any state interest in directing decision-making for the care, custody, and control of a child is subordinate to those of the parents: In subsequent cases also, we have recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. (“It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and</p>	<p><i>Toxel, supra</i>, quoting <i>Stanley v. Illinois</i>, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)</p>

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<p>management of his or her children 'come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements' ” (citation omitted))</p>	
<p>“The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition”</p>	<p><i>Wisconsin v. Yoder</i>, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)</p>
<p>“In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the righ[t] ... to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children” (citing <i>Meyer and Pierce</i>). In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care,</p>	<p><i>Washington v. Glucksberg</i>, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).</p>

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custody, and control of their children.”	
Free Expression is a fundamental right; state laws infringing free expression are presumed invalid; to overcome the presumption of invalidity the state must prove the interference falls within one of the limited “historic and traditional categories long familiar to the bar”:  “[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” As a result, the Constitution “demands that content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid . . . and that the Government bear the burden of showing their constitutionality.”	<i>United States v. Alvarez</i> , 567 U.S. ____ (2012); <i>Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union</i> , 535 U. S. 564, 573 (2002);
Strict Scrutiny Supremacy of Constitution and laws of the United States, invalidates “free floating” standards hindering Free Expression “In light of the substantial and expansive threats to free expression posed by content-based restrictions,	<i>United States v. Stevens</i> , 559 U. S. ____ (2010) (slip op., at 7).



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<p>this Court has rejected as “startling and dangerous” a “free-floating test for First Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”</p>	
<p>“content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to the few “ ‘historic and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar to the bar,’ ”</p>	<p><i>Id.</i>, at ___ (slip op., at 5) (quoting <i>Simon &amp; Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd.</i>, 502 U. S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)).</p>
<p>The limited “historical and traditional categories” of permissive restrictions on free speech include <i>only</i>:</p> <p>1. Advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless action, see <i>Brandenburg v. Ohio</i>, 395 U. S. 444 (1969) (per curiam);</p> <p>2. Obscenity, see, e.g., <i>Miller v. California</i>, 413 U. S. 15 (1973) ;</p> <p>Defamation, see, e.g., <i>New York Times Co. v. Sullivan</i>, 376 U. S. 254 (1964) (providing substantial protection for speech about public figures); <i>Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.</i>, 418 U. S. 323</p>	<p><i>Alvarez</i>, supra</p>

1 (1974) (imposing some limits on  
2 liability for defaming a private figure);

3  
4 3. Speech integral to criminal conduct,  
5 *see, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage &*  
6 *Ice Co.*, 336 U. S. 490 (1949) ; so-  
7 called “fighting words,” *see*  
8 *Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire*, 315 U.  
9 S. 568 (1942) ;

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11 4. Child pornography, *see New York v.*  
12 *Ferber*, 458 U. S. 747 (1982) ;

13 5. Fraud, *see Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy*  
14 *v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,*  
15 *Inc.*, 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976) ;

16  
17 6. True threats, *see Watts v. United*  
18 *States*, 394 U. S. 705 (1969) (per  
19 curiam);

20  
21 7. Speech presenting some grave and  
22 imminent threat the government has  
23 the power to prevent, *see Near v.*  
24 *Minnesota ex rel. Olson*, 283 U. S.  
25 697, 716 (1931) , although a restriction  
26 under the last category is most difficult  
27 to sustain, *see New York Times Co. v.*  
28

<p>1 <i>United States</i>, 403 U. S. 713 (1971) 2 (per curiam).</p>	
<p>3 Content-based restrictions on speech in 4 electronic communications are 5 presumed invalid unless the state can 6 prove that technological means for 7 regulating speech are impossible: In 8 addition, when the Government seeks 9 to regulate protected speech, the 10 restriction must be the “least restrictive 11 means among available, effective 12 alternatives.”</p>	<p><i>Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union</i>, 535 U. S. 564, 666 (2002); <i>Alvarez</i>, supra.</p>

13  
14 **Plaintiffs’ Support and Advocacy for FFR**

15 77. PLAINTIFFS have been active in supporting and advocating for the FFR,  
16 including the institutions, laws, and entities of the United States that protect, uphold,  
17 and defend them against state intrusion. Though the FFR are well-recognized under  
18 federal (and state) laws, it has been PLAINTIFFS’ collective experience that within  
19 the state of California the FFR are frequently ignored in the hands of those exercising  
20 jurisdiction over parents and families, including DEFENDANTS and the entities of  
21 which they are associates and members. Notwithstanding that such state actors may  
22 legally exercise their enormous powers only when according to law, and  
23 notwithstanding that such actors enjoy limited immunities only when they exercise  
24 such powers legally, state of California color of law actors regularly wander far off  
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1 the reservation to inflict unjust, irrational, and often heinous crimes against civil  
2 liberty.

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4 78.PLAINTIFFS have acted to end these trespasses and redress the grievances of  
5 those offended. These efforts have included support and advocacy for the supremacy  
6 of the Constitution and laws of the United States vis-à-vis relevant sections of  
7 California Family and Penal codes, including the Domestic Violence Intervention  
8 Legislative Scheme (“DVILS”) discussed below and in Ex. 1. PLAINTIFFS have  
9 advocated for, supported, sought to educate, exercise, and enforce the FFR and for  
10 the institutions and processes of the United States upholding, protecting, and  
11 defending the same. PLAINITIFFS’ reform efforts have specifically directed to  
12 bringing California’s domestic relations law and practice into compliance with the  
13 protections afforded to all United States citizens under federal institutions, laws, and  
14 practice. PLAINTIFFS’ FFR reform, exercise, support, and advocacy activity has  
15 included:

- 16 1. Open exercise of FFR and other civil liberties putatively extinguished by  
17 California state domestic relations law (see DVILS infra); engagement with  
18 DEFENDANTS’ threats, harassment, obstruction, retaliation, intimidation,  
19 and injury for such exercise (Exs. 5-7, 27-30);
- 20 2. Public education and awareness campaigns regarding worldwide FFR  
21 exercise and government abuse, and encouragement and facilitation toward  
22 broader public exercise of the same (Ex. 10);

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3. Sponsoring public events, interviews, and meetings with reform leaders such as Up To Parents, *Support, System Down*, the National Coalition for Men, state assembly candidates, local board of supervisors candidate John Van Doorn, to educate, motivate, and organize to protect the FFR from state deprivation (Exs. 7, 8, 11);
4. The SDSBCA ENGAGEMENT (below and Ex. 5);
5. Direct ENGAGEMENTS in Family Court facilities (Ex. 6);
6. Public education and awareness of family courts’ disregard for FFR through editorial series on high-profile cases such as Bonnie Holt, Eric Moelter, Evan Nash, Morse v. Morse, Cindy Dumas, Cynthia Sommer, Chris Nobel, Emad Tadros, Cole Stuart, with CCFC editorial perspectives (Ex. 7);
7. Appearance on various public interest “video blog” shows and series such as “Face Up To Fred,” with Fred Sotilie, “Progress in San Diego” with Walter Davis, San Diego’s ABC affiliate, and more; (See “Internet Links to Plaintiffs’ Exhibits” incorporated herein by reference);
8. Raising awareness and direct ENGAGEMENT of DDIJO DEFENDANTS ALKSNE, ALLARD, DOYNE, INC., SCHALL, WOHLFEIL, TRENTACOSTA, and Judges Lewis, Bloom, So, Hallahan, Trapp, Salcido, of the schemes, artifices, and devices to defraud such as the SCSDC’S systematic failure to observe the laws requiring Child Custody Evaluators to

1 be properly licensed, educated, trained, and overseen by the Superior Courts  
2 (Exs. 1, 2, 4);  
3

4 9. Revealing descriptions of the schemes, artifices and devices to defraud of  
5 the DDI, including government abuse and private schemes to defraud, to the  
6 general public, including those of Defendants DOYNE, FRITZ and  
7 BIERER (Exs. 7, 10, 12, 18);  
8

9 10.Co-Promotion and awareness campaigns with leading “family civil rights”  
10 writers and thinkers such as Dr. Stephen Baskerville, Ned Holstein, Charles  
11 Asher, Walter Davis, and others (Exs. 8, 11, 13);  
12

13 11.Litigation and other confrontational reform efforts adverse to Defendants  
14 DOYNE, INC. (Ex. 2, 3, 4, 20), ALLIANCE, (Ex. 1), BLANCHET (Ex.  
15 14).  
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17 79.*Formal Advocacy*: Plaintiffs have undertaken projects asserting FFR civil  
18 rights under federal law throughout California. These include:  
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21 12.Civil Rights Fraud matter filed in the name of CCFC member Dr. Emad  
22 Tadros adverse to the chairman of the family law committee of the San  
23 Diego County Bar Association, Mr. Robert Lesh and the State Bar of  
24 California, presently-pending in a Petition for Certiorari before the United  
25 States Supreme Court, entitled *Tadros v. Lesh, The State Bar of California*,  
26 case No. 12-1438. (Exs. 2, 20);  
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13. A parent's federal law, civil rights, and state law matter filed in the name of CCFC member Dr. Emad Tadros adverse to defendant herein DOYNE INC asserting civil rights violations, Defamation, HIPPA violations, and state law commercial fraud, unfair business practices, malpractice, and defamation, entitled *Tadros v. Doyne*, San Diego Superior Court Case No. \_\_\_\_\_ (Exs. 3, 4, 20);

14. An Amicus Curie Brief in favor of Plaintiff in the above referenced case (Ex. 3);

15. A cease and desist letter to the City of San Diego, County of San Diego, Superior Court of San Diego County, San Diego Sheriff's Department, San Diego Police Department, and numerous judges on the family law division bench, including several defendants herein;

16. Hosting numerous online informational, support, educational, and organizing sites, including [www.facebook.com/ccfconline](http://www.facebook.com/ccfconline), [www.thepubliccourt.com](http://www.thepubliccourt.com), and [www.carpedita.com](http://www.carpedita.com) (Ex. 15);

17. Organizing support for state reform such as judicial immunity reform proposed in California Assembly Bill AB 2475 which would have clarified that custody evaluators are not entitled to judicial immunity, including publications, public appearances, and directly appearances at California State Assembly Judiciary Council meetings in Sacramento to advocate for imposing conformity on California law, lobbying for stronger oversight by state legislatures over administrative and judicial bodies such as

1 DEFENDANTS, Child Protective Services, Department of Child Support  
2 Services (Exs. 10, 16);  
3

4 18. Organizing public support for redress of the constitutional wrongs  
5 committed against attorney former federal prosecutor and judicial reformer  
6 Richard Fine by Judge David Yaffe in Los Angeles County (Ex. 17);  
7

8 19. Sponsoring public forums in which issues with DDI operatives, including  
9 judges, attorneys, and evaluators, may be heard and publicized at  
10 www.carpdicta.com (Ex. 18);  
11

12 20. Collaborating with professional local and national media to raise awareness  
13 of all of these issues and efforts, including “PBS Frontline’s” “Pro Publica”  
14 series exposing credential fraud of ACFEI “No Forensic Background? No  
15 Problem”, ABC Channel 10’s series on a local “forensic psychologist’s”  
16 credentials fraud (Ex. 19);  
17

18 80. PLAINTIFFS’ protected legal, social, political, and commercial activities  
19 toward reform, support and advocacy described above shall hereafter be referred to as  
20 FEDERAL FAMILY RIGHTS REFORM, EXERCISE, SUPPORT, AND  
21 ADVOCACY, or “**FFRESSA**”.

22  
23  
24 **FFRESSA Engagement in Support and Advocacy for United States**  
25 **Representatives**

26 81. PLAINTIFFS have actively engaged the institutional representatives of the  
27 United States in their FFRRESA. This activity includes federal election support,  
28 lobbying, and coordination with Senator Barbara Boxer’s Office in San Diego and  
COMPLAINT



1 Washington, DC, Senator Diane Feinstein’s Offices in Washington, D.C., Senator  
2 Harkin’s Offices in Washington, DC, United States Representatives Darrell Isa,  
3  
4 Duncan Hunter, Juan Vargas, Scott Peters, and Susan Davis. PLAINTIFFS have  
5 ENGAGED on these issues with the United States Department of Justice, the Ninth  
6  
7 Circuit Court of Appeals. See Ex. 1. PLAINTIFFS have undertaken similar reform  
8  
9 ENGAGEMENT with California state representatives Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger,  
10  
11 Gov. (and attorney general) Jerry Brown, Assemblywomen Karen Bass, Fiona Ma,  
12  
13 Assemblyman Nathan Fletcher, Lynn Daucher, Tim Donnelley, State Assembly  
14  
15 reform candidate Peter Thotham, county supervisor candidate John Van Doorn,  
16  
17 opposing Defendant GORE’s and WHOLFEIL’S election campaigns and supporting  
18  
19 that of opponents of DEFENDANTS herein; ENGAGED Bonnie Dumanis, Attorney  
20  
21 General Kamala Harris, Chief Justices Tani Cantil-Sakauye and Ronald M. George,  
22  
23 Dennis Hollingsworth, Diane Jacobs, Bill Lockyear, Jerry Sanders, Bob Filner, as  
24  
25 well as direct communications with all DEFENDANTS herein. Ex. 1, 2, 20.

26 *82.FFRRESA Engagement in Reform of State Color of Law Actors: Plaintiffs’*

27 FFRRESA has included numerous ENGAGEMENTS with state and federal  
28  
29 authorities to attempt to enforce FFRRESA reforms on California laws and  
30  
31 institutions, including identification, publication, accusation, formal and informal  
32  
33 complaints, ENGAGEMENT, litigation, and collaborative remedy of the illegal  
34  
35 activities of the Domestic Dispute Industry. These efforts include:

COMPLAINT

1 83.*DIJO COMPLAINT I*: In November, 2009, STUART contacted the United  
2 States Attorneys Office for the Southern District of California to report violations of  
3 the FFR, specifically identifying numerous provisions of federal law, including 18  
4 U.S.C. §§ 2(a)-(b), 241, 242, 371, 666, 1341, 1343, 1346, 1503, 1505, 1510, 1581-  
5 1595, 1951, 1961-1964; and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-86 (these statutory provisions shall  
6 hereafter be referred to as the Civil Rights Civil and Criminal Statutes, or “CRCCS”)  
7 by SCHALL, DOYNE, and WOHLFEIL detailing allegations consistent with those  
8 asserted herein. STUART detailed numerous violations of the CRCCS on the part of  
9 SCHALL, including deprivation of rights, abuse of process, abusive behavior and  
10 remarks from the bench, a long history of three prior admonishments by Defendant  
11 CJP including a 2008 conviction for drunken driving, a persistent pattern of refusals  
12 to adhere to state and federal minimum due process standards in STUART’S case and  
13 several others known publically, illegal, unnoticed, and without probable cause  
14 searches and seizure of STUART and STUART’S property inside the a civil (family  
15 law) courtroom, and generally extreme and outrageous unprofessional demeanor.  
16

17 84.The U.S. Attorney’s Office advised STUART as follows:  
18

19 A. That the DDIJO COMPLAINT I allegations could be violations of  
20 federal law, but that because the matters were “not all that serious”  
21 STUART should proceed instead with the California Commission on  
22 Judicial Performance (CJP), the California State body with jurisdiction to  
23 investigate, and enforce standards, rules, and laws, including violations of  
24 federal law, regarding state actor’s judicial behavior;  
25

26 COMPLAINT

1  
2 B. That the CJP had jurisdiction to impose address, investigate, and  
3 discipline or otherwise dispose of STUART's complaints under both state  
4 and federal law, and was obligated to report any violations of federal  
5 criminal law to the appropriate federal authorities;  
6

7 C. That if Stuart filed a complaint with both the U.S. Attorney's Office and  
8 the CJP, the U.S. Attorney's Office would not take action until the  
9 complaint to the CJP's Office was "exhausted.";  
10

11 D. That the CJP was the "first step in the process." The U.S. Attorney's  
12 Office advised Stuart that he could, if he wished, file a complaint with the  
13 U.S. Attorney and the Grand Jury, but that because the facts did not indicate  
14 "anything serious", the U.S. Attorney would likely not act;  
15

16 E. That if STUART was unsatisfied with the CJP's response, he could  
17 pursue the same complaint directly with the U.S. Attorney or F.B.I. and rely  
18 on the documentation, evidence, facts, and testimony provided to the CJP.  
19

20 85. Though STUART disagreed that the behavior he described was "not serious,"  
21 he obeyed the instructions of the U.S. Attorney's Office, contacting the CJP to  
22 continue prosecution of the DDIJO COMPLAINT I in the CJP Offices. The CJP  
23 representative advised STUART that because DOYNE was not an elected or  
24 appointed judicial official, the CJP had no jurisdiction to hear Complaints regarding  
25 him. The CJP further advised that since STUART's Complaint regarding  
26 WOHLFEIL was related to his appointment of DOYNE, and because SCHALL was  
27 COMPLAINT  
28

1 the party primarily involved in the allegations of civil rights deprivations concerning  
2 DOYNE, that a complaint regarding WOHLFEIL would not be appropriate. The CJP  
3 advised STUART to deliver a written description of his complaint regarding only  
4 SCHALL.  
5

6 86.STUART did so, detailing violations of the CRCCS by SCHALL. Stuart also  
7 detailed facts relating to DOYNE and WOHLFEIL's potential involvement in  
8 violations of the FFR and CRCCS. STUART submitted the complaint to the CJP and  
9 copies thereof to the United States Attorney's Office, the Grand Jury of the United  
10 States District Court for the Southern District of California, the Internal Revenue  
11 Service, all of California's representatives in the United States House of  
12 Representatives and the United States Senate, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
13 and the California Commission on Judicial Performance (hereafter be referred to as  
14 the "FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS").  
15  
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17

18 87.STUART also provided a copy of the DDIJO COMPLAINT (I) to numerous  
19 DDIJO DEFENDANTS including all then-sitting DDIJO on the San Diego County  
20 Superior Court, Family Law Division, San Diego County Superior Court supervising  
21 Judge Kenneth So, the San Diego Daily Transcript, the San Diego Union Tribune, a  
22 number of state and federal media outlets, parenting groups, and related entities. A  
23 true and correct copy of Stuart's letter to the FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT  
24 OFFICERS is unavailable and as such is referenced as if attached (Ex. 22).  
25  
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COMPLAINT

1 88. During the investigation of DDIJO COMPLAINT I, STUART continued to  
2 interact with the FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, including at or  
3 around the time of the STUART ASSAULT, and continues today.  
4

5 89. *DDIJO COMPLAINT II*: In October, 2012, STUART supplemented his prior  
6 DDIJO COMPLAINT I with more extensive detail regarding SCHALL,  
7 WOHLFEIL, AND DOYNE, INC., and asserting additional allegations against  
8 DEFENDANTS SCHALL, ALKSNE, C. GOLDSMITH, and GROCH. STUART  
9 submitted the DDIJO COMPLAINT II to the FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT  
10 OFFICERS regarding substantially the same allegations as asserted herein. A true  
11 and correct copy of the DDIJO COMPLAINT II is attached hereto as Exhibit 21.  
12 STUART delivered a copy of DDIJO COMPLAINT II other DDIJO, the FEDERAL  
13 LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, the public and various media outlets.  
14  
15

16 90. STUART has continued to interact with the FEDERAL LAW  
17 ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS regarding the DDIJO COMPLAINTS through the  
18 present day.  
19  
20

21 91. *DOYNE INC. COMPLAINT I*: In May, 2008, and June, 2013, STUART filed  
22 complaints with the California Board of Psychology regarding DOYNE, INC  
23 detailing substantially the same allegations herein. The entire body of  
24 correspondence relating the DOYNE INC. COMPLAINT is in the possession of the  
25 California Board of Psychology and as such is referenced as exhibit 22 to be  
26  
27  
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COMPLAINT

1 produced once obtained from the Board. A true and correct copy of the June, 2013  
2 correspondence is attached hereto as Exhibit 23.

3  
4 *92.DOYNE, INC. COMPLAINTS II-IV:* PLAINTIFFS have filed, assisted,  
5 coordinated, advocated for, and supported others further complaints and lawsuits  
6 regarding DOYNE, INC. (Ex. 2, 4, 7, 20, 22, 23)  
7

8 *93.FFRRESA Engagement with National Non-Profits:* CCFC has also undertaken  
9 FFRRESA ENGAGEMENT with regard to the City of San Diego and the National  
10 Family Justice Center Alliance (ALLIANCE) in a Notice and Demand to Cease and  
11 Desist (Ex. 1) from actions in violation of the FFR. CCFC has delivered the Notice  
12 and Demand package, including abundant evidence of violations of the CRCCS, to  
13 FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, including The United States  
14 Attorney for this District, the Grand Jury, the United States Department of Justice,  
15 including Ms. Bea Hanson and Mr. Eric Holder, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
16 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, as well as state color of law administrative  
17 defendants with jurisdiction over such matters, including Defendants AOC, CJC,  
18 CANTIL- SAKAUYE, ALKSNE, C. GOLDSMITH, WOHLFEIL,  
19 TRENTACOSTA, SCSDC, SDSD, and COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO. Ex. 1.  
20  
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23

24 *94.Other CCFC Federal Engagement:* CCFC organizers and affiliates have  
25 become involved as witnesses and potential parties in reporting violations of the  
26 CRCCS to several FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. In August,  
27 2011, Dr. Tadros spoke with Ms. Laura O'Farrell of the Federal Bureau of  
28 COMPLAINT

1 Investigations to report possible deprivations of the FFR described more fully in the  
2 attached exhibits. ” In 2007 Ms. Eileen Lasher began interacting with Assistant  
3 United States Attorneys Mssrs. Jason Forge and Michael Wheat of the U.S.  
4 Attorneys’ Office for the Southern District of California regarding allegations of  
5 racketeering operation of the Superior Court of the County of San Diego, specifically  
6 including RODDY, ALKSNE, and other Family Division judges, for intentionally  
7 abusing process and extorting funds from families in state family court proceedings in  
8 violation of the CRCCS. Ms. Lasher has provided detailed information to these  
9 LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS regarding bribery, extortion, fraud, abuse of  
10 process, peonage, and deprivation of civil rights pursuant to the CRCCS and  
11 California State bribery and extortion statutes. In 2004 Ms. Lasher provided similar  
12 details to Officer John McCahal of the NYPD Federal Task Force in three separate  
13 meetings. Officer McCahal referred the matter to the Federal Bureau of  
14 Investigation, whereupon Ms. Lasher personally and through her attorney provided  
15 details to the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York regarding  
16 similar crimes. Dr. Tadros has also met with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s  
17 Ms. Laura O’Farrell regarding similar issues.

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24 95. Ms. Lasher has met with Deputy District Attorney for the County of San  
25 Diego, Mr. Damon Mosler and Mr. Brian Ahearn of the San Diego Police  
26 Department Internal Affairs Office to provide similar information regarding the  
27 violation of the CRCCS criminal activity described above. PLAINTIFFS have  
28 COMPLAINT

1 assisted, represented, advised, and advocated on behalf of CCFC affiliates in these  
2 and many similar FFRRESA Engagements.  
3

4 96. At the time of the STUART ASSAULT, STUART, CCFC member Dr. Emad  
5 Tadros and Eileen Lasher and other CCFC members were in ongoing DUE  
6 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE with the FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT  
7 OFFICERS, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES, including Senator Barbara  
8 Boxer, and Defendants AOC internal affairs representatives Eric Pulido and John  
9 Judnich, SCSDC, RODDY, CJP, to provide information, documents, assistance,  
10 testimony, and evidence of violation of the CRCCS.  
11  
12

13 97. CCFC affiliate Emad Tadros has become involved in interstate consumer fraud  
14 litigation in District Courts in this state and in Missouri with Defendants ACEFI.  
15  
16 Ex. 43.

17 98. On information and belief, state and FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT  
18 OFFICERS have and continue to investigate PLAINTIFFS' allegations under the  
19 CRCCS toward presentment to a grand jury, indictment, and prosecution under  
20 federal law.  
21

22 99. The above-described activities of PLAINTIFFS' and their affiliates in  
23 interaction and cooperation with FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS,  
24 constitutes attendance as a witness or party at proceedings, giving of evidence,  
25 documents, records, objects, or other testimony given or any record, document, any  
26 information relating to the commission or possible commission of a CRCCS violation  
27  
28 COMPLAINT



1 or otherwise regarding PLAINTIFFS' FFRRESA and related matters to the  
2 FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS in pursuit of investigation,  
3 presentation, indictment, prosecution, redress, reform, and punishment of  
4 DEFENDANTS shall hereafter be referred to as the DUE ADMINISTRATION OF  
5 JUSTICE.  
6

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8  
9 **Commercial Purposes of Plaintiffs ("COMMERCIAL PURPOSES")**  
10

11 100. CCFC: California Coalition for families and Children is a public benefit  
12 corporation educating, supporting, protecting, and promoting parents' and children's  
13 rights and interests which are presently under- or misrepresented by existing  
14 marketplace or government institutions, particularly in domestic dispute and child  
15 custody matters. Since 2008 CCFC has assisted mothers, fathers, and children in  
16 defending and supporting family autonomy in relations with one another and  
17 government interests with related jurisdiction. CCFC is active in protecting,  
18 empowering, and promoting parents and children through education, community  
19 support, lobbying, litigation, and public and private entity awareness.  
20  
21

22  
23 101. Recognizing the widespread deprecation to tens of thousands of victim  
24 parents and children wrought by California's unchecked operation of its uniquely  
25 pernicious Domestic Dispute Industry in violation of the FFR, CCFC's commercial  
26 activities have been directed toward educating, empowering, supporting, and  
27  
28

COMPLAINT

1 representing parents and children to withstand and eventually reverse this well-armed  
2 invidious bureaucratic tide eroding parents' and children's welfare. CCFC has  
3 advanced public and governmental awareness of the underserved needs of the  
4 "Domestic Relations Class" including defending parents against numerous alarming  
5 deprivations of parents' and children's financial interests by the steamroller public-  
6 private enterprise Domestic Dispute Industry. CCFC works closely with national  
7 parenting organizations such the National Parents Organization, ACFC, and Up To  
8 Parents to provide healthy, safe, and legal counseling, resources, representation,  
9 services, and support alternatives to traditional domestic dispute services.  
10  
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14 **STUART's Position Under the United States**

15 102. STUART has been admitted to practice before the United States District  
16 Courts for the Southern Northern, and Central Districts of the State of California, the  
17 District of Nevada, the District of Arizona, and the Eastern District of Texas. He has  
18 appeared on briefs before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals  
19 for the Federal Circuit, and in predecessor litigation to the United States Supreme  
20 Court. On behalf of CCFC member Dr. Emad Tadros, STUART and CCFC assisted  
21 in preparing briefing in a matter currently on Petition for Certiorari before the United  
22 States Supreme Court, entitled *Tadros v. Lesh, The State Bar of California*, Case No.  
23 12-1438. (Ex. 2).  
24  
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26  
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1        103.        STUART has represented parties in cases involving federal subject  
2 matter in federal district courts and courts of appeal, including civil rights, patent,  
3 copyright, trademark laws, antitrust, interstate commerce, racketeering, insurance,  
4 and supplemental state law claims. These engagements include litigation matters  
5 now or previously pending within this District as well as the Central and Northern  
6 Districts of California, the District of Arizona, District of Nevada, the Eastern District  
7 of Texas, Northern District of Virginia, District of Delaware, and Southern District of  
8 New York. As such, STUART is an officer of the courts, sworn to numerous oaths to  
9 “protect, uphold, and defend the Constitution and the laws of the United States.” He  
10 has been similarly so bound having been admitted to the bar of three states.  
11

12        104.        STUART’S practice has been focused on federal engagements, including  
13 an Internship with the United States Attorney’s Office under Assistant United States  
14 Attorney Ronald Dixon (Hon. Ronald M. Dixon, Judge Supreme Court of the District  
15 of Columbia) prosecuting felony crimes within the District of Columbia. STUART’S  
16 private practice has been focused on federal Commerce and Trade and Intellectual  
17 Property matters under Titles 15, 17, 28, 35 United States Code and related state law.  
18 He has tried, arbitrated, or mediated dozens of cases in district and state courts in  
19 several districts, and represented clients before foreign and international bodies  
20 relating to international intellectual property, commerce, and law. STUART’S  
21 practice shall hereinafter be referred to as STUART’S POSITION UNDER THE U.S.  
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1 105. He is a co-founder, President, and Chief Executive Officer of the  
2 California Coalition for Families and Children.

3  
4 106. Details of STUART'S employment history with the United States  
5 Attorney for the District of Columbia, legal engagements in federal-law matters and  
6 litigation appear on his resume at Exhibit 24.  
7

### 8 **LEXEVIA**

9 107. At all times relevant hereto Plaintiff LEXEVIA was a professional law  
10 corporation founded by STUART in 2008. As of April 15, 2010 it included  
11 STUART and three members. LEXEVIA'S primary practice areas include  
12 intellectual property, licensing, consumer fraud counseling and litigation, child  
13 protection regulation, privacy laws, technology, life science, software, Internet and  
14 new media matters, and digital copyright and e-mail "spam" regulation. LEXEVIA  
15 lawyers have spoken to numerous industry groups and written on related topics.  
16  
17  
18

19 108. LEXEIVA'S public interest or pro bono engagements have included  
20 numerous Civil Rights and Constitutional Law matters, including representation of  
21 CCFC and numerous parents affiliated therewith. STUART founded LEXEVIA in  
22 2008 after practicing for thirteen years as a partner or associate at international firms.  
23 Ex. 24; [www.lexevia.com](http://www.lexevia.com).  
24  
25

### 26 **Business Development Activities of PLAINTIFFS**

27 109. In furtherance of PLAINTIFFS' FFRRESA and COMMERCIAL  
28 PURPOSES, in 2008 PLAINTIFFS established and began growing independent  
COMPLAINT

1 parent-child-oriented private support networks and services to share resources,  
2 improve awareness, advance joint social, political, and legal goals, protect and  
3 promote the independent interests of families and children in domestic dispute  
4 matters, develop superior, more efficient, safer, and legal alternatives to traditional  
5 family law practices, and to improve the visibility of parent-child interests to legal  
6 institutions including policymakers, law enforcement, and courts. Recognizing  
7 abundant opportunity to fill a demand for more efficient, safe, and legal services  
8 within the family law community, CCFC's early business development efforts  
9 focused on gaining intelligence about the Domestic Dispute Industry to better  
10 understand the existing business structures and thereon reform and/or influence and  
11 build more efficient, effective, safe, and legal services for parents and children who  
12 have *no effective advocates* in the present industry. These goals include improving  
13 professional standards of care for DDI professionals—including DDIA, DDIPS,  
14 DDIJO, DDISW, DDISO, and others, providing more consumer-oriented legal and  
15 government services, inform and improve industry governance, improve licensing,  
16 certification, discipline, oversight standards, from consumer (parents' and children's)  
17 perspectives, and develop or assist in developing superior service products to  
18 compete in that healthier environment.

25 110. In furtherance of the COMMERCIAL PURPOSES, PLAINTIFFS have  
26 undertaken the following business development activities:  
27  
28

COMPLAINT

1 A. Studies of the “closed society” of the multi-billion dollar Domestic Dispute  
2 Industry (DDI) both from “outside” and ”inside” to observe and understand the  
3 DDI “money flow” from DDIL to DDIA, DDIP, DDIJO, DDISW, and DDISO;  
4

5  
6 B. Identification of existing industry-wide fraud schemes and artifices, including  
7 consumer fraud, Lanham Act violations, bribery, “kickbacks”, invidious  
8 discrimination, unchecked abuse of power, nepotism, illegal conduct, and general  
9 inefficiency;  
10

11  
12  
13 C. Identification of the Domestic Dispute Industry “dealmakers”; the structure of  
14 its commercial relationships and networks between DDIAS, DDIPS, DDIJOs, and  
15 other DDI agents and affiliates;  
16

17  
18 D. Contribute to the ongoing analysis of the DDI to prepare legal actions to  
19 restrain the DDI operatives from violations of law providing it with unfair  
20 competitive advantages;  
21

22  
23  
24 E. Contribute to preparation of competitive business models to better serve DDI  
25 clients with more efficient, less expensive, less disruptive, ethical and legal  
26 services, including law, social/governmental parenting support and dispute  
27 resolution services;  
28

COMPLAINT

1  
2 F. Development of personal and professional networks at events such as the  
3  
4 SDCBA SEMINAR to convert “traditional” Domestic Dispute Industry agents to  
5  
6 CCFC’s healthier, safer, more efficient, and legal alternative business models;  
7

8 G. Promote parent/child (consumer) awareness of rights and options in holding  
9  
10 existing “black hat” DDI affiliates to their PROFESSIONAL DUTIES, and  
11  
12 developing strategies for development and promotion of competitive services and  
13  
14 increased self-regulation of professionals to level the playing field for “white hat”  
15  
16 competitors such as CCFC, LEXEVIA, Up To Parents, and other “white hat” FLC  
17  
18 members which chose to adopt safer, healthier, more efficient, and legal business  
19  
20 models (Ex. 25);  
21

22 H. Develop understanding and awareness of existing “free” resources presently  
23  
24 discouraged by DDICE affiliates such as court-sponsored mediation, expert  
25  
26 services, and ordinary adjudication; to understand the causes of the common  
27  
28 perception that divorce is “inevitably” brutalizing, unfair, and expensive (Ex. 25).

I. Obtain awareness useful to state and federal authorities in discipline and reform  
of the DDI operatives, through the DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE; (Ex.  
4.);

COMPLAINT

1  
2 J. Obtain awareness useful to CCFC in its activism, social justice, and justice  
3 system FFRRESA (Ex. 10);  
4

5  
6 K. Advance Lexevia’s marketable legal expertise in representing CCFC, parents,  
7 and DDI victims through potential individual actions, class actions, civil rights,  
8 racketeering, or other lawsuits under the CRCCS adverse to the DDI (Ex. 1);  
9

10  
11  
12 L. Advance CCFC’s and LEXEVIA’s knowledge and divisibility within the DDI  
13 as part of a foundation for building improved domestic dispute service models for  
14 citizens in domestic disputes, including social, financial, psychological, faith-  
15 based, and criminal justice system capabilities such as those presently operated by  
16 CCFC affiliate “Up To Parents” (Ex. 25).  
17

18  
19  
20 111. PLAINTIFFS’ FFRRESA, COMMERCIAL PURPOSES, and  
21 BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES shall hereinafter be collectively referred  
22 to as PLAINTIFFS’ PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITY  
23

24  
25 **IV. COMMON ALLEGATIONS**

26 112. This matter arises out of DEFENDANTS’ criminal and tortious  
27 interference with and retaliation for PLAINTIFFS PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITY.  
28  
COMPLAINT



1 DEFENDANTS are owners, associates, participants, collaborators, affiliates,  
2 benefactors, associates of entities providing “traditional” professional, legal, social,  
3 and government services as part of the DDI. They have acted aggressively and  
4 illegally against PLAINTIFFS to commit criminal and civil violations of  
5 PLAINTIFFS’ state and FFR civil rights, obstruct justice, abuse process, interfere  
6 with existing and prospective business relations, and commit civil and criminal  
7 violations federal law prohibiting RACKETEERING ACTIVITY under 18 U.S.C.  
8 1961 (b). These and other civil and criminal statutes set forth herein are collective  
9 referred to as the Civil Rights Criminal and Civil Statutes, or “CRCCS.” The details  
10 of DEFENDANTS’ activities in violation of the FFR and actionable under the  
11 CRCCS have been described in publications attached hereto as Exs. 1-10.  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17

### **The SDCBA ENGAGEMENT**

18 113. As part of PLAINTIFFS’ PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITY,  
19 PLAINTIFFS have sought opportunities to ENGAGE FLC professionals and clients  
20 to raise awareness of the ongoing unsafe, inefficient, and illegal activity and harm to  
21 clients being caused by the FLC, and to influence DEFENDANTS toward adoption  
22 of safer, more efficient, and legal “white hat” alternatives to FLC practices such as  
23 those advanced by PLATINTIFFS. In furtherance of those goals PLAINTIFFS have  
24 initiated and/or coordinated numerous ENGAGEMENTS with FLC members,  
25 including DEFENDANTS.  
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COMPLAINT

1 114. One such ENGAGEMENT occurring on April 15, 2010 at the San Diego  
2 County Bar Association building at 1333 7th Avenue, San Diego, California is the  
3 central subject of this litigation. In February, 2010, CCFC learned of a seminar to be  
4 hosted in April, 2010 by SDCBA for various San Diego FLC professionals. The  
5 seminar was advertised to thousands of FLC professionals and was to feature a panel  
6 of speakers including:  
7

9 115. Family Court Division judicial officials (“DDIJO”) ALKSNE, C.  
10 GOLDSMITH, WOHLFEIL, LOWE, McADAM, McKENZIE, FLC legal industry  
11 professionals (“DDIA”) C. BALDWIN, L. BALDWIN, CHUCAS, FLC behavioral  
12 sciences professionals (“DDIPS”) CORRIGAN, DOYNE, GRIFFIN,  
13 HARGRAEVES, LEVIN, LOVE, and STOCKS, as well as numerous other domestic  
14 dispute industry professionals, attorneys, and clients at a meeting hosted by  
15 Defendant SDCBA at the SDCBA building (“SDCBA SEMINAR”).  
16

17 116. The advertising brochure announcing the seminar and soliciting  
18 attendees identified the seminar theme as “Litigants Behaving Badly—Do  
19 Professional Services Really Work?” is attached hereto as Ex. 26.  
20

21 117. Though startled by the DDI’s attack on its own client base, CCFC  
22 thought they had some answers to the FLC’S question, and viewed the seminar as an  
23 opportunity to ENGAGE key members of the FLC and their clients to offer answers.  
24 CCFC saw the SDCMA SEMINAR as an excellent opportunity to raise awareness of  
25 the CCFC FFRRESA, the FFR, and ongoing violations of the FFR and rights of  
26 COMPLAINT  
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1 action under the CRCCS, promote CCFC alternatives to illegal, harmful business  
2 practices of the FLC, and continue CCFC’s PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES.

3  
4 118. PLAINTIFFS determined to use the SDCBA SEMINAR to engage the  
5 FLC to advance CCFC’s PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES. PLAINTIFFS and their  
6 affiliates sought to communicate one of CCFC’s central messages that the FLC,  
7 including judges, blame “Litigants Behaving Badly” (their own clients) for harms  
8 enabled—indeed largely manufactured—by the Domestic Dispute Industry’s own  
9 longstanding predatory commercial practices. CCFC saw the “Litigants Behaving  
10 Badly” theme as part of the self-delusional propoganda engaged in by so many FLC  
11 members who, rather than recognizing the harm their industry enables and “healing  
12 themselves”, instead blame their own clients, who, quite true, do regularly abuse  
13 process, their loved ones, and even themselves—in perfect compliance with DDI  
14 instructions.

15  
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18 119. To communicate an answer to the DDI’s question “Do Professional  
19 Services Really Work?”, CCFC adopted a counter-theme to “LITIGANTS  
20 BEHAVING BADLY”: “JUDGES BEHAVING BADLY—IF YOU DON’T  
21 FOLLOW THE LAW, WHY WOULD WE?” CCFC created promotional pamphlets  
22 and exhibits to distribute and large “poster”-sized signage to display, and organized  
23 volunteers to participate in the ENGAGEMENT (hereinafter the SDCBA  
24 ENGAGEMENT). True and correct copies of the signage is attached as Ex. 28.

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COMPLAINT

1        120.        In the “JUDGES BEHAVING BADLY” brochure, CCFC described  
2 CCFC’s PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES and suggested alternatives to the FLC’s  
3  
4 diagnosis of the “LITIGANTS BEHAVING BADLY” problem:

5  
6  
7        *San Diego Family Courts and Professionals are trained and paid to resolve*  
8 *family disputes efficiently. They rarely do. Why?*

9            *Courts, attorneys, and service providers are ineffective at assisting*  
10 *families in transition. In fact, they encourage conflict and expense that*  
11 *harms litigants, their children, and your community.*

12  
13  
14            *Reducing conflict may seem impossible, but with a few available and*  
15 *free alternatives, you can make a difference. Here’s the truth you*  
16 *won’t hear from tonight’s panel by the litigants whom you failed to*  
17 *invite.*

18  
19  
20            *You were hired to assist litigants in efficiently transitioning through a*  
21 *family dissolution. Litigants come to you hurt, angry and fearful*  
22 *about an uncertain future for the most important things in their lives:*  
23 *their children, family, and financial security. Unmanaged, that*  
24 *uncertainty leads to conflict.*

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27            *Your duty to your clients and your community is to end conflict, end*  
28 *fear, and let them move on.*

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*Yet family courts presently offer few tools to calm emotions, while providing abundant tools to make them even more destructive. Courts and evaluators sit in passive judgment, yet rarely render guidance. Evaluators are scientifically incapable of identifying the “better” parent, yet earn millions from desperate parents by pretending they can. Attorneys rarely end conflict, but regularly use courts to encourage litigation, absorb resources, and harm their clients, children, and community.”*

121. The brochure offered suggestions to supplement their answer to the SDCBA’s “Do Professional Services Really Work?” question:

**1. Change your Attitude:** *You don’t work in a sterile court of appeals. You work in people’s lives. Divorce hurts. Families in transition need healing and support—not sharp advocacy, endless services, and harsh judgment. Give compassion in their crisis.*

**2. Change your Procedures:** *Easy OSCs and unpredictable outcomes encourage litigation, drive costs, increase conflict, and facilitate abuse. Give restraint and predictability.*

**3. Change your Resources:** *Books in a waiting room are useless. Free, easy resources like UpToParents.org focus parents on working together to promote their child’s best interests independently. Give education and direction to establish long term peace.*

1  
2 **4. Change People's Lives:** *Years after divorce both parents will say "It's a*  
3 *cesspool benefiting attorneys, evaluators, and courts but immeasurably harmed*  
4 *me and my children." In other words, you're not doing your job.*

5  
6 ***At the end of your career, will you be able to say "I helped to prevent that harm***  
7 ***and to achieve peace and prosperity for my community, clients, and their***  
8 ***families."?***

9  
10 ***We will. Join us.***

11  
12 Ex. 28.<sup>iv</sup>

13 122. The messages and themes of the CCFC Brochure, poster signs, and  
14 CCFC representatives communicated to the FLC at the CCFC Engagement shall  
15 hereafter be referred to as the "JUDGES BEHAVING BADLY" MESSAGE.

16  
17 123. The brochure referenced CCFC's website presently located at  
18 [www.facebook.com/ccfconline](http://www.facebook.com/ccfconline) where FLC members could learn more about CCFC's  
19 PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES. CCFC scheduled the ENGAGEMENT to  
20 coincide with the SDCBA SEMINAR in front of the SDCBA Bar Building to enable  
21 maximum impact for the MESSAGE, and continue developing knowledge, networks,  
22 contacts, and intelligence to advance CCFC's FFRRESA and BUSINESS  
23 DEVELOPMENT with key FLC members, including DDIJO, DDIA, DDIPS, and  
24 DDIL. Ex. 28.

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COMPLAINT

1 **The STUART ASSAULT**

2 124. DEFENDANTS received CCFC’s press releases announcing the  
3 ENGAGEMENT ahead of the Seminar. True and correct copy of articles  
4 identifying a “spike” in downloads of the CCFC Press Release by DEFENDANTS is  
5 attached at Exhibit 29 and incorporated herein as if set forth in full. DEFENDANTS  
6 also knew or had reason to know of the CCFC FFRRESA by virtue of CCFC’s past  
7 ENGAGEMENT, and FFRRESA.  
8

9  
10 125. CCFC members arrived early to the Engagement with signs and  
11 brochures. (Exs. 28-30) As attendees arrived, including family court judges,  
12 attorneys, industry professionals, and clients, they could easily see CCFC members  
13 peacefully carrying signs, walking on the sidewalks in front of the SDCBA building  
14 and through the crosswalks intersecting 7th and B. Streets.  
15

16  
17 126. The ENGAGEMENT was peaceful. Pamphlets were distributed as  
18 attendees entered the building, establishing professional relationships valuable to  
19 CCFC and LEXEVIA’s commercial interests. Numerous contacts were added to  
20 CCFC’s network, ideas and business contact information exchanged. No conflict,  
21 disruption, obstruction, or breach of the peace occurred.  
22

23  
24 127. STUART did not participate in the ENGAGEMENT, but did attend  
25 SDCBA SEMINAR. His intent on attending the SEMINAR was to focus on gaining  
26 knowledge in order to advance PLAINTIFF’S PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITY.  
27

28 STUART was then a member of SDCBA and regular attendee at SDCBA events. A  
COMPLAINT

1 week prior to the SEMINAR he purchased admission through SDCBA’S online store  
2 as an SDCBA member in the way he has numerous times before (STUART-SDCBA  
3 CONTRACT).

5 128. STUART entered the seminar as a normal attendee, signed in to the  
6 “pre-registration” table at the front door, received a name badge, chose a seat  
7 and awaited quietly for the seminar to begin. He maintained a normal professional  
8 demeanor—he was not seeking and did not exercise FFRRESA at the seminar, but  
9 only to gather information about how the judges, attorneys, and professional service  
10 providers conducted their affairs, marketed services, formed and maintained  
11 relationships, and made money. He was dressed professionally, spoke to no one, and  
12 attended the seminar like any other attendee.

16 129. In attendance at the seminar were approximately 100 legal professionals,  
17 presumably members of the FLC, as well as approximately fifteen uniformed armed  
18 Sheriff’s Deputies spread in a uniformly-spaced perimeter along the walls of the  
19 room. After STUART selected his seat, the Sheriff’s Deputies changed their  
20 perimeter to positions nearer to STUART along the walls, effectively surrounding  
21 STUART. Each deputy was watching STUART closely.

24 130. The seminar began with introductory remarks by Family Law Division  
25 supervising judge ALKSNE. However, after only about two minutes of speaking,  
26 ALKSNE announced an abrupt break, apologizing that she needed a break “so we can  
27 straighten something out.” One or more of the SDCBA Defendants had signaled or  
28 COMPLAINT



1 otherwise drew the attention of Defendant ALKSNE to alert her of STUART's  
2 presence and that the plan to eject STUART (described below) was underway.

3  
4 131. ALKSNE left the podium, walked to the back of the conference room,  
5 and began speaking in a huddle of several other defendants, including several  
6 Sheriff's Deputies, two security guards, and two or three other persons who appeared  
7 to be SDCBA agents or seminar attendees.  
8

9 132. The group conferred for several minutes, looking in STUARTS'  
10 direction and referencing his presence with nods, glances, and gestures. It was  
11 apparent that the group was discussing STUART. STUART remained seated quietly  
12 during the unscheduled break.  
13

14 133. After consulting with ALKSNE and others, two employees of defendant  
15 ODO and two Sheriff's Deputies approached STUART where he was seated. The  
16 men asked STUART if he was "Colbern Stuart." STUART acknowledged his  
17 identity. The men then asked STUART to accompany them to leave the seminar.  
18 STUART declined and inquired why he was being asked to leave. The men reiterated  
19 that the SDCBA wanted him to leave. STUART again refused, stating that he had  
20 purchased a ticket and was intent on attending the entire seminar. STUART asked if  
21 he was breaking any laws or interfering with the seminar in any way. The men replied  
22 "no." STUART politely again expressed his desire and intent to remain attending the  
23 entire seminar.  
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COMPLAINT

1       134.       The men then informed STUART that if he did not leave voluntarily that  
2 they would forcibly eject him. STUART objected, again stating that he intended to  
3 remain. The men then returned to where the others were “huddled” several feet  
4 away. The group again conferred with similar references and gestures toward  
5 STUART.  
6

7  
8       135.       Within moments, the same two security guards and two Sheriff’s  
9 deputies approached STUART, who continued to sit quietly awaiting the resumption  
10 of the seminar. The men again asked STUART to leave. STUART again refused.  
11 The men then forced STUART to stand, grabbed his arms, forced his hands behind  
12 his back, and handcuffed him. They searched his person, emptied his pockets, and  
13 seized his property, consisting of a notebook, reading glasses, a mobile phone, pen,  
14 spare change, CCFC and LEXEVIA business cards, and a wallet. They forcibly led  
15 STUART out of the SEMINAR in front of dozens of STUART’s professional  
16 colleagues including one of his law partners, fellow bar members, lawyers, judges,  
17 professional service providers, clients, employees, and law enforcement officers.  
18  
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20  
21       136.       The officers released STUART outside of the SDCBA building and  
22 informed him he was not free to return. The seminar re-convened immediately after  
23 STUART’S removal. According PLAINTIFFS’ witnesses present at the SEMINAR,  
24 several SDCBA panel speakers joked during the seminar “I guess he got what he  
25 asked for” and “let’s see if that gets them any publicity.” They made puns about  
26  
27  
28

1 CCFC as “THE Litigants Behaving Badly”, calling CCFC a “bunch of borderlines”  
2 “crazy parents” and stating “that’s why we have to do what we do.”  
3

4 **DEFENDANTS’ Conspiracy to Retaliate and Obstruct Justice in the STUART**  
5 **ASSAULT**

6 137. Subsequent to the formation of the STUART-SDCBA CONTRACT and  
7 prior to the STUART ASSAULT, DEFENDANTS, and each of them, were or  
8 became aware of the STUART-SDCBA CONTRACT, the planned ENGAGEMENT,  
9 STUART’S planned attendance at the SEMINAR and ENGAGEMENT, his  
10 affiliation with PLAINTIFFS, and PLAINTIFFS’ PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES.  
11 DEFENDANTS considered PLAINTIFFS PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES to be a  
12 threat to traditional FLC persons, institutions, businesses, and enterprises, including  
13 those identified in the ENTERPRISE ALLEGATIONS below.  
14

15  
16 138. Upon learning of the Engagement, DEFENDANTS and each of them  
17 affiliated, came to a meeting of the minds, and agreed to support the STUART  
18 ASSAULT in retaliation, abuse of process, and obstruction of justice as described  
19 herein. In doing so, DEFENDANTS and each of them CULPABLY (to be defined as  
20 “unreasonably, unlawfully, willfully, intentionally, maliciously, without probable  
21 cause, recklessly, knowingly, unjustified, brutal, and offensive to human dignity,  
22 fraudulently, oppressively, wantonly, in premeditation, in deliberate indifference,  
23 with the intent to deprive rights, privileges and immunities of others including  
24 plaintiffs and retaliate for exercising same, criminally, wrongfully, in bad faith, in  
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COMPLAINT

1 furtherance of on or more alleged criminal or civil CONSPIRACY, with deliberate  
2 indifference, in a manner that was extreme, outrageous, unjustified, and in reckless  
3 disregard for the possibility of causing harm, damage, loss and constitutional injury  
4 as elsewhere alleged”) altered their planned behavior for the seminar to respond to  
5 PLAINTIFFS’ presence and the ENGAGEMENT, including failing to exercise their  
6 duty to prevent or aid in preventing the acts of other DEFENDANTS as alleged  
7 herein, to support, permit, facilitate, encourage, affiliate with, coordinate, collaborate,  
8 with one another in joint purpose, efforts, enterprise and conspiracy, to CUPLAPLY  
9 retaliate for, obstruct, deter, hinder delay, oppress, obstruct, unfairly compete with,  
10 and deprive PLAINTIFFS PUBLICL BENEFIT ACTIVITIES by committing the  
11 STUART ASSAULT in defiance of the rule of law (the “CRIMINAL  
12 CONSPIRACY”).

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17 139. DEFENDANTS’ acts in furtherance of conspiracy included alerting all  
18 other DEFENDANTS of PLAINTIFFS’ PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES, and the  
19 ENGAGEMENT, the STUART-SDCBA CONTRACT, STUART’s planned  
20 attendance at the SDCBA SEMINAR, and the activities of others, including other  
21 DEFENDANTS in the CONSPIRACY TO ASSAULT STUART.  
22  
23

24 140. One or more of DEFENDANTS communicated with DDISO DOES, and  
25 GORE, to coordinate an increased presence of DDISO Defendants at the seminar,  
26 hired, altered, communicated with, or coordinated with ODO Defendants,  
27 communicated with SDCBA, SDSD DOES 16-20, GORE, COUNTY OF SAN  
28 COMPLAINT

1 DIEGO, TRENTACOSTSA, RODDY, CJC, ALKSNE, DOYNE, INC., DDIJO  
2 DOES 1-10 regarding of the ENGAGEMENT, researched PLAINTIFFS and their  
3 PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES, DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, the  
4 DDICE and other CRIMINAL and civil CONSPIRACIES, facilitating ENTERPRISE  
5 affiliation, coordination, and cohesion, in defiance of the rule of law.  
6  
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8  
9 **V. CHARGING ALLEGATIONS: CIVIL RIGHTS**

10  
11 141. For each Count, PLAINTIFFS reallege and incorporate all prior  
12 paragraphs as if set forth in full.  
13

14 **Count 1**

15 **Illegal Search, Seizure, Assault, Battery, Arrest, and Imprisonment**

16 **Deprivation of Constitutional Rights Under Color of State Law**

17 **42 U.S.C. 1983**

18 **U.S. Const. 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 14th Amend.**

19 **Supplemental State Claims**

20 **Against Defendants**

21 **SDCBA, ODO, DDISO DOES 1-15, GORE, DDIJO DOES 1-50, SAC, SIMI,**

22 **BATSON**

23 142. Each act of DEFENDANTS alleged in the STUART ASSAULT was  
24 done under color of state law.

25 143. DEFENDANTS in the STUART ASSAULT have:

26  
27 Used, attempted, and threatened use of force CULPABLY and  
28 UNREASONBLY (to be defined as “without due care, in breach of duty,

COMPLAINT

1 without provocation, justification, defense, privilege or immunity, and in an  
2 unjustified and excessive manner”);

3  
4 Terrorized, seized, detained, restrained, arrested, imprisoned, assaulted,  
5 searched, injured, cruelly and unusually punished, harassed, intimidated,  
6 and annoyed STUART, CCFC, LEXEVIA, and their clients, colleagues,  
7 partners, and affiliates in violation of their and

8  
9 Deprived STUART of and retaliated for his FFRRESA and PUBLIC  
10 BEEFIT ACTIVITIES.

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13 These and other terroristic threats, abuse, assaults, and illegal activity described  
14 herein shall be denominated HARRASSEMENT AND ABUSE.

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17 144. At all times relevant hereto, STUART behaved REASONABLY (to be  
18 defined as “lawfully, with due care, dutifully, with probable cause”), was unarmed,  
19 calm, and did not pose a disturbance or threat of death or grievous bodily injury to  
20 defendants or others.

21  
22 145. Prior to the STUART ASSAULT, no Defendant possessed a search or  
23 arrest warrant for STUART.

24  
25 146. Prior to the STUART ASSAULT, STUART had violated no laws in any  
26 DEFENDANT’S presence, and no DEFENDANT had any knowledge of STUART’S  
27 having violated any law in or out of their presence.

28 COMPLAINT

1 147. No act alleged against any defendant in the STUART ASSAULT is a  
2 judicial act, an act intimately associated with the criminal judicial process, or, with  
3 the potential exception of DDISO DOES, pursuant to any authority, charter,  
4 constitution, regulation, or law.  
5

6 148. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.  
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10 **Count 2**

11 **Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress**

12 **Extreme and Outrageous Breach of Duty**

13 **Deprivation of Constitutional Rights Under Color of State Law**

14 **42 U.S.C. 1983**

15 **U.S. Const. 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 14th Amend.**

16 **Supplemental State Claims**

17 **Against Defendants**

18 **SDCBA, ODO, DDISO DOES 1-15, GORE, DDIJO DOES 1-50, SAC, SIMI,  
19 **BATSON****

20 149. In performing the acts ascribed to them, DEFENDANTS knew or should  
21 have known that STUART was an attorney, and assaulting him as described in front  
22 of dozens of his professional colleagues, clients, and judges would cause him severe  
23 mental distress and resulting business injury. Specifically, DEFENDANTS knew or  
24 should have known:  
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1 A. PLAINTIFF maintained dozens of business, personal, and professional  
2 relationships in San Diego such that the STUART ASSAULT in the presence of  
3 dozens of PLAINTIFF's business, personal, and professional colleagues would  
4 cause severe emotional distress;

6 B. PLAINTIFF was an attorney at law licensed to practice in three states including  
7 California such that the STUART ASSAULT would jeopardize STUART'S law  
8 practice and license, causing emotional severe distress therefrom;

10 C. PLAINTIFF was a founding member and office of LEXEVIA and CCFC such  
11 that assaulting STUART in front of CCFC members and LEXEVIA partners,  
12 business colleagues, and clients would intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy, and  
13 terrorize PLAINTIFFS and their affiliates, furthering HARASSMENT AND  
14 ABUSE, and causing cause PLAINTIFFS and their affiliates to:  
15  
16

17  
18 (i) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an  
19 official proceeding;

21 (ii) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the integrity  
22 or availability of the object for use in an official proceeding;

23  
24 (iii) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness, or to  
25 produce a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding;

26 (iv) be absent from an official proceeding to which that person has been  
27 summoned by legal process; and  
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COMPLAINT



1 (v) be otherwise hindered, deterred, delayed, or wrongfully influenced thereby.

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3  
4 (collectively hereinafter referred to as “CHILL”) from further DUE

5 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, FFRRESA, and PUBLIC BENEFIT  
6 ACTIVITY.

7  
8 D. That CHILLING PLAINTIFFS and their affiliates would further injure  
9 PLAINTIFFS’ affiliates’ PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES further causing  
10 PLAINTIFFS’ HARM.

11  
12 E. STUART, was the founder and lead partner of the law firm LEXEVIA, with  
13 offices in San Diego and Los Angeles, such that the STUART ASSAULT and  
14 resulting impact on LEXEVIA would cause loss of business assets, income, and  
15 good will, causing further emotional distress to STUART.  
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18 150. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.  
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**Count 3**  
**Culpable Breach of Duty under California Government Code § 820**  
**Deprivation of Constitutional Rights**  
**42 U.S.C. 1983**  
**U.S. Const. 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 14th Amend**  
**Supplemental State Claims**  
**All Defendants as Indicated**

151. At all times pertinent hereto, DEFENDANTS, and each of them, owed one or more PROFESSIONAL DUTIES to PLAINTIFFS with respect to their status as citizens, professionals, attorneys, law enforcement officers, fiduciaries, color of state law actors, judicial officers, employers/employees, and their agents, officers, affiliates, and collaborators.

152. Said PROFESSIONAL DUTIES include:

A. All DEFENDANTS: Duty of ordinary reasonable care: The duty to act REASONABLY, and to avoid acting UNREASONABLY and CULPABLY.

B. COLD: Exercise color of law powers only in the presence of jurisdiction: those provided under enabling legislation, rules, charters, or constitutions; protect, uphold, and defend the laws and the Constitution of the United States; act only in the public interest; provides only honest government services; avoid all conflict, undue influence, bribery, self-dealing, bias, nepotism; commit no deprivations of clearly established civil rights; create or inflict no HARM unless specifically authorized after due process of law;

C. DDIPS: Professional duties to observe all professional standards relevant to their

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respective professional licensure, best practices, and specialty standards, do no harm (Ex. 36);

D. Fiduciaries (DDIA, DDIPS): Duties of trust and loyalty trustee of treating pecuniary interests of named or foreseeable beneficiaries equal to own;

E. DDIJO: Protect rights of those in courtroom; “ensure rights”; all duties enumerated in Canons 1-6 (Ex. 39) and related codes;

F. DDIAS: Professional competence, loyalty, zealous advocacy and those specifically articulated in the Model Code of Professional Conduct (Ex. 40);

G. Supervisors: train, enforce law, implement, create, monitor policy, background checks, discipline, terminate, exercise power to prevent or aid in preventing breaches of others with power to influence or control;

H. Contractual: Specific duties under contract, and duty of good faith and fair dealing;

I. Municipal: Enact no policies, rules, laws, customs, behaviors or procedures which are intended to or deliberately indifferent to constitutional injury;

J. Therapeutic: When acting in any “therapeutic” capacity—as a DDIJO (“therapeutic” jurisprudence), DDISW (“public service”), DDIPS (psychology, even as a “forensic psychologist”), or DDIA, observe the ancient rule of genuine healers: *“above all else, do no harm.”*

1 Exhibits 36, 39, 40 are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.  
2

3 153. Pursuant to California Govt. Code § 820, “a public employee is liable for  
4 injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person.” This  
5 special “ordinary care” duty of California state public employees extends not only to  
6 avoid harm by the public employee’s direct actions, but to avoid harm to all those  
7 who are foreseeably injured by virtue of the public employee’s actions which “set in  
8 motion” acts that result in constitutional injury.<sup>v</sup>  
9  
10

11 154. By virtue of the State of California’s special statutory duties imposed on  
12 COLD, PLAINTIFFS possess reciprocal rights under state and federal due process to  
13 the observance of those duties. (CALIFORNIA FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS)(CFR).  
14

15 155. Said PROFESSIONAL DUTIES extend to PLAINTIFFS.<sup>vi</sup>  
16

17 156. In performing the acts ascribed to them, DEFENDANTS, and each of  
18 them UNREASONABLY and CULPABLY breached one or more PROFESSIONAL  
19 DUTIES, depriving one or more of PLAINTIFFS of their CALIFONRIA  
20 FUNDAMETNAL RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.  
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22 157. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED  
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**Count 4**  
**Trespass Under Color of Law**  
**42 U.S.C. 1983**  
**U.S. Const. 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 14th Amend.**  
**Supplemental State Claims**  
**Against All COLD**

158. Each Defendant acting under color of state law is empowered and restrained from acting by virtue of the respective constitutions, charters, articles of incorporation, appointments, or other entity formation documents describing the Defendant’s jurisdiction.

159. In proceeding as described in the STUART ASSAULT Defendants, and each of them acted in the complete absence of jurisdiction, causing “off the reservation” injury.<sup>vii</sup>

160. In exceeding the limits of their authority, DEFENDANTS, and each of them, committed a trespass onto the property, persons, rights, privileges, and immunities of PLAINTIFFS and are strictly liable for all HARM resulting therefrom.

161. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.

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**Count 5**  
**Supervisory Liability**  
**Deprivation of Rights under Color of State Law**  
**42 U.S.C. 1983**  
**U.S. Const. 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 14th Amend.**  
**Supplemental State Claims**

**Against SUPERVISING DEFENDANTS: SDCBA, SDSD DOES 16-20, GORE,  
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, TRENTACOSTSA, RODDY, CJC, AOC,  
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, ALKSNE, DOYNE, INC., DDIJO DOES 1-20**

162. SUPERVISING DEFENDANTS, and each of them, at all times had the power to oversee, supervise, train, discipline one or more other DEFENDANTS herein so as to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of acts of each other DEFENDANTS as alleged herein, including the DDIJO COMPLAINTS, the DOYNE COMPLAINTS, the FEDERAL ENGAGEMENT, the RACKETEERING ACTIVITY, and the STUART ASSAULT.

163. SUPERVISING DEFENDANTS knew or should have known of:

- A. PLAINTIFFS' FFRRESA;
- B. The widespread violations of the FFR and CFR, CULPABLE breach of PROFESSIONAL DUTIES, and other illegal activities of other defendants as alleged herein;
- C. The DDIJO and DOYNE COMPLAINTS; and

1 D. The ENGAGEMENTS and DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE of  
2 PLAINTIFFS and others regarding DEFENDANTS, the DDIJO, DDIA,  
3 DDIPS, SAC, ENTERPRISE and CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY operators  
4 and affiliates.  
5

6 164. After learning of PLAINTIFFS' FFRRESA, DEFENDANTS had a duty  
7 to investigate, oversee, re-train, discipline, and/or terminate those over whom they  
8 had the power to influence or control. Supervising Defendants failed to implement  
9 remedial measures such as reassignment, removal or other disciplinary actions to  
10 prevent further constitutional injuries to PLAINTIFFS and those similarly situated.  
11

12 165. Having this knowledge, SUPERVISING DEFENDANTS neglected or  
13 refused to prevent or aid in preventing the same.  
14

15 166. SUPERVISING DEFENDANTS UNREASONABLY and CULPABLY  
16 failed to implement appropriate training, supervision, hiring, discipline, programs to  
17 assure persons over whom they had the ability to influence or control would not  
18 commit the acts complained of, including the acts alleged in the DDIJO and DOYNE  
19 COMPLAINTS and the STUART ASSAULT.  
20

21 167. In performing their supervising duties, SUPERVISING DEFENDANTS  
22 implemented customs, policies, or practices that created unreasonable risks that  
23 subordinates would perpetrate the constitutional injuries complained of by  
24 PLAINTIFF, including:  
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COMPLAINT

- 1 A. Directing, rewarding, encouraging, or acting with deliberate indifference to the  
2 actions of subordinates which led to PLAINTIFF's constitutional injuries; and  
3 B. Failing to change the customs, practices, or policies, or employ corrective  
4 practices for subordinates, after having knowledge of actual or threatened  
5 constitutional injury.  
6 C. Facilitating, acquiescing to, endorsing, or ratifying HARRASMENT AND  
7 ABUSE  
8

9 168. Each Supervising Defendant played a role in forming and/or  
10 implementing the customs, policies, and/or practices causing PLAINTIFF's  
11 constitutional injury.  
12

13 169. Each Supervising Defendant had prior knowledge of acts of their  
14 subordinates, supervisors and/or trainees which cause constitutional injury similar to  
15 that complained of by PLAINTIFF.  
16

17 170. Despite the knowledge of past/prior acts causing or likely to cause  
18 constitutional injury, Supervising Defendants took no and/or inadequate corrective  
19 action, and in fact encouraged and/or covered up for the past/prior acts that caused or  
20 were likely to cause constitutional injury.  
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22 171. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.  
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**Count 6**  
**Municipal Liability**  
**Deprivation of Rights under Color of State Law**  
**42 U.S.C. 1983**  
**U.S. Const. 1st, 4th, 5th, 14th Amend.**  
**Against Defendants County of San Diego, SCSDC, CJC, AOC, CJP, SDSD**

172. DEFENDANTS in this Count are “governments beneath the state level” within the definition of that term in *Board of Comm’rs v. Brown*, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). (MUNICIPAL DEFENDANTS).

173. DEFENDANTS maintained rules, policies, customs, procedures, traditions, practices and permitted behaviors by policymakers themselves which perpetrated an intentional, reckless, and deliberate indifference to the likelihood of constitutional injury of the type caused to PLAINTIFFS in the DDIJO, DOYNE, INC., COMPLAINTS, and STUART ASSAULT, including customs and policies in violation of FFR and CALIFORNIA FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, and permitting HARASSMENT AND ABUSE against those exercising FFRRESA.

174. DEFENDANTS were acting pursuant to such custom and policy in committing the acts ascribed to them herein.

175. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.

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**Count 7**  
**Respondeat Superior Liability**  
**Against Defendants SDCBA, SDSB, GORE, County of San Diego, ALKSNE,**  
**DOYNE, INC., DDIJO DOES 1-10**

176. At all times pertinent hereto, each SAC Defendant was acting as an agent or employee of each RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR DEFENDANT herein. As a result, each of the wrongs or acts alleged against each Defendant herein is attributable to each Respondeat Superior Defendant.

**Count 8**  
**Breach of Contract, Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**  
**Against SDCBA**

177. In committing the STUART ASSAULT, Defendant SDCBA UNREASONABLY and CULPABLY deprived STUART of his rights under the STAURT-SDCBA CONTRACT without cause, notice, justification, or abatement, thereby breaching the contract.

178. Based on Defendant SDCBA's participation in the CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, STUART ASSAULT, ENTERPRISES, and other CULPABLE acts alleged herein, this breach of contract was, in bad faith, malicious, fraudulent, and oppressive in breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

179. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.

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2 **Count 9**  
3 **Wrongful Inducement To Breach of Contract, Covenant of Good Faith and Fair**  
4 **Dealing; Wrongful Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations;**  
5 **Defamation**  
6 **Deprivation of Constitutional Rights Under Color of Law**  
7 **42 U.S.C. 1983**  
8 **U.S. Const. 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 14th Amend.**  
9 **Supplemental State Claims**  
10 **Against SAC Defendants**

11 180. DEFENDANTS and each of them were aware of PLAINTIFFS and their  
12 affiliates, PLAINTIFFS' PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES and the STUART-  
13 SDCBA CONTRACT prior to the STUART ASSAULT.

14 181. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, CULPABLY planned, coordinated,  
15 communicated, and cooperated with SDCBA to induce and affect the STUART  
16 ASSAULT knowing and intending the same to be a breach of the SDCBA  
17 CONTRACT and covenants thereto.

18 182. DEFENDANTS' actions were undertaken willfully, maliciously, and  
19 fraudulently with the intent to wrongfully and illegally, arrest, imprison, intimidate,  
20 assault, humiliate, embarrass, and defame and wrongfully HARM PLAINTIFF  
21 causing interference with existing and prospective contractual relations as alleged  
22 above.

23 183. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.

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**Count 10**

**Deprivation of and Retaliation for FFRRESA Under Color of Law**

**42 U.S.C. 1983**

**U.S. Const. 1st, 5th, 14th Amend.**

**Against COLD, DOYNE, INC.**

184. DEFENDANTS were aware of the CCFC FFRRESA, BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT and ENGAGEMENT before the SDCBA SEMINAR.

185. DEFENDANTS disfavored PLAINTIFFS' PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES; Specifically PLAINTIFFS' "JUDGES BEHAVING BADLY" MESSAGE, and PLAINTIFFS' ongoing FFRRESA.

186. DEFENDANTS' affected the STUART ASSAULT to cause PLAINTIFFS, their members and affiliates, HARM, injury, embarrassment, intimidation, and humiliation, to their person and property CULPABLY and in retaliation for and with the intent to suppress, deprive, interfere with, and obstruct PLAINTIFFS' FFRRESA.

187. DEFENDANTS' actions were CULPABLE in violation of PLAINTIFF's rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

188. By the STUART ASSAULT DEFENDANTS intended, attempted, and did CHILL PLAINTIFFS and their affiliates from further FFRRESA as PLAINTIFFS, their affiliates, including the DDIA, DDIPS, DDIJO, DDIL, and others at or aware of the STUART ASSAULT were frightened, worried, demoralized, and

COMPLAINT

1 emotionally and psychologically traumatized. PLAINTIFFS and their affiliates have  
2 since abandoned further PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITY, dissembled, disassociated,  
3 avoided interactions with other PLAINTIFFS, causing personal and property HARM  
4 to PLAINTIFFS. After the STUART ASSAULT, PLAINTIFFS were inundated with  
5 business contacts, queries, and requests for direction which PLAINTIFFS,  
6 compromised, terrorized, and debilitated by the affect of the HARRASSMENT AND  
7 ABUSE, could not adequately respond to, further exacerbating damages to  
8 PLAINTIFFS' CCFC FFRRESA, and PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITY.  
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12 189. Further, PLAINTIFFS' clients, professional colleagues, and affiliates at  
13 or aware of the STUART ASSAULT who previously had high opinions of  
14 PLAINTIFFS and referred them significant business stopped referring business to  
15 PLAINTIFFS and their affiliates out of fear of reprisal by DEFENDANTS.  
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17 190. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.  
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19 **Count 11**

20 **Preventing Officer from Performing Duties**

21 **42 U.S.C. 1985(1)**

22 **U.S. Const. 1st, 4th, 5th, 14th Amend.**

23 **Against SAC Defendants**

24 191. In committing the acts alleged above, Defendants CONSPIRED:  
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26 A. To prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, STUART (1) from accepting or  
27 holding a POSITION UNDER THE U.S.; (2) from discharging his  
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PROFESSIONAL DUTIES; and

B. to induce by like means STUART to leave the State of California, the City of San Diego, the County of San Diego, the SDCBA SEMINAR where STUART’s PROFESSIONAL DUTIES were and are required to be performed;

C. to injure STUART in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of his PROFESSIONAL DUTIES under the United States, while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof; and

D. to injure STUART’s property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his PROFESSIONAL DUTIES under the United States.

192. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.

**Count 12**

**Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror**

**42 U.S.C. 1985(2)**

**U.S. Const. 1st, 4th, 5th, 14th Amend.**

**Against all Defendants**

193. PLAINTIFFS are members of and/or advocates for each of the following three classes subject to historic de facto and de jure invidious discrimination in violation of the 5th and 14th Amendment rights to Equal Protection of the Laws (collectively “EQUAL PROTECTION CLASSES”):

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**A. Parent-Child Class**

194. Parents and Children have been identified as a special class entitled to unique fundamental parental constitutional rights, including special status under the rights to equal protection of the laws. See *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); FFR supra.

**B. Domestic Relations Class**

195. Similarly, state and federal authorities in California have identified a special “domestic relations” class as entitled to heightened protection under the Equal Protection Clause. The state of California has identified the “Domestic Relations Class” as:

. . . an adult or a minor who is a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or person with whom the suspect has had a child or is having or has had a dating or ENGAGEMENT relationship. For purposes of this subdivision, "cohabitant" means two unrelated adult persons living together for a substantial period of time, resulting in some permanency of relationship. Factors that may determine whether persons are cohabiting include, but are not limited to, (1) sexual relations between the parties while sharing the same living quarters, (2) sharing of income or expenses, (3) joint use or ownership of property, (4) whether the parties hold themselves out as husband and wife, (5) the continuity of the

1 relationship, and (6) the length of the relationship.

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4 Cal. Fam. C. § 6211, Pen. C. § 13700.

5 196. Like marital status, the DOMESTIC RELATION Class is defined by a  
6 “relational” characteristic: persons in a current or former identified relationship, but  
7 only to interaction between others in the same Class. For example, a husband and  
8 wife are within the DOMESTIC RELATIONS Class with respect to one another, but  
9 not the rest of the world.  
10

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12 197. The DOMESTIC RELATIONS CLASS is also entitled to special  
13 protection because of a lengthy history of invidious discrimination against its  
14 members. This history and a complete explanation of the DOMESTIC RELATIONS  
15 CLASS status, jeopardy, invidious discrimination,, and rationale for special status  
16 under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and (3) are discussed in detail in the July 24, 2013 letter  
17 from CCFC to the City of San Diego, and the San Diego Family Justice Center and  
18 the *Tadros v. Lesh* Petition for Certiorari, Exhibits 1 and 2 incorporated herein by  
19 reference.  
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22 198. Discrimination against the DOMESTIC RELATIONS CLASS is  
23 invidious social, economic, and legal discrimination similar to racial, ethnic, gender,  
24 or legitimacy. In addition to the inevitable and debilitating economic, social, and  
25 psychological impact of divorce, children and parents within the DOMESTIC  
26 RELATIONS CLASS are the historical targets of ridicule, prejudice, and scorn  
27  
28 COMPLAINT



1 amounting to invidious discrimination. Domestic Relations Class members are  
2 stamped with stereotypes as “broken family,” “latch-key kids,” “damaged goods,”  
3 “gold diggers,” “divorcees,” “sugar daddies,” “first wives,” “wife beater,”  
4 “histrionics,” “single moms,” “broken homers”—and the list goes on.  
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### 8 **C. Gender Class**

9 199. PLAINTIFF STUART a male within the recognized equal protection  
10 class of gender. The invidious discrimination against males by DEFENDANTS has  
11 been described in detail in a publication by Dr. Stephen Baskerville entitled *Taken*  
12 *Into Custody, The War Against Fathers, Marriage, and the Family*, Cleveland House  
13 Publishing, Inc., 2007 and in Exhibit 1 hereto. Dr. Baskerville has extended  
14 permission to reprint portions, but not all of his publication herein. The publication is  
15 therefore referenced and incorporated herein as if set forth in full as Exhibit 13; the  
16 entirety is available at ISBN-10: 1581825943, ISBN-13: 978-1581825947.  
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### 21 **D. Class of One**

22 200. STUART, CCFC, LEXEVIA each comprise a class of one for purposes  
23 of PLAINTIFFS’ FFRRESA on behalf of themselves and other equal protection  
24 classes.  
25

26 201. No COLD may legally act with discretion in the absence of jurisdiction  
27 established by the constitution, statutes, laws, contract, or regulation.<sup>viii</sup>  
28

1        202.        PLAINTIFFS' membership in and advocacy for the EQUAL  
2 PROTECTION CLASSES was known to and targeted by DEFENDANTS prior to  
3  
4 the SDCBA SEMINAR. DEFENDANTS CULPABLY undertook each of the acts  
5 ascribed to them with the intent affect the STUART ASSAULT and  
6 HARRASSMENT AND ABUSE with the intent to deprive PLAINTIFFS, and each  
7  
8 of them, of equal protections, privileges, and immunities, including rights related to  
9 FFRRESA, rights as advocates for and on behalf of the EQUAL PROTECTION  
10 CLASSES.

11        203.        In performing the acts alleged above, DEFENDANTS conspired:

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14 A. to deter, PLAINTIFFS, by the STUART ASSAULT and HARRASSMENT AND  
15 ABUSE, from attending or testifying freely, fully, and truthfully as a party or witness  
16 in PLAINTIFFS' FFRRESA, or from testifying to any matter, freely, fully, and  
17 truthfully;  
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21 B. to injure PLAINTIFFS, by the STUART ASSAULT and HARRASSMENT AND  
22 ABUSE, in their person or property on account of having participated in FFRRESA  
23 or testified in conjunction with the FFRRESA and the DUE ADMINISTRATION OF  
24 JUSTICE;  
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28 C. to influence, by the STUART ASSAULT and HARRASSMENT AND ABUSE,  
COMPLAINT

1 the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in connection with  
2 PLAINTIFF'S FFRRESA and the DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE;  
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5 D. committed the STUART ASSAULT and HARRASSMENT AND ABUSE for the  
6 purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, the DUE  
7 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE and PLAINTIFFS' FFRRESA with intent to  
8 deny to PLAINTIFFS as members and advocates for the EQUAL PROTECITON  
9 CLASSES the equal protection of the laws and to  
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13 E. by STUART ASSAULT and HARRASSMENT AND ABUSE, injure  
14 PLAINTIFFS in their property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the  
15 right of PLAINTIFFS and THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLASSES, to the equal  
16 protection of the laws.  
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20 204. Hereinafter collectively referred to as the CIVIL CONSPIRACY.

21 As an actual an proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.  
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**Count 13**

**Conspiracy to Deprive Rights and Privileges**

**42 U.S.C. 1985(3)(a)**

**U.S. Const. 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 14th Amend.**

**Against all Defendants**

205. In committing the STUART ASSAULT, DEFENDANTS CULPABLY acted in CIVIL CONSPIRACY for the purpose of depriving PLAINTIFFS individually as members of and advocates for the EQUAL PROTECTION CLASSES, of the equal protection of the laws and equal privileges and immunities under the laws, including but not limited to their FFRRESA, the DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, and retaliating for exercise thereof, causing PLAINTIFFS deprivation and injury therefrom.

206. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.

**Count 14**

**Conspiracy to Deprive of Constitutional Rights**

**42 U.S.C. 1985(3)(b)**

**U.S. Const. 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 14th Amend.**

**Against all Defendants**

207. In committing the STUART ASSAULT, DEFENDANTS CULPABLY CONSPIRED to cause the STUART ASSAULT for the purpose of preventing or hindering the FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS and color of state law actors identified herein from giving or securing to all persons within the state of

COMPLAINT

1 California, including the EQUAL PROTECTION CLASSES and PLAINTIFFS  
2 individually as members of and advocates for the EQUAL PROTECTON CLASSES.  
3

4 208. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.

5 **Count 15**

6 **Conspiracy to Deprive of Constitutional Rights**

7 **42 U.S.C. 1985(3)(c)**

8 **U.S. Const. 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 14th Amend.**

9 **Against all Defendants**

10 209. In committing the STUART ASSAULT, Defendants CULPABLY and  
11 UNREASONABLY acted and CONSPIRED to prevent by force, intimidation, or  
12 threat, PLAINTIFFS'S FFRRESA as a member or on behalf of each EQUAL  
13 PROTECTION CLASS, in a legal manner, and to injure PLAINTIFFS in person and  
14 property on account thereof.  
15

16 210. PLAINTIFFS' FFRRESA included support and advocacy toward and in  
17 favor of federal processes and institutions, including the election of lawfully qualified  
18 persons as electors for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the  
19 United States.  
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**Count 16**  
**Failure to Prevent or Aid in Preventing Deprivation of**  
**Constitutional Rights**  
**42 U.S.C. 1986**  
**Against all COLD**

211. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, had knowledge of all facts alleged herein, including that the acts CONSPIRED to be done, and committed as alleged in Counts 11-15 were about to be committed.

212. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, by virtue of their relationships with each other defendant, their authority under color of law, and PROFESSIONAL DUTIES, had power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same.

213. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, neglected or refused to exercise their powers to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same.

214. The acts as alleged herein were in fact committed as alleged.

215. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.

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**Count 17**  
**Breach of Contract, Fraud, Abuse of Process,**  
**CULPABLE Breach of Duty**  
**42 U.S.C. 1983**  
**U.S. Const. 4th, 5th, 14th Amend.**  
**Against DOYNE, INC., ABC&K, WOHLFEIL, SCHALL**

216. On or about September 12, 2008, STUART and DOYNE, INC. entered into written and oral contracts with PLAINTIFF (STUART- DOYNE CONTRACT). A true and correct copy of which is in DOYNE INC’s possession and as such is referenced as Exhibit 31 as if attached hereto.

217. DOYNE, INC. made further representations and warranties to STUART as follows:

- A. That DOYNE was only authorized and would only act to “mediate”, and could not perform a custody evaluation, therapy, “forensic investigation” “analysis” or “evaluation” or act as a witness in court;
- B. That DOYNE would not permit ex parte contact, and would take no action or recommendation except as authorized by the court or the parties;
- C. That DOYNE would base his reasoning and actions on actual evidence and law;
- D. That all parties would be afforded notice and opportunity to be heard before DOYNE took any action or made any recommendations regarding the matter;

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E. That DOYNE INC. was an alternative to court and governmental intervention, safer, more private, and less expensive than court, but with the same procedural safeguards;

F. That DOYNE would “quickly” work toward 50/50 custody, that it would only take “a few sessions”, and that his fees and expenses would not exceed the initial \$5,000 retainer;

G. That the DOYNE INC. mediation process would be completed in “a month or two”;

H. That DOYNE’s contact with the court would be in the form of a written report which both parties would have an opportunity to review, comment on, contest, supplement, and collaborate over before submission to the court;

I. That DOYNE’S had no authority to take actions or make judgments, but only to work toward cooperative solutions;

J. That DOYNE would not recommend any solution that would harm, burden, or obstruct any party, and that he was “honest, fair, and completely competent” to perform mediation services.

218. These representations were false when made.

219. As described more fully in Exhibits 22 and 23, during the course of performance, on or about June, 2009, DOYNE INC breached the contracts and representations by failing to abide by each of the above reference promises, his

COMPLAINT



1 PROFESSIONAL DUTIES, including duties of disclosure, loyalty, honesty, and  
2 good faith, as well as breaching one or more provision of the written contract.  
3

4 220. Specifically:

5 A. DOYNE extended the mediation for over a year, insisting on weekly  
6 sessions for months on end to address issues he had not been authorized to  
7 mediate;  
8

9 B. DOYNE was not only unable to resolve even minor issues successfully, he  
10 welcomed and encouraged both parties to bring up new issues unrelated to  
11 child custody, effectively attempting to insert himself as an arbiter for all  
12 disputes—real or imagined—between the parties; and by otherwise extended  
13 the mediation for over a year to increase his fees;  
14

15 C DOYNE refused to investigate STUART’s claims and evidence that MS.  
16 STUART was abusing their son, Croix Stuart, in violation of his professional  
17 duties to report child abuse (Ex. 12);  
18

19 D. DOYNE exceeded his authority in filing false and misleading reports with  
20 San Diego County child protective services alleging that PLAINTIFF had  
21 “held his son upside down over a balcony” when DOYNE in fact knew and  
22 later admitted, that claim was untrue;  
23

24 E. That San Diego County Child Protective Services had performed an  
25 investigation of DOYNE’s allegations against PLAINTIFF and found  
26 DOYNE’s allegation to be false;  
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F. Because of DOYNE’s false and misleading letters and report to San Diego Child Protective Services, DOYNE caused the removal of PLAINTIFF’s son Croix Stuart from PLAINTIFF’S shared custody and awarded sole custody to Petitioner Ms. Stuart;

G. The DOYNE repeatedly ignored or failed to follow up on PLAINTIFF’s concerns that Croix Stuart was being abused, manipulated, and alienated by Petitioner Ms. Stuart;

H. That DOYNE was forcing PLAINTIFF to pay for services of DOYNE which PLAINTIFF objected to, did not request, and were wasteful and unnecessary; and

I. That DOYNE effectively held Stuart’s son hostage, dangling his custody decisions between the couple, increasing adversarial hostilities, strife, and conflict, in order solely to run up his fees in the case;

J. That DOYNE was in fact unauthorized to perform any work on the matter as he was ineligible, unqualified, and had failed to establish his eligibility by appropriate procedure; and

K. Further breaches of each representation identified herein and in Exs. 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 14, 18, 19, 20, 22, and 23 hereto.

**DOYNE INC.’S Retaliation**

221. In response to these breaches, on or about March 1, 2009, STUART terminated DOYNE’S services.

1        222.        In addition to complaining to and firing DOYNE, PLAINTIFF also filed  
2 formal complaints with DOYNE's landlord, Scripps Memorial Hospital, the State of  
3 California Board of Psychology, the LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS as part of  
4 his FFRRESA. Doyne knew of these complaints.  
5

6        223.        A true and correct copy letters to and concerning DOYNE relating to  
7 these allegations are attached as Exhibits 22-23.  
8

9        224.        In response to PLAINTIFF's objections and reports detailed above  
10 DOYNE INC. retaliated against STUART as described above relating to the  
11 STUART ASSAULT and by committing one or more of the following acts against  
12 STUART:  
13

14            A.        Committing perjury in a hearing relating to the PLAINTIFF Stuart's son,  
15 Croix Stuart;  
16

17            B.        Continuing to file false reports and encourage the (false) investigation of  
18 his initial report against PLAINTIFF Stuart;  
19

20            C.        Attempting to terrorize, intimidate, distress, harm, defraud, extort, and  
21 rob Stuart; and  
22

23            D.        Requesting a bribe.  
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1 **DOYNE INC'S Terrorist Threats to extort, defraud, HARM STUART and his**  
2 **son, Croix Stuart**

3 225. In May, 2009, DOYNE telephoned STUART at home requesting that  
4 STUART pay DOYNE for services he falsely claimed to have provided.  
5

6 226. DOYNE advised STUART that he had sent STUART several invoices  
7 which STUART had advised DOYNE he would not pay.  
8

9 227. DOYNE advised STUART that he "should come current" and that if he  
10 did so, DOYNE would "work with you" to "get more time with your son."  
11

12 228. Given DOYNE'S pattern and history of professional incompetence,  
13 fraud, breach of contract, HARRASSMENT AND ABUSE, deprivation of rights,  
14 false CPS report, overbilling, and other CULPABLE conduct as alleged herein,  
15 STUART was horrified at what he regarded as predatory behavior and an apparent  
16 threat to commit further acts of perjury, abuse of process, and manipulation regarding  
17 custody of STUART's son if STUART did not "come current."  
18

19 229. He was further extremely distressed that DOYNE then maintained a  
20 relationship with his Croix Stuart and Lynn Stuart as a therapist, and would inflict  
21 further harm or commit further facilitation of Ms. Stuart's child abuse if STUART  
22 did not comply with DOYNE's demand for a bribe. Ex. 4, 22  
23

24 230. STUART refused to pay DOYNE any more money, but was horrified,  
25 traumatized, and severely distressed as a result of DOYNE'S behavior.  
26

27 231. As an actual and proximate result, STUART has been HARMED.  
28

COMPLAINT

1  
2 **BLANCHET’S Agency, Representations, Warranties for DOYNE INC:**

3 232. STUART hired DOYNE INC. pursuant to various material  
4 representations and warranties by BLANCHET. These representations and  
5 warranties are set forth in Exhibit 14 and incorporated herein by reference.  
6

7 233. STUART’S reliance on these representations was reasonable.

8 234. Said representations and warranties were in fact false when made.  
9

10 235. As an actual and proximate result, STUART has been HARMED.  
11

12  
13 **Count 18**

14 **CULPABLE Breach of Duty**

15 **Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law**

16 **42 U.S.C. 1983**

17 **U.S. Const. 1st, 4th, 5th, 14th Amend.**

18 **Against DOYNE INC Supervising Defendants**

19 **WOHLFEIL, SCHALL, ALKSNE, TRENTACOSTA, SCSDC**

20 236. DOYNE SUPERVISING DEFENDANTS, and each of them, at all times  
21 had the power to oversee, supervise, train, discipline DOYNE and DOYNE INC. so  
22 as to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of DOYNE and DOYNE INC.’s  
23 acts as alleged herein.  
24

25  
26 237. On or about April 10, 2008, Defendant WOHFEIL recommended to  
27 oversee Defendant DOYNE to “mediate” custody in the Stuart Dissolution.  
28

COMPLAINT

1       238.       From the date WOHLFEIL recommended Defendant DOYNE until the  
2 Stuart dissolution was re-assigned to Defendant SCHALL, Defendant WOHLFEIL  
3 acted, inter alia, in an administrative capacity in supervising Defendants DOYNE as a  
4 professional “Forensic Psychologist” and Defendant DOYNE INC’s as commercial  
5 psychology enterprise and in the Stuart Dissolution.  
6

7  
8       239.       DOYNE INC. was hired by STUART pursuant to representations and  
9 assurances from WOHLFEIL and BLANCHET that DOYNE INC. was a trustworthy,  
10 competent mediator. WOHLFEIL retained administrative supervisory authority,  
11 oversight, and ability to prevent or aid in preventing the breaches of duty, fraud,  
12 extortion, and abuse of DOYNE INC. described herein.  
13

14  
15       240.       In or about December, 2008, SCHALL took over WOHLFEIL’S  
16 courtroom, including the STUART v STUART matter. As such, SCHALL undertook  
17 WOHLFEIL’S responsibilities for supervision and oversight of DOYNE and  
18 DOYNE INC.  
19

20       241.       From the date the Stuart Dissolution was re-assigned from Defendant  
21 WOHLFEIL to Defendant SCHALL, until on or about November, 2009, Defendant  
22 SCHALL acted, inter alia, in the same administrative capacity in supervising  
23 Defendants DOYNE and DOYNE INC.  
24

25       242.       Defendants WOHLFEIL and SCHALL had independent and/or joint and  
26 several Supervising Authority over Defendants DOYNE and DOYNE, INC.  
27  
28

1        243.        SCHALL and WOHLFEIL CULPABLY AND UNREASONABLY  
2 permitted DOYNE to commit the fraud, abuse of process, extortion, and terror  
3  
4 against STUART.

5        244.        DOYNE SUPERVISING DEFENDANTS knew or should have known:

6  
7  
8        A. DOYNE’S history of fraud, abuse, and illegal conduct described herein;

9        B. The pattern of illegal activities of the CONSPIRACIES and CRIMINAL  
10 ENTERPRISES herein;

11  
12        C. DDIJO and DOYNE COMPLAINTS; and

13        D. The FEDERAL ENGAGEMENT of PLAINTIFFS and others regarding  
14 DEFENDANTS, the DDIJO, DDIA, DDIPS, SAC, ENTERPRISE and  
15 CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY operators and affiliates.  
16

17  
18        245.        After learning of DOYNE’S history of illegal conduct, fraud, and abuse,  
19 DOYNE SUPERVISING DEFENDANTS had a duty to investigate, oversee, re-train,  
20 discipline, and/or terminate those over which they had the power to influence or  
21 control including DOYNE and DOYNE, INC. Supervising Defendants failed to  
22 implement remedial measures such as reassignment, removal or other disciplinary  
23 actions to prevent further constitutional injuries to PLAINTIFFS and those similarly  
24 situated.  
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COMPLAINT

1       246.       Having this knowledge, DOYNE SUPERVISING DEFENDANTS  
2 neglected or refused to prevent or aid in preventing the same.

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4       247.       SUPERVISING DEFENDANTS UNREASONABLY and CULPABLY  
5 failed to implement appropriate training, supervision, hiring, discipline, programs to  
6 assure persons over whom they had the ability to influence or control would not  
7 commit the acts complained of, including the acts alleged in the DDIJO and DOYNE  
8 COMPLAINTS and the STUART ASSAULT.

9  
10       248.       In performing their supervising authorities, DOYNE SUPERVISING  
11 DEFENDANTS implemented customs, policies, or practices that created  
12 unreasonable risks that subordinates would perpetrate the constitutional injuries  
13 complained of by PLAINTIFF, including:  
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17       A. Directing, rewarding, encouraging, or acting with deliberate indifference to the  
18 actions of subordinates which led to PLAINTIFF's constitutional injuries; and  
19  
20       B. Failing to change customs and policies, or employ corrective practices for  
21 subordinates causing PLAINTIFFS' constitutional HARM.  
22

23  
24       249.       Each DOYNE SUPERVISING DEFENDANT played a role in forming  
25 and/or implementing the customs, policies, and/or practices causing PLAINTIFF's  
26 HARM.  
27

28  
COMPLAINT





1 255. DOYNE INC.'S behavior was a CULPABLE, extreme and outrageous,  
2 malicious, oppressive, and fraudulent breach of one or more PROFESSIONAL  
3 DUTIES and deprivation of STUART'S FFR, CRF, and EQUAL PROTECTION  
4 CLASS rights.  
5

6 256. Each DEFENDANT facilitated, encouraged, was deliberately indifferent  
7 to, was aware of and acquiesced to DOYNE INC'S behaviors, actions,  
8 representations, inducement, and PLAINTIFF'S likely and actual reasonable reliance  
9 thereon.  
10

11 257. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFF has been HARMED.  
12  
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14  
15 **Count 20**

16 **Unjust Enrichment**

17 **Against DOYNE, DOYNE INC. ABC&K, BLANCHET**

18 258. In reliance on DEFENDANTS' acts and omissions, PLAINTIFF has  
19 been wrongfully induced to retain DEFENDANTS, and as a result has paid in excess  
20 of \$350,000 to Defendants.  
21

22 259. As an actual and proximate result of Defendant DEFENDANTS'  
23 misfeasance and malfeasance described herein, DEFENDANTS have been unjustly  
24 enriched in an amount paid by PLAINTIFF and Ms. Stuart, the exact amount to be  
25 proven at trial  
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27  
28 COMPLAINT

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**Count 21**  
**False designation of origin, false description**  
**Lanham Act**  
**15 U.S.C. § 1125**  
**Against All Defendants**

260. DEFENDANTS, in connection with their businesses, professions, PROFESSIONAL DUTIES, CONSPIRACIES and ENTERPRISE OPERATIONS, use in their advertisements, promotions, sale and offer for sale of their legal services words, terms, names, symbols, and devices, and combinations thereof, (COMMERCIAL SPEECH) which are false and misleading.

261. In their COMMERCIAL SPEECH DEFENANTS represent that their services abide by ordinary and professional standards of care, are legal, efficient, safe, and effective exercise of governmental powers and public licenses provided under law as follows per defendant:

<b>Entity/ies</b>	<b>Misrepresentation/Reference</b>
A. All Defendants	See below; public and private services are legal, safe, efficient, obedient to PROFESSIONAL DUTIES and standards of care.
B. DOYNE, INC	See below; child custody evaluations/mediations are safe, therapeutic, “caring” and effective, cause no harm to parents or children ; prices for services are reasonable; services provider is authorized according

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to court processes and law; service provider is and will observe legal, professional, and moral restraint in his duties; will not abuse power or process; In collusion with Defendant ACFEI, that DOYNE’S certifications, “Diplomat/e” status, resume are accurate, true, and authentic.

C. ACFEI

See below, Ex. 43; Independently and in collusion with DOYNE, Defendant offers “Certified” “Diplomat” and “Fellow” titles and certifications as authentic reflections of common understanding of such titles; the organizations is a “College” institution of higher learning, has a “campus” on Sunshine Street in Springfield MO;

D. ALLIANCE

See below; Ex. 1, 41

E. CJC/AOC/SCSDC, ALLIANCE

ALLIANCE and Family Court Facilitator Officers are legal advisors authorized to provide legal representation and advice; DV Forms are legal; “abuse” is a crime; Judges can legally issue DVILS Orders; the FFR and CFR are not available to California Citizens; there is no right to jury trial in liberty or property deprivation hearings; the DVILS are valid and enforceable.; all Defendants exercise their authority according to constitutional authority PROFESSIONAL DUTIES and law. Ex . 42.

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F. CJP                      The CJP protects the rights of litigants from judicial abuse, transgression, and civil rights violations of the FFR and CFR; CJP has authority to and does enforce the CRCCS on behalf of litigants; the CJP is the “first step” in proceeding in federal court for enforcement of civil rights; DDIL need not proceed to federal court; The CJP is a neutral finder of fact; The CJP is loyal to PROFESSIONAL DUTIES to serve the interests of litigants equally as to government lawyers

G. FRITZ                      Ex. 46

H. BIERER                      Ex. 47

I. BLANCHET                      Ex. 48

262.      With Respect to Defendant ALLIANCE, it further advertises and promotes:

A. The ALLIANCE legally operates the lead “technical assistance” center for development of Family Justice Centers across the United States. The Alliance claims it “has been expanding and broadening its services since its inception in response to the increasing demand for technical assistance (consulting, training, planning, and support services) from existing and developing Family

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Justice Centers in the United States and around the world. The Alliance serves as the clearinghouse, research center, and national membership organization for all Family Justice Centers and similar multi-agency, multi-disciplinary service delivery models serving victims of domestic violence and other forms of abuse and oppression.”

B. The ALLIANCE claims it legally “serves as the clearinghouse, research center, and national membership organization for all Family Justice Centers and similar multi-agency, multi-disciplinary service delivery models serving victims of domestic violence and other forms of abuse and oppression;” “serves as the comprehensive technical assistance and training provider for the United States Department of Justice for federally funded Centers;” “works with Centers outside the federal initiative in the U.S. and abroad.”

C. The ALLIANCE claims “there are currently more than 80 operational Centers in the United States with ten international Centers (Canada, Mexico, England, Jordan, and Sweden). There are over 140 Centers currently developing in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Central America. The Alliance is currently partnered with the Mexican government, Management Systems International, and USAID to help open more than twenty Women's Justice Centers in Mexico.”

D. “The ALLIANCE hosts an annual international conference, provides shared learning opportunities such as staff exchange programs, internships, web-based education programs, and training in many areas related to family violence, elder abuse, child abuse, sexual assault, and human trafficking. At present, the Alliance has over 11,000 members and over 10,000 attendees per year in its online training courses. Over 60,000 unique users per year access the Alliance's online resources.”

- 1 E. “The ALLIANCE is the coordinator of the current California Family Justice  
2 Initiative, funded by the Blue Shield of California Foundation, which has  
3 helped start ten new Family Justice Centers in California in the last three years.  
4 The \$2 million Blue Shield of California Foundation California Family Justice  
5 Initiative is funding development of a statewide network of Centers made up of  
6 core criminal justice system professionals and a host of community-based non-  
7 profit and government agencies. Today, the Alliance is assisting with the start  
8 up of fifteen additional Centers in California.”
- 9 F. The ALLIANCE “staffs the FJC Legal Network, the Client Services Program,  
10 Camp HOPE, and the Teen Relationship Violence Program in the San Diego  
11 Family Justice Center. The FJC Legal Network, founded in 2009, is housed at  
12 the San Diego Family Justice Center and provides civil legal assistance to  
13 domestic violence victims. The Client Services Program manages client  
14 screenings, intakes, and delivery of services to victims and their children.  
15 Camp HOPE is a specialized camping and mentoring initiative for children  
16 exposed to domestic violence, physically and sexually abused children, and at-  
17 risk youth.
- 18 G. The ALLIANCE advertises and represents that it is “creating a future where:  
19 ALL the needs of victims are met; children are protected; Batterers are held  
20 accountable; Violence fades; Economic justice increases; Families heal and  
21 thrive; Hope is realized; and we ALL work together.” The Alliance seeks “to  
22 create a network of national and international Family Justice Centers and  
23 similar co-located service models with close working relationships, shared  
24 training and technical assistance, collaborative learning processes, coordinated  
25 funding assistance, and transformational leadership.” Exs. 1, 41.

26  
27 263. With respect to Defendant CJP, it advertises and promotes:  
28

- 1 A. "The commission's jurisdiction includes oversight, supervision, training,  
2 supervision, and discipline over judges of California's superior courts and the  
3 justices of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. The commission also has  
4 jurisdiction over former judges for conduct prior to retirement or resignation.  
5 Additionally, the commission shares authority with the superior courts for the  
6 oversight of court commissioners and referees. The Director-Chief Counsel of  
7 the commission is designated as the Supreme Court's investigator for  
8 complaints involving the judges of the State Bar Court. The commission does  
9 not have authority over federal judges, judges pro tem or private judges. In  
10 addition to its disciplinary function, the commission is responsible for handling  
11 judges' applications for disability retirement."
- 12 B. "The commission's authority is limited to investigating allegations of judicial  
13 misconduct and, if warranted, imposing discipline. Judicial misconduct usually  
14 involves conduct in conflict with the standards set forth in the Code of Judicial  
15 Ethics. After investigation, and in some cases a public hearing, the commission  
16 may impose sanctions ranging from confidential discipline to removal from  
17 office."

18  
19 264. With respect to Defendant ACEFI:

- 20  
21 A. ACEFI advertises and promotes itself as "the largest forensic science  
22 membership association, forensics education, credentials, courses, training and  
23 membership for forensics examiners." ACEFI sells memberships,  
24 certifications, accreditations, training materials and products, career services,  
25 and professional referral networking. It publishes and circulates a subscription  
26 magazine entitled "The Forensic Examiner" to members and other Subscribers.
- 27 B. ACEFI sells certifications in areas such as "Certified Forensic Examiner,"  
28 "Certified Forensic Accountant, Cr.FA®," "Certified Forensic Nurse, CFN®,"



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“Certified Criminal Investigator, CCI®,” “Certified Forensic Physician CFP®,” “Certified Medical Investigator CMI®,” “Certified Master Forensic Social Worker CMF SW®,” “Certified Forensic Consultant CFC®,” “Certified Survival Mindset CSM®,” and “Certified Instructor CI.”

C. ACEFI operates no campus. It sells its certifications nationwide online at a website located at [www.acefi.com](http://www.acefi.com) and at [www.facebook.com/acefi](http://www.facebook.com/acefi). At its online website it offers the “advanced” certifications of “Diplomat” and “Fellow” to consumers who want to “Become a Diplomat Now!” Ex. \_\_. From its website and its Sunshine Street offices in Springfield, MO, it offers the following “Diplomate” “Board Certifications:” and “Accreditations;”

- 1) Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Accounting—DABFA; Accredited bachelor’s degree or higher; current and active CPA or international equivalent;
- 2) Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Counselors—DABFC; Minimum of an accredited master’s degree; current and valid license in counseling or mental health field;
- 3) Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Dentistry—DABFD, DDS or DMD from an ADA-accredited school or equivalent non-US academic institution; current, valid license to practice dentistry;
- 4) Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Examiners—DABFE; Accredited bachelor’s degree or higher;
- 5) Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Engineering and Technology—DABFET; Accredited bachelor’s degree or higher in an engineering or technological discipline;
- 6) Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Medicine—DABFM;

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MD/DO degree in medicine from an accredited medical school;  
current, valid medical license;

7) Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Nursing—DABFN;  
Minimum of a BSN from an accredited nursing school; possession of  
a current, valid RN license;

8) Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Social Workers—  
DABFSW;  
Minimum of an MSW from an accredited university or college;  
current, valid social work license (if applicable);

9) Diplomate of the American Board of Recorded Evidence—DABRE;

D. The single requirement for “Fellow” advanced certifications are available to  
anyone who has been a “Diplomate” for three years, and pay \$250.

E. To anyone who can answer “No” to the questions “Have you been convicted  
of a felony?” and “Are you under investigation for fraud?”, and pay \$250,  
ACEFI also offers the following Credentials:

- 10) Certified Master Forensic Social Worker, CMFSW®
- 11) Certified Forensic Accountant, Cr.FA
- 12) Certified Forensic Consultant, CFC®
- 13) Certified in Survival Mindset, CSM®
- 14) Certified Forensic Nurse, CFN®
- 15) Certified Forensic Physician®, CFP
- 16) Certified Medical Investigator®, CMI
- 17) Certified Criminal Investigator, CCI®

F. ACEFI describes the “Fellow” certification as “the highest honor ACEFI can  
bestow upon a member. This designation is reserved for members with  
outstanding achievements and excellence as well as participating actively in

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ACFEI programs.” This Honor is achieved by filling out an online form requiring a name, address and telephone number, and answering the questions “Have you ever been convicted of a felony?\*” and “Have you ever been disciplined, or are you currently under investigation, by any legal or licensing board? \*” The “Fellow” and “Diplomat” advanced certifications are available online for \$250.

G. ACEFI offers online courses for “Behavioral Science,” “Forensics,” “Psychotherapy,” “Integrative Medicine,” and “Missouri Sheriffs.”

H. The “Certifications,” “Boards,” “College,” “school,” and “classes” offered by ACEFI described in paragraphs 1)-24) do not exist.

265. The claims of all Defendants described in this count and elsewhere are false and misleading.

266. With respect to each Defendant:

A. In their activates described herein, DEFENDANTS operate CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES which defraud, abuse, oppress, and deprive PLAINTIFFS and the general public of their property and liberty.

B. In their COMMERCIAL SPEECH promotion for such ENTERPRISES, including websites, literature, public appearances, statements and representations, DEFENDANTS misrepresent theirs and others’ legal and professional services as legal, fair, honest, and beneficial, when in fact they are fraudulent, harmful, inefficient, oppressive, and illegal.

C. Further, in their advertising and promotion DEFENDANTS fail to warn consumers of the illegality of their services, the constitutional deprivations they cause and form the basis of liability for, and the many disastrous pitfalls which occur regularly from use of such professional services. As such,

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DEFENDANTS mislead as to the nature, characteristics, qualities, of their and their ENTERPRISE affiliates' services, including the nature of the ENTERPRISE and purposes of the SAD,

D. Defendants mislead consumers by misdirection from superior, legitimate, legal services by one ore more SAD, and by advising "that's how it is" in family court, and by failing to advise of the full options consumers have toward legal, healthy, and safe alternatives to avoid the abundant harm likely to befall those who engage in such activities.

E. .DDICE DEFENDANTS operate SAD and "black hat" operations under the guise of "white hat" legality and professional responsibility, thereby deceiving consumers of legal services into engaging such services with the expectations that such is as safe, lawful, and healthy as "standard" legal and psychological services. They are not.

267. PLAINTIFFS have been damaged and reasonably believe they are likely to be damaged again by such acts.

**VI. RICO ALLEGATIONS:**

**RICO DEFENDANTS**

268. In addition to the allegations regarding each Defendant above, certain defendants are each engaged in activities which constitute a RICO Enterprise, and that each such defendant is a "person," as that term is defined pursuant to Section 1961(3) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO).

Such Defendants are:

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- A. SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, a California Corporation
- B. SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, a municipal entity
- C. WILLIAM D. GORE, an individual
- D. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, a municipal entity
- E. SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, a municipal entity
- F. ROBERT J. TRENTACOSTSA, an individual
- G. MICHAEL RODDY, an individual
- H. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, a municipal entity
- I. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, a municipal entity
- J. TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE, an individual
- K. COMMISSION JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, a municipal entity
- L. LAWRENCE J. SIMI, an individual
- M. BRAD BATSON, an individual
- N. NATIONAL FAMILY JUSTICE CENTER ALLIANCE, a California Corporation
- O. LISA SCHALL, an individual
- P. LORNA ALKSNE, an individual
- Q. OFF DUTY OFFICERS, INC., a business entity of unknown form
- R. CHRISTINE GOLDSMITH, an individual
- S. JEANNIE LOWE, an individual
- T. WILLIAM MCADAM, an individual
- U. EDLENE MCKENZIE, an individual
- V. JOEL WOHLFEIL, an individual
- W. CAROLE BALDWIN, an individual
- X. LAURY BALDWIN, an individual
- Y. BALDWIN AND BALDIWN, a California professional corporation
- Z. LARRY CORRIGAN, an individual

- 1 AA. WILLIAM HARGRAEVES, an individual  
2 BB. HARGRAEVES & TAYLOR, PC, a California Professional  
3 Corporation  
4 CC. TERRY CHUCAS, an individual  
5 DD. MERIDITH LEVIN, an individual  
6 EE. ALLEN SLATTERY, INC., a California Corporation, a Corporation  
7 FF. JANIS STOCKS, an individual  
8 GG. STOCKS & COLBURN, a California professional corporation  
9 HH. DR. STEPHEN DOYNE, an individual  
10 II. DR. STEPHEN DOYNE, INC., a professional corporation  
11 JJ. SUSAN GRIFFIN, an individual  
12 KK. DR. LORI LOVE, an individual  
13 LL. LOVE AND ALVAREZ PSYCHOLOGY, INC., a California  
14 corporation  
15 MM. ROBERT A. SIMON, PH.D, an individual  
16 NN. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF FORENSIC EXAMINERS INSTITUTE,  
17 a business entity of unknown form  
18 OO. ROBERT O'BLOCK, an individual  
19 PP. LORI CLARK VIVIANO, an individual  
20 QQ. LAW OFFICES OF LORI CLARK VIVIANO, a business entity of  
21 unknown form  
22 RR. SHARON BLANCHET, an individual  
23 SS. ASHWORTH, BLANCHET, KRISTENSEN, & KALEMENKARIAN,  
24 a California Professional Corporation  
25 TT. MARILYN BIERER, an individual  
26 UU. BIERER AND ASSOCIATES, a California Professional Corporation  
27 VV. JEFFREY FRITZ, an individual  
28

COMPLAINT

1 WW. BASIE AND FRITZ, a professional corporation

2  
3 269. By virtue of their affiliations, conspiracy, associations, and collaboration  
4 as alleged herein, RICO DEFENDANTS function collectively as alter ego vehicles of  
5 one another facilitate and further the commercial purposes of the ENTERPRISES  
6 alleged herein.  
7

8 270. Specifically, in addition to the conspiracy allegations detailed above,  
9 each defendant is liable as a principal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2(a)-(b), and that each  
10 and every RICO person that is a RICO defendant is liable as a co-conspirator  
11 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371.  
12

13 271. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, while affiliated with one or more  
14 ENTERPRISES, have operated, affiliated with, and participated directly and  
15 indirectly in the conduct of ENTERPRISE affairs through a pattern of racketeering  
16 activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (b), (c), and (d) as follows:  
17  
18

19  
20 **RICO ENTERPRISES**

21 272. Each of the following configurations, for purposes of plaintiff RICO  
22 §1962(c) claims for relief, constitute an enterprise engaged in, or the activities of  
23 which affect, interstate or international commerce as those term is defined pursuant to  
24 Title 18 United States Code §1961(4) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt  
25 Organizations Act of 1970 (“RICO”) and *Odom v. Microsoft Corp.*, 486 F.3d 541  
26  
27  
28

COMPLAINT

1 (9th Cir. 2007) (collectively “RICO ENTERPRISES”)  
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3

#### 4 **RICO Enterprise 1**

##### 5 **The California Domestic Dispute Industry Criminal Enterprise (DDICE)**

6 273. The California Domestic Dispute Industry Criminal Enterprise (DDICE)

7 consists of individual private and public professionals, professional corporations,

8 professional membership organizations, and governmental entities engaged in that

9 portion of “family law” practice in which two or more parties’ have competing

10 interests, or compete with the government for such interests, and is described herein

11 as “Domestic Dispute Law.” Domestic Dispute Law includes marital dissolution,

12 parentage, child custody, child support, domestic violence, and related areas.  
13

14 274. All RICO DEFENDANTS including DDICE DOES 1-500 and the

15 entities with which they are associated, including every other ENTERRISE, civil and

16 criminal CONSPIRACY constitute the DDICE. These entities, acting concert with

17 one another, are organized and maintained by and through a consensual hierarchy of

18 agents, partners, managers, directors, officers, supervisors, agents, deputies, and/or

19 representatives that formulate and implement policies, practices, relationships, rules,  
20

21 and procedures related to Domestic Dispute Law.  
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#### 25 **RICO Enterprise 2**

##### 26 **San Diego Family Law Community Domestic Dispute Industry Criminal**

##### 27 **Enterprise (SD-DDICE)**

28 COMPLAINT



1       275.       In San Diego, the relationships among DDICE operators and affiliates  
2  
3 are created and supported through what has been denominated by members of the  
4 DDICE as the San Diego “family law community” Ex. 2, 26. The SD-DDICE is  
5 comprised of individual family law attorneys and law firms, professional “service  
6 providers”, domestic dispute judges, the Family Law Subsection of the San Diego  
7 County Bar Association and SDCBA staff, officers, and employees, specifically  
8 including:  
9

10  
11               SDCBA, SDSD, GORE, SCSDC, TRENTACOSTA, RODDY, CJC, CANTIL-  
12 SAKAUYE, ALLIANCE, SCHALL, ALKSNE, WOHLFEIL, C.  
13 GOLDSMITH, LOWE, McADAM, McKENZIE, C. BALDWIN, L.  
14 BALDWIN, CORRIGAN, HARGRAEVES, CHUCAS, LEVIN, STOCKS,  
15 ALLEN, SLATTERY, INC., STOCKS & COLBURN, ACFEI, O’BLOCK,  
16 DOYNE, DOYNE, INC., GRIFFIN, LOVE, LOVE, INC., SIMON,  
17 VIVIANO, BLANCHET, ABC&K, BIERER, BIERER & ASSOCIATES,  
18 FRITZ, BASIE & FRITZ, DDICE DOES 21-30, and the entities with which  
19 they are associated, including DDICE DOES 501-1000.

20  
21       276.       SD-DDICE utilize and share private and SDCBA, SCSDC, SAC, DDIPS  
22 and others’ communications systems, offices, fixtures and equipment, professional  
23 and personal networks, campaign and lobbying vehicles and personnel, and political  
24 organizations and networks. The DDICE and SD-DDICE also conspires to promote  
25 DEFENDANTS’ CIVIL CONSPIRACIES, HARRASSMENT AND ABUSE, agenda  
26 detailed above for the benefit of the enterprise and detriment of the DDIL.  
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COMPLAINT

1       277.       The DDICE and SD-DDICE have been in existence for as long as the  
2 FLC has been organized—dating back far longer than ten years. The DDICE and SD-  
3 DDICE have gained influence in recent years since the passage of the Domestic  
4 Dispute Intervention Legislative Scheme (DVILS) in 1993-1997. Since passage of  
5 the DVILS, DDICE members have been empowered and increasingly skilled at  
6 utilizing one or more of the schemes and artifices to defraud (SAD) described below  
7 to further the purposes of the ENTERPRISES and commit racketeering activity.  
8

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10       278.       These entities, acting concert with one another, are organized and  
11 maintained by and through a consensual hierarchy of agents, partners, managers,  
12 directors, officers, supervisors, agents, deputies, and/or representatives that formulate  
13 and implement policies relative to business development coordination, education,  
14 social networking, informational services to the public about various areas and  
15 practices of lawyers practicing law, including, but not restricted to, aspects of  
16 family law, child custody, and domestic relations in the San Diego area.  
17

18  
19       279.       The SD-DDICE acting in concert with San Diego DDIJO, SCSDC,  
20 SDCBA, DDISO, and the SAC engage in a course of conduct and a pattern of  
21 practice to illegally compete in the DDIL marketplace by illegal antitrust affiliations,  
22 barriers to entry, fraudulent “certifications”, and predatory tactics such as the  
23 STUART ASSAULT and ongoing HARRASSMENT AND ABUSE.  
24

25  
26       280.       Through mutual anticompetitive pacts, fraudulent licensing, certification,  
27 specialization, excluding or deterring fair competition from the market, the DDICE  
28 COMPLAINT

1 compete illegally in the DDIL marketplace, sharing access only those attorneys and  
2 law firms that share and promote the interests of the ENTERPRISES, and committing  
3 HARRASSMENT AND ABUSE against entities such as PLAINTIFFS which they  
4 view as competition in the DDIL marketplace.  
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### 8 **RICO Enterprise 3**

#### 9 **Domestic Dispute Industry Intervention Advocate Criminal Enterprise (DDI-** 10 **IACE)**

11 281. The DDI-IACE consists of Defendants AOC, CJC, CANTIL-  
12 SAKAUYE, ALLIANCE, TRENTACOSTA, RODDY, ALKSNE, SCSDC, SDSO,  
13 and DDICE DOES 1001-1500. DDI-IACE constitutes a RICO criminal enterprise,  
14 organized and maintained by and through a consensual hierarchy of, managers,  
15 directors, officers, supervisors, agents, deputies, and/or representatives that formulate  
16 and implement policies relative to family law, child custody, and domestic relations.  
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19 282. The DDI-IACE ENTERPRISE, acting in concert with AOC, CJC,  
20 DDISW, DDIJO, and DDISO Defendants engage in a course of conduct designed and  
21 intended to deprive and conspire to commit one or more SAD, deprive DDIL of FFR  
22 and CFR, and commit HARASSEMENT AND ABUSE as described herein through  
23 the illegal practice of law, abuse of process, illegal advice, guidance, form selection,  
24 individual litigant support, advocacy, and services through the ALLIANCE and  
25 county court locations across the state. The DDI-IACE's activities focus on topics  
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COMPLAINT

1 such as divorce, restraining orders, constitutional law, child custody, parents' and  
2 children's rights, guardianship, adoption, , domestic violence, "abuse" and  
3 "harassment."  
4

5 283. The DDI-IACE commercial purpose is to generate revenue and income  
6 within this District by expanding the ENTERPRISE and the criminal activities of the  
7 DDIJO, DDISW, DDISO, and others associated with it, by committing fraud on the  
8 United States, and state and local charities. Funding for statewide DDI-IACE entities  
9 is obtained from billions of dollars in Violence Against Women Act grants and  
10 awards, and private foundations. Ex. 1.  
11  
12

#### 13 14 15 **Rico Enterprise 4**

#### 16 **The Domestic Dispute Industry Forensic Investigator Criminal Enterprise (DDI- 17 FICE)**

18 284. The DDI-FICE consists of behavioral science "professional custody  
19 evaluators," mediators, and the organizations which certify, oversee, discipline,  
20 appoint, refer, conspire, associate, or affiliate with them, and includes Defendants  
21 ACFEI, DOYNE, DOYNE, INC., LOVE, LOVE INC. BLANCHET, BIERER,  
22 FRITZ, SCSDC and DDICE DOES 1501-2000. These RICO DEFENDANTS  
23 constitute a criminal enterprise, organized and maintained by and through a  
24 consensual hierarchy of, managers, directors, officers, supervisors, agents, deputies,  
25 and/or representatives that formulate and implement policies relative to providing the  
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COMPLAINT

1 rendition of “forensic psychology” services to the public, including, but not restricted  
2 to, DDIL, their lawyers, judges, and others in the field of family law, child custody,  
3 and domestic relations.  
4

5 285. The DDI-IACE ENTERPRISE Defendants engage in a course of  
6 conduct designed and intended to conspire to commit one or more SAD, deprive of  
7 FFR and CFR, and commit HARASSEMENT AND ABUSE as described herein  
8 through the illegal practice of law, abuse of process, illegal advice, guidance, form  
9 selection, individual litigant support, advocacy, and services through the ALLIANCE  
10 and county court “facilitator offices” locations across the state. The DDI-IACE’s  
11 activities focus on topics such as parental/domestic dispute mediation, civil rights,  
12 child custody, domestic violence, and harassment.  
13  
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16 286. The DDI-IACE commercial purpose is to generate revenue and income  
17 within this District committing one or more SAD, false COMMERCIAL SPEECH,  
18 including HARASSMENT AND ABUSE.  
19  
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### 21 **Rico Enterprise 5**

#### 22 **The DDIA/DDIPS Ad Hoc Criminal Enterprise (AHCE)**

23 287. The AHCE is a well-established enterprise formation which is formed  
24 when two or more DDIL enter the DDIL marketplace and hire one or more DDIA.  
25 The enterprise affiliates—ordinarily one DDIA attorney for a Petitioner, and one for  
26 Respondent—engage with their clients, make fraudulent COMMERCIAL SPEECH  
27 misrepresentations to them regarding their FFR, the family court laws and processes,  
28 COMPLAINT

1 and begin exploiting them by use of one or more SAD. Depending on how malicious  
2 the DDIA conduct their fraud, DDIL may be induced into engaging in “Poser  
3 Advocacy” and one or more SAD, either as initiator or forced responder, thereby  
4 generating revenue for both DDIA. The process by which the AHCE enterprise is  
5 ordinarily formed is described in detail in a publication entitled *A Promise To*  
6 *Ourselves: A Promise to Ourselves: A Journey Through Fatherhood and Divorce*,  
7 Baldwin, A., ISBN-10: 0312586019. PLAINTIFFS have not received permission to  
8 reproduce this publication and therefore reference it as Exhibit 32 as if set forth  
9 herein in full.

13 288. In the present matter, the STUART AHCE consists of Defendants  
14 BLANCHET, BIERER, FRITZ, VIVIANO, DOYNE INC., and DDICE DOES 2001-  
15 2010 (collectively STUART AHCE). By execution of various frauds and SAD, the  
16 STUART AHCE introduced additional DEFENDANTS DOYNE, INC. WOHLFEIL,  
17 and eventually SCHALL, CJP, BATSON, SDCBA, STUART ASSAULT  
18 COORDINATORS to commit one or more CIVIL and CRIMINAL  
19 CONSPIRACIES.

22 289. The STUART AHCE is organized and maintained by and through a  
23 consensual hierarchy of, managers, directors, officers, supervisors, agents, deputies,  
24 and/or representatives that formulate and implement policies relative to the  
25 dispensing and providing the rendition of judicial services to the public , including,  
26 but not restricted to, lawyers practicing before, networking with, funding, and  
27 COMPLAINT

1 collaborating with this enterprise, including, but not restricted to, aspects of family  
2 law, child custody, and domestic relations. The STUART AHCE enterprise, acting in  
3 concert with one and others unknown to PLAINTIFFS, engaged in a course of  
4 conduct and a pattern of practice formulated, designed, intended, implemented, and  
5 executed to as part of one or more SAD.  
6  
7

### 8 9 **GENERAL ENTERPRISE ALLEGATIONS**

10  
11 With respect to each ENTERPRISE:

#### 12 **Commercial Purpose**

13 290. The constituent members comprising each ENTERPRISE are engaged in  
14 a concerted campaign to extort, defraud, trick, deceive, corruptly persuade, victims,  
15 including primarily family court litigants and their children and extended families  
16 (Domestic Dispute Industry Litigants “DDIL”) to exercise control over, and extract  
17 maximum value from, the target community estate (“TCE”). The TCE includes all  
18 assets of the DDIL, the labor value of the DDIL going forward, and the “custody  
19 award” value of any children of the DDIL.  
20  
21

22 291. Further, in unfairly protecting their commercial purposes, each  
23 ENTERPRISE harasses, threatens, assaults, abuses, denigrates, impugn, and/or  
24 otherwise harm, or threaten and attempt to harm, competitors, critics, reformers, and  
25 others.  
26  
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COMPLAINT

1        292.        The ENTERPRISES operate as a “cabal,” a semi private, sometimes  
2 secret, informal affiliation of entities with public presence and identity that is wholly  
3 or partially inaccurate and misleading as to the true goals, affiliations, and processes  
4 of the cabal. The ENTERPRISES achieve their respective purposes by fraudulent  
5 collusion among DDICE operators and affiliates, who in their COMMERCIAL  
6 SPEECH represent to their DDIL clients that the relationships among the DDICE  
7 members are in compliance with legal and ethical PROFESSIONAL DUTIES when  
8 they in fact are not. See “False Flag” and “Pose Advocacy” SAD below.  
9 (COMMERCIAL PURPOSES).

13        293.        The ENTERPRISES also compete unfairly through their  
14 COMMERCIAL SPEECH by misrepresenting the legitimacy of the ENTERPRISES,  
15 by representing to DDIL that their illegal behavior is “how it is” in a “take it or leave  
16 it” breach of one or more PROFESSIONAL DUTIES.

18        294.        The ENTERPRISES also compete unfairly within the DDI marketplace  
19 by creating the impression that non- ENTERPRISE entities are incapable of  
20 representing the interests of family law clients. In the present case, the  
21 ENTERPRISES operated as alleged to suppress and retaliate for PLAINTIFFS  
22 FFRRESA and PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES by HARRASSMENT AND  
23 ABUSE to restrict the family law marketplace access, knowledge, and awareness to  
24 only ENTERPRISE operators and affiliates.

28 COMPLAINT



1       295.       Funded by fraudulent exploitation of the DDIL TCE, ENTERPRISE  
2 operators and affiliates engage in bribery, exchanging value, emoluments, patronage,  
3 nepotism, and/or kickback schemes within their networks to assure system-wide  
4 “cash flow” and continued viability and vitality of the ENTERPRISES.  
5 ENTERPRISES refuse such cooperation with non-affiliates, thereby barring potential  
6 competitors. These bars include fraudulently manipulated referrals, representations,  
7 certifications, nepotism, illegal antitrust tactics, and manufactured pitfalls to support  
8 the pervasive “who you know” cabal in defiance of the rule of law.

9       296.       When necessary, illegal marketplace protections are perpetrated by  
10 illegal criminal justice system sanctions by DDIJO and DDISO, direct attacks such as  
11 the STUART ASSAULT DDISO, and HARASSMENT AND ABUSE. This  
12 predatory competitive behavior targets any entity, association, or organization that  
13 supports and advocates for DDIL that appears as a potential or probable threat to  
14 these DDICE purposes, including PLAINTIFFS (ENTERPRISE UNFAIR  
15 COMPETITION).

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23                   **Domestic Dispute Industry Legal Services Marketplace**

24       297.       The ENTERPRISES are successful due to manipulation of unique  
25 factors characterizing the marketplace for Domestic Dispute Industry legal services.  
26 DDIL are ordinarily families in crisis seeking to resolve their personal difficulties by  
27 altering relationships. In doing so they must often seek the involvement of the state.

28 COMPLAINT

1 For contested or unusually complex matters, DDIL enlist experts to help navigate the  
2 market. Hence, a market for family law experts to assist in navigating the complexity  
3 and/or maximizing outcome exists. (DDI MARKET).

5 298. The DDL view the DDI either as a necessary evil to be treated as a toll,  
6 or in some cases a nefarious tool of oppression to illegally obtain wealth, power, and  
7 control at the expense of a former loved one. The DDI can deal with either.  
8 However, for purposes of the civil and criminal enterprises alleged herein, the later  
9 represent an exploitation opportunity for DDICE operatives, and as such special  
10 attention is paid to them.  
11

13 299. ENTERPRISE affiliates who serve or cultivate the illegal purposes of  
14 the enterprise—“black hat” operatives—view DDIL as a “raw material:” a resource  
15 from which to extract net profit. While each case may present different  
16 circumstances, and while DDICE associates market their services as “specialized”, in  
17 fact the DDICE operate in conspiracy with common SAD applied to each DDIL in  
18 the DDI MARKET; providing “white hat” services to those seeking simple, healthy  
19 solutions, while still preserving, promoting, misrepresenting, and protecting the  
20 ability to deliver illegal, unhealthy, yet far more profitable “black hat” services.  
21  
22

24 300. However, to maintain long-term vitality, DDICE operatives must govern  
25 themselves to avoid exposure of their illegal SAD, or “overfishing”—extracting so  
26 much value from one or more DDIL that they “sour” to the DDIL marketplace or  
27  
28

1 reveal the ENTERPRISE and SAD, thereby inducing reform such as FFRRESA, and  
2 DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE.

3  
4 301. Yet the balance necessary to achieve maximum TCE extraction without  
5 fair competition, revelation, or overfishing cannot be achieved without cooperation  
6 between the petitioner's and respondent's counsel—hence “False Flag” and other  
7 fraudulent SAD by which DDIA, DDIJO, and DDIPS exercise “client control” by  
8 refraining from zealous advocacy or honest services in hopes of lowering extraction  
9 costs for Petitioner's counsel, maximizing TCE extraction, and leaving at least one  
10 “unburned” DDIL to perpetuate future SAD on future DDIL market entrants.

11  
12  
13 302. Petitioner and Respondent counsel (seeking to maximize wealth transfer)  
14 evaluate each case early through compelled disclosures known as “Income and  
15 Expense Declarations.” These forced sworn statements require both parties to reveal  
16 extensive details regarding income, assets, and expenses. The putative goal is for the  
17 determination of support levels. However ENTERPRISE operators and affiliates also  
18 use the declarations to plan how to maximize extraction of value from the TCE. This  
19 collaboration is evidenced by the common observation that DDICE operators and  
20 affiliate follow the business rule to “bill until the client runs out of money or patience,  
21 then quit.” (or, in the case of even “white hat” operatives, finish for free). DDIJO  
22 fully comply by allowing DDIA withdrawals for nonpayment with unusual ease, in  
23 further violation of the equal protection of the laws.  
24  
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COMPLAINT

1       303.       Unfortunately, unlike commercial legal markets populated by business  
2 clients and in-house counsel, many DDIL lack the sophistication, intelligence, market  
3 awareness, or general psychological stability in a time of crisis to recognize the SAD  
4 until it is too late—if then. As such, educating the DDIL marketplace to improve  
5 awareness and thereby eliminate the competitive advantage of illegal “black hat”  
6 operators has been a central theme both in PLAINTIFFS FFRRESA and BUSINESS  
7 DEVELOPMENT.  
8  
9

10       304.       For the DDICE operatives, the market for perpetrating the SAD on  
11 unwary DDIL has become almost too easy—the main goal is no longer to facilitate  
12 the illegal extraction but to avoid “overfishing.” DDICE operatives must seek to  
13 maximize the value extracted from the TCE in the short term without achieving a  
14 “burned DDIL” rate that deters potential future market entrants from seeking  
15 services, or becoming “too aware” of the market dynamics enabling crime. This  
16 balance can only be achieved through coordination among DDIA, DDIPS, and  
17 DDIJO Enterprise operatives who must defy their PROFESSIONAL DUTIES to  
18 coordinate the cabal.  
19  
20  
21

22       305.       They do so by the False Flag SAD described below, including “Poser  
23 Advocacy” “paperwads” and “kite bombs” to achieve maximum TCE extraction with  
24 as little risk for deterrence and exposure. Hence the tendency of the DDICE to utilize  
25 irrational motivating tactics such as The PIT “fear or anger” or DDI-FICE  
26  
27  
28

COMPLAINT

1 (selfishness, greed), with “balancing” tactics such as illegal conspiracy through SAD,  
2 drives illegal market collusion.  
3

### 4 5 **Interstate and International Commerce of the ENTERPRISES**

6 306. The activities of the DDICE affect interstate and international commerce  
7 as follows:  
8

9 A. The DVILS are authorized and enforceable under federal law and entitled to  
10 full faith and credit under the multiple state laws (18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1),  
11 2265) (Ex. 33);

12 B. Child Support awards may be enforced in foreign countries through bilaterail  
13 international treaty including by revoking passports of U.S. citizens (Ex. 33);

14 C. State child support awards are enforceable in all U.S. Military Courts (Ex. 33);

15 D. The affairs of families is a worldwide industry generating tens of billions of  
16 dollars acquired by the DDICE ENTERPRISES each year.  
17

### 18 **Longevity**

19 307. In conducting the affairs of the ENTERPRISES, and in committing the  
20 acts, omissions, misrepresentations, and breaches referred to herein beginning as far  
21 back as 1997 and continuing up through initiation of these proceedings, RICO  
22 DEFENDANTS engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in contravention of Title  
23 18 United States Code § 1962(c) inasmuch as the defendant was employed by, or  
24 associated with, one or more ENTERPRISE engaged in activities that affect federal  
25 interstate and/or foreign commerce, and conducted such multiple criminal enterprise  
26  
27  
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COMPLAINT

1 affairs by and through a pattern of racketeering activity.

2  
3  
4 **ENTERPRISE Schemes and Artifice to Defraud**

5 **Scheme and Artifice to Defraud 1**

6 **Illegal Invocation of DVILS ORDERS: Abuse of Process:**

7  
8 **Abuse of Process: The Pit**

9 308. The central tool of the DDICE is the widespread illegal exercise of the  
10 enormous equitable powers of state DDI courts. DDI courts exercise such powers  
11 putatively under a set of laws enacted to extend state police powers to “intervene” in  
12 intense domestic interpersonal conflict to address domestic violence. These laws are  
13 ensconced in Family Code §§ 6211 et seq, including §§ 6200-6219, 6389, 3031,  
14 4325, 6301, 6228, 6300-6306, 6404, 6380, 6384, 3044, 4320, 4007.5, 3190, 6203,  
15 6209, 6205, 2040, 6253, 6306 et seq.; Civil Code §§ 3295 et seq., and Penal Code §§  
16 13700 et seq.. §§ 136.2, 273.6, 273.75, 166, 836, 11161, 679.05, 273.83, 868.8,  
17 1203.3, 273.75, 1203.097, 646.91, et seq. These laws shall hereafter be collectively  
18 referred to as the “DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION LEGISLATIVE  
19 SCHEME” or “DVILS”. (Ex. 35)  
20  
21  
22

23  
24 **DVILS Orders**

25 309. Collectively, the DVILS create a set of practices and procedures  
26 whereby a party asserting that another within the DOMESTIC RELATIONS CLASS  
27 may quickly obtain an injunction imposing severe and onerous deprivations,  
28 COMPLAINT

1 restrictions, penalties, pains, and expense on another suspected of undesirable  
2 activity. A party seeking a protective order using a state form DV 110 is requested  
3 only to “describe the abuse.” (Ex. 34) Though committing “Abuse” can form the  
4 basis of highly invasive property and liberty deprivations, it is nowhere defined in the  
5 form, and under California law, *is not a crime*.  
6

7  
8 310. Upon overcoming the procedural safeguard of “showing of good cause”  
9 for the existence of “abuse”, a DDI court may grant an order imposing the following  
10 “Personal Conduct,” “Move Out,” “Stay Away,” “Property Control” and “Child  
11 Custody and Visitation”:  
12

13  
14 *“Personal Conduct: The person in must not do the following things to*  
15 *the protected people listed...*

16  
17 *a. Harass, attack, strike, threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit,*  
18 *follow, stalk, molest, destroy personal property, disturb the peace,*  
19 *keep under surveillance, or block movements;*

20  
21 *Contact (either directly or indirectly), or telephone, or send messages*  
22 *or mail or e-mail or other electronic means”;*

23  
24  
25 *Take any action either directly or through others to obtain the address*  
26 *or locations of the person ... “*

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*“Peaceful written contact through a lawyer or process server as needed to serve Form DV-120 (Response to Request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order) or other legal papers is allowed and does not violate this order. . . .*

*“Stay Away Order:*

*The person in must stay at yards away from:*

*The children’s school or child care*

*a. The person listed in d.*

*b. The people listed in e. Other (specify):*

*c. Home Vehicle of person in Job”*

*“Move-Out Order*

*The person in must take only personal clothing and belongings needed until the hearing and move out immediately from (address):*

*“Child Custody and Visitation Order*



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*a. You and the other parent must make an appointment for court mediation (address and phone number):*

*b. Follow the orders listed in Form DV-140, which is attached.*

*No Guns or Other Firearms or Ammunition*

*The person ... cannot own, possess, have, buy or try to buy, receive or try to receive, or in any other way get guns, firearms, or ammunition.*

*Turn in or sell guns or firearms...*

*Must sell to a licensed gun dealer or turn in to police any guns or firearms that he or she has or controls. This must be done within 24 hours of being served with this order.*

*Must bring a receipt to the court within 48 hours of being served with this order, to prove that guns and firearms have been turned in or sold.*

*Property Control*

*Until the hearing, only the person in can use, control, and possess the following property and things:”*

1  
2 Cal. Pen. Code §§ 136.2, 1203.097(a), 273.5(i), 646.9(k); forms DV-110, CR-160  
3  
4 (collectively “DVILS ORDERS”) (Ex. 35).

5  
6 311. The DVILS, DVIL ORDERS, and jeopardy of the “imposed disability”  
7 they represent will be referred to as “THE PIT.”

8  
9 312. Together, the DVILS, DVILS ORDERS constitute the central  
10 foundation of conspiracy to violate civil rights actionable under at least 18 U.S.C.  
11 241, 242, 42 U.S.C. PLAINTIFFS shall borrow the term used by the DDICE itself to  
12 refer to the device hereafter as “THE PIT.” By threatening, offering, or processing its  
13 (illegal) invocation, DEFENDANTS defraud the DDIL, perpetrating one or more  
14 frauds and swindles, abuse of process, or deprivations of FFR and CFR described  
15 herein.  
16

17  
18 313. In December, 2007 STUART confronted DEFENDANT ABC&K about  
19 the legality of the DVILS ORDERS which he had been illegally and without notice  
20 subjected to. AC&K’s BLANCHET explained the scheme:  
21

22  
23 *Of course they’re unconstitutional—they’re illegal as Hell, but they*  
24 *know it’s expensive to fight it, so they strike first, throw you in The Pit*  
25 *and make you pay or work to climb your way out.*  
26

27 BLANCHET advised  
28

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*You can either pay her to get out of it or jump through the hoops and pray you make it.*

314. BLANCHET was quite accurate. She kindly offered her firm’s assistance toward either end.

315. THE PIT is the embodiment of the pervasive disregard for the rule of law pervading the DDI ENTERPRISES. The DVILS are illegal, unconstitutional, and criminal to seek and enforce, yet their use in practice has become unremarkable—largely because those who use them benefit, and those against whom they are used are unaware of their illegality because they are misled.

316. The DVILS ORDERS and all acts relating to soliciting, advising, obtaining, adjudicating, issuing, and enforcing are an illegal abuse of process. First, the laws on which they are based are unconstitutional. See Ex. 1, 2. In addition, the “DV” and “CR” “mandatory use” Forms on which the orders are inconsistent with extend beyond the statutory authorization articulated in the DVILS. Third, the terms used, even if statutorily enabled, are fatally and unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Ex. 35.

317. DDICE operators and affiliates , in soliciting, threatening, offering, advertising, directing, granting, issuing, and enforcing DVILS ORDERS are violating at least sections 241 and 242 of Title 18. The construction of a non profit or public

1 enterprise funded by United States grants and fraudulent grant applications is a  
2 violation of section 371 of that Title.  
3

4  
5 **Scheme and Artifice to Defraud 2**  
6 **Abuse of Process: Conspiracy to Obtain DVILS Orders through illegal**  
7 **formwork, “technical assistance” and unauthorized practice of law**  
8

9 318. The process of obtaining DVILS ORDERS is further illegal. In most  
10 counties, “domestic violence” courts have established “family law facilitator” offices,  
11 websites, forms libraries, and “self help” workers to guide and assist citizens in  
12 obtaining orders operated by Defendants ALLIANCE, AOC, SCSDC,  
13 TRENTACOSTA and RODDY. These materials and workers provide detailed, case  
14 specific advice, instructions, guidance, direction, advocacy, oversight, and monitoring  
15 of the process by which the DVILS ORDERS are issued. Exs. 1, 36. Such practice  
16 constitutes the illegal practice of law under California state and federal law. *People v.*  
17 *Landlords Professional Services, Inc.*, 178 Cal.App.3d 68 (1986); *People v. Sipper*,  
18 61 Cal.App.Supp.844, 846 (1943); *In re Glad.* 98 B.R. 976, 977 (9th Cir.BAP 1989);  
19 *In re Anderson*, 79 B.R. 482, 484 (Bkrcty.S.D.Cal.1987). Ex. 1.  
20  
21  
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24 319. The solicitation, enablement, facilitation, advocacy for, issuance, and  
25 enforcement is also illegal—a violation of numerous constitutional rights and  
26 criminal laws. Plaintiff CCFC’s July 24, 2013 Cease and Desist/Notice to the City of  
27 San Diego describes the illegality of this practice. It is referenced at Exhibit 1 and  
28

COMPLAINT

1 incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

2  
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4 **Scheme or Artifice To Defraud 3**

5 **Forensic Child Custody Evaluations**

6 320. DDICE members' recommendation, appointment, use, and payment of  
7 private child custody constitutes a scheme to defraud and extort DDIL. Denominated  
8 by DDICE as "Forensic Psychologists", child custody evaluators in family law  
9 disputes have been a longstanding concern for hundreds of thousands of southern  
10 California state courts, political representatives, and the FLC, including  
11 PLAINTIFFS. Hotly-contested, or "high conflict" family law cases frequently center  
12 on disputes over child custody. Unfortunately, the experience of thousands of  
13 Southern California parents and children suggests that the professionals  
14 recommended by DDIA, appointed, endorsed, and overseen by DDIJO, and paid for  
15 by DDIL and their children are a sham. Ex. 3.

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19 321. A publication by Dr. Margaret Hagen describes the fraud:

20  
21 The abuses and excesses of so many child welfare specialists should not be allowed  
22 to obscure the indisputable fact that there are many decent, caring, hardworking  
23 professionals who do their absolute best with huge caseloads to help the children as  
24 well as they can be helped with the psychological tools available. It would be cruel  
25 and ungrateful and stupid to say otherwise. The problem for them and for us is that  
26 the psychological tools just do not exist for them to do their jobs, and no one can or  
27 is willing to admit that. It is just too difficult to deal with the awful reality that in  
28 the three million annual cases of alleged abuse, our already overworked police

COMPLAINT

1 forces would be called on to investigate and make determinations essentially  
2 without any evidence at all of where, with whom, and by whom abuse has occurred.  
3

4 Who can blame the police and the prosecutors' offices-along with our courts-for  
5 wanting the assistance of professionals who know what they are doing? It is just too  
6 bad that there are none available.  
7

8 Both in custody cases involving allegations of grave risk to children in the home,  
9 and in cases arising where parents cannot agree on custody for reasons both  
10 profoundly serious and dismayingly foolish, our judges-our whole family legal  
11 system-desperately seeks guidance about where to find and where to place the best  
12 interests of the children involved. Agencies, parents, and judges alike turn to  
13 psychological professionals to help them find the truth or make their case.  
14

15 Our common desperation seems to have produced the common delusion that experts  
16 actually exist who really can determine with the unerring instinct of a homing  
17 pigeon exactly where the best interests of a child lie, where a child should live,  
18 whether and how a child has been hurt, how a child should be protected, who will  
19 be the superior parent, and who is unfit to be a parent at all, who should have the  
20 right and the duty to care for a child, who should see the child only under restricted  
21 conditions, and who should be kept away from the child altogether. Acceptance of  
22 their expertise has led us to trust professionals to make these decisions for the  
23 family court system. That means ultimately that we also grant them the power to  
24 make these decisions for our own families. The abstract need of society to protect  
25 its children becomes inevitably the rape of the rights of the real parents of  
26 individual children.  
27  
28

1 Once again, the institutionalization of society's desire to "do good" results in terrible  
2 harm for those in the path of the dogooders.

3  
4 The marriage of law and psychology has reached the heights of disproportionate  
5 power for the psychologists not just in family courts but in all legal disputes in  
6 which a psychological matter is at issue. Judges buy the validity of the expertise of  
7 the confident psychological practitioner and no doubt welcome the opportunity to  
8 make their own decisions on some foundation other than personal opinion and bias.  
9

10 322. A true and correct copy of Dr. Hagen's publication entitled "Whores of  
11 the Court: The Fraud of Psychiatric Testimony and the Rape of American Justice" is  
12 attached hereto as Ex. 37 and incorporated herein as if set forth in full.  
13

14 323. PLAINTIFFS have identified the existence and practice of this scheme  
15 among the ENTERPRISES, reported the same to DEFENDANTS SDCBA, brought  
16 suit to enjoin the fraud, and are presently pursuing the matter on appeal to the United  
17 States Supreme Court. *Tadros v. Lesh, et al.*, Exhibit 2, incorporated herein in its  
18 entirety as if set forth in full. A complete analysis of the numerous schemes, devices,  
19 schemes, and artifices used by Child Custody Evaluators is described in a publication  
20 entitled *Equivocal Child Abuse* by Sandra B. McPherson and Farshid Afsarifard,  
21 ISBN No. ISBN-10: 1439847762 | ISBN-13: 978-1439847763 (CRC Press, 2011)  
22 (Ex. 38). The authors have declined permission to reprint the entire publication with  
23 this pleading. As such the publication is referenced and incorporated herein as if set  
24 forth in full.  
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COMPLAINT

1 **Scheme or Artifice To Defraud 4**

2 **Custody Evaluator Abuse of Process**

3 324. Petitioners have identified a pattern of deception among DDIPS and  
4 DDIA to avoid detection and oversight by refusing to obtain required authorization to  
5 operate as court-appointed agents. Without necessary paperwork, DDIPS are  
6 susceptible to little or no judicial, professional, governmental, or parental oversight.  
7 This practice of unauthorized “Dark Appointment” creates an environment in which  
8 the racketeering activity can exist “under the radar” of DDIJO, DDIA, and even  
9 unsuspecting DDIL. Exhibit, 2, 3, and 4 include PLAINTIFF CCFC’S Amicus Curie  
10 Brief *Tadros v. Doyne*, matter, explaining this matter are incorporated herein by  
11 reference as if set forth in full.

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15 325. Perpetrating one or more of the SAD disclosed herein, evaluators  
16 defraud parents and children of millions of dollars fraudulently claiming that they can  
17 determine the “best interests of the child” by scientific means. The claim is a  
18 demonstrable fraud. Ex. 37.

19  
20  
21 326. The custody evaluator fraud generates tens of millions of dollars per year  
22 from families and children similarly situated. Based on on DDICE operative’s  
23 misrepresentations, DDIL are lulled into a false sense of security by the DDIA, the  
24 DDIJO, and other DDIPS who “cross-refer” one another, and impose threats of  
25 severe repercussions for a DDIL failure to obey the professional referral. See,  
26 STUART ASSAULT, HARASSEMENT AND ABUSE, Ex. 2 (*Tadros v. Lesh*



1 Petition, Statement of the Case, Section B, pp. 8-12, incorporated herein by reference  
2 as if set forth in full).

3  
4 327. DDIA and DDIJO participate in the SAD by recommending retaining  
5 professionals like DOYNE, INC, failing to warn parents and children for the dangers,  
6 expense, and jeopardy of the dangers thereof.  
7

### 8 9 **Scheme and Artifice to Defraud 5**

#### 10 **False Flag breach of PROFESSIONAL DUTIES**

11 328. DDICE operators regularly breach one or more of their  
12 PROFESSIONAL DUTIES of loyalty, zealous advocacy, fiduciary responsibility,  
13 and professional competence through one or more “false flag” frauds to induce,  
14 deprive, or deceive DDIL. Ex. 32. These “False Flag” maneuvers involve one or  
15 more COMMERCIAL SPEECH misrepresentations to unsophisticated DDIL, thereby  
16 depriving them of the benefits of legal professional services, and perpetrating fraud.  
17  
18 “False Flag” schemes and artifices include:  
19

20 329. *Poser Advocacy, Paperwads, Kite Bombs*: “Poser Advocacy” is the  
21 practice and sale of what appears to be the practice of law to unsophisticated DDIL.  
22 Attorneys engaging in poser advocacy act to appeal to their client’s emotions, greed,  
23 or other untoward ends to generate fees with no beneficial legal work performed.  
24 Poser advocates write angry letters (“paperwads”), exchange worthless formwork  
25 discovery, or repeatedly file baseless motions with no hope of success (“kite  
26  
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COMPLAINT

1 bombs”), to generate what looks like legitimate legal to an unsophisticated DDIL  
2 acclimated to a daytime TV diet of Judge Judy drama and CSI suspense.

3  
4 330. In the more sophisticated commercial legal marketplace, poser advocacy  
5 is not tolerated as clients insist, and attorneys abide by, legitimate practice and ethical  
6 standards. Because of the unique nature of the clients and market, DDICE members  
7 are able to pass off Poser Advocacy as real legal work. It is not.

8  
9 331. Yet given the nature of the marketplace and absence of DDIL awareness  
10 of the fraud, there is little incentive to eradicate its existence. Because it is highly  
11 profitable, even if illegal, it is therefore quietly encouraged. Because it can only exist  
12 in a market place where all players—the attorneys, professional service providers,  
13 and even judges—play along, it requires a “cabal” enterprise to be successful.  
14 Outsiders such as PLAINTIFFS who offer legal, safe, and far more efficient services  
15 are market spoilers, and as such are illegally targeted as described herein.  
16  
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19

## 20 **Scheme and Artifice To Defraud 6**

### 21 **DDIA and DDIJO FFR/CFR Abstention**

22 332. DDIAAs for both petitioners and respondents conspire to ignore their  
23 oaths to protect, uphold and defend the U.S. Constitution and laws of the United  
24 States, thereby providing ineffective, fraudulent, incompetent, and harmful advice to  
25 their clients and community. Both petitioner and respondent counsels ignore the  
26 illegality of the DVILs and withhold objections to increase job security and the  
27  
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COMPLAINT

1 “billable activity” provided by The Pit—either seeking to throw a litigant in it, or  
2 working to dig one out. They fail to advise their clients’ rights to object to the  
3 constitutionality of such orders as doing so would deprive the DDI of a highly  
4 profitable tool. Their failure to do so establishes an industry standard of private  
5 abstention from exercise of constitutional rights, suiting DDIA, DDISW, DDISO, and  
6 DDIJO alike.  
7

9 333. In abstention, DDIA’s violate their PROFESSIONAL DUTIES, oaths of  
10 office, as well as their duties to individual clients, and in so doing also commit  
11 invidious discrimination against the EQUAL PROTECTION CLASSES.  
12

13 334. To the extent that DDILs raise objections or observations relating to the  
14 illegal acts, DDIA and DDISW CULPABLY advise that the U.S. Constitution does  
15 not prohibit such acts, and that there is “nothing you can do” to prevent judges from  
16 issuing illegal orders, or otherwise WRONGFULLY DISSUADE DDILs from their  
17 own FFRRESA. The representation is false.  
18  
19  
20

### 21 *DDIJO Acquiescence*

22 335. These SAD cannot go unnoticed by any competent legal professional, or  
23 unacted upon by any ethical one. And yet they are prolific among Defendants,  
24 indicating that the DDIJO themselves are at best deliberately indifferent to the SAD  
25 and ENTERPRISES that run them, further facilitating this pernicious fraud on DDIL  
26  
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28

1 in violation of Judicial Canon 2 to “ensure rights”, PROFESSIONAL DUTIES, of all  
2 parties, and in defiance of the rule of law.  
3

4  
5 **RICO §1961(5) PATTERN OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY**  
6 **ALLEGATIONS**

7 **18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)**

8 **COMMISSION OF RICO §1961(1)(B) RACKETEERING ACTIVITY:**

9 336. RICO DEFENDANTS engage in the following “racketeering activity,”

10 as that term is defined pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1961(c) (“RACKETEERING

11 ACTIVITY”). RICO DEFENDANTS’ RACKETEERING ACTIVITY as

12 committing, aiding and abetting, or conspiring to commit, tens of thousands of

13 violations of the following laws within the past ten years, including:  
14

15  
16  
17 A. Fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents,

18 authentication features, and information: 18 U.S.C. § 1028;

19 B. Mail Fraud: 18 U.S.C. § 1341

20 C. Wire Fraud: 18 U.S.C. § 1343

21 D. Bank Fraud: 18 U.S.C. § 1344

22 E. Intangible Personal Property Right Deprivation: Title 18 U.S.C. § 1346.

23 F. Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally: 18 U.S.C. § 1503;

24 G. Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees: 18

25 USC § 1505;  
26  
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COMPLAINT

- 1 H. Obstruction of Criminal Investigations: 18 U.S.C. § 1510;
- 2 I. Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant: 18 U.S.C. § 1512;
- 3
- 4 K. Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant: 18 U.S.C. § 1513;
- 5 L. Peonage; obstructing enforcement: 18 U.S.C. § 1581,
- 6 M. Enticement into slavery; 18 U.S.C. § 1583;
- 7
- 8 N. Sale into involuntary servitude: 18 U.S.C. § 1584;
- 9 O. Seizure, detention, transportation or sale of slaves: 18 U.S.C. § 1585;
- 10 P. Service on vessels in slave trade: 18 U.S.C. § 1586;
- 11
- 12 Q. Possession of slaves aboard vessel: 18 U.S.C. § 1587;
- 13 R. Forced labor: 18 U.S.C. § 1589;
- 14 S. Trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced
- 15 labor: 18 U.S.C. § 1590;
- 16
- 17 T. Unlawful conduct with respect to documents in furtherance of trafficking,
- 18 peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor: 18 U.S.C. 1592;
- 19
- 20 U. Benefitting financially from peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons: 18
- 21 U.S.C. § 1593A;
- 22
- 23 V. Conspiracy, attempt to commit acts of peonage, slavery, proscribed: 18 U.S.C. §
- 24 1594;
- 25 W. Interference with commerce by threats or violence: 18 USC § 1951;
- 26
- 27 X. Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises:
- 28 18 U.S.C. § 1952;

COMPLAINT

1 Y. Violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity: 18 U.S.C. § 1959 –

2 Z. Principal and Aider and Abettor, Attempt, Conspiracy Liability: Title 18 U.S.C.  
3 § 2(a) and (b).  
4

5  
6 **Racketeering Claim for Relief 1**

7 **18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d)**

8 **Frauds and Swindles**

9 **18 U.S.C. § 1341**

10 **Against Defendants DOYNE INC, BLANCHET, VIVIANO, FRITZ**

11 337. DEFENDANTS, having affiliated with one or more ENTERPRISE and  
12 devising or intending to devise one or more SAD for obtaining money or property by  
13 means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, delivered  
14 invoices, accountings, billing statements, letters, reports, and other correspondence  
15 into the U.S. mails, email, telephone facsimile to STUART.  
16

17  
18 338. Such use of U.S. mails, emails, facsimile, and wire occurred as follows:  
19

20 **A. VIVIANO:**

21 339. Beginning on or about July, 2007 and every month thereafter through an  
22 including December, 2007 having committed or while committing one or more SAD,  
23 fraudulently communicated with STUART regarding, SAD misrepresentations,  
24 billing, accountings, filings, and other false statements in furtherance thereof,  
25 requesting to be paid therefore in the approximate amount of \$45,000;  
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**B. BLANCHETS and ABC&K**

340. Beginning in or about December, 2007 and every month thereafter through and including November, 2008 having committed or while committing one or more SAD, fraudulently communicated with STUART regarding, SAD misrepresentations, billing, accountings, filings, and other false statements in furtherance thereof, requesting to be paid therefore in the approximate amount of \$250,000;

**C. FRITZ**

341. Beginning in or about May, 2008 and every month thereafter through and including March, 2011, for invoices fraudulently billed and charged in furtherance of one or more SAD requesting to be paid therefore in the approximate amount of \$190,000;

**D. DOYNE INC.**

342. Beginning in or about May, 2008, and every month thereafter through and including March, 2010, having committed or while committing one or more SAD, ABUSE OF PROCESS, BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD, EXTORTION, ROBBERY, and INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOITNAL DISTRESS, fraudulently communicated with STUART regarding the same, including delivering SAD misrepresentations, billing, accountings, filings, and other false COMPLAINT

1 statements in furtherance thereof, requesting to be paid therefore in the approximate  
2 amount of \$17,500.  
3

4  
5 343. DEFENDANTS and each of them further committed fraud by virtue of  
6 use of the Internet, describing, advocating, and supporting their SAD and  
7 ENTERPRISES as legitimate and healthy practices, and failing to advise  
8 PLAINTIFFS and the general public of the true nature of their ENTERPRISES and  
9 SAD.  
10

11  
12 344. As an actual and proximate result, STUART has been HARMED.  
13

14  
15 **Racketeering Claim for Relief 2**

16 **18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d)**

17 **Honest Services Fraud**

18 **18 U.S.C. § 1346**

19 **Against All RICO DEFENDANTS**

20 345. DEFENDANTS engaged in one or more SAD by, through, and in  
21 conjunction with the ENTERPRISES to deprive PLAINTIFFS of the intangible right  
22 of honest services.  
23

24 346. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, supported and promoted one another  
25 in perpetrating each SAD actionable fraud, bribery and/or kickbacks, wherein a quid  
26 pro quo (monetary, preferential referral, business referral, and/or some other form of  
27 benefit) was provided by the RICO defendants to persons unknown to plaintiffs to  
28

COMPLAINT



1 assure that PLAINTIFFS in their PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES would be  
2 effectively punished, silenced, discredited, and rendered ineffective as an effectively  
3 competing alternative vehicle offering reasonable and realistic forms of professional  
4 quality services to counsel and advise individual parents and guardians addressing  
5 family law, child custody, and domestic relations issues. Plaintiff alleges that such  
6 conduct constitutes the deprivation of the intangible personal property right to  
7 receive ‘honest-services’ for purposes of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 1346.  
8

9  
10 347. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.  
11

12  
13 **Racketeering Claim for Relief 3**

14 **18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d)**

15 **Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally**

16 **18 U.S.C. § 1503**

17 **Against Defendants Simi, Batson, SDCBA, ODO, SAC**

18 348. DEFENDANTS, by the STUART ASSAULT, corruptly, or by threats or  
19 force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavored to influence,  
20 intimidate, or impede STUART in performance of his FFRRESA, or corruptly or by  
21 threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs,  
22 or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, PLAINTIFFS from  
23 continuing in their cooperation with the FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT  
24 OFFICERS in pursuing the due administration of justice.  
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1 349. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.

2  
3  
4 **Racketeering Claim for Relief 4**

5 **18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d)**

6 **Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees:**

7 **18 U.S.C. § 1505, 1959**

8 **Against Defendants Simi, Batson, SDCBA, ODO, SAC**

9 350. DEFENDANTS corruptly and by force or threat of force in the

10 STUART ASSAULT endeavored to and did influence, obstruct, or impede

11 PLAINTIFFS FFRRESA and the DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE before

12 the FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, and the due and proper exercise

13 of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by

14 either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the

15 Congress of the United States pursuant to PLAINIFFS'S FFRRESA before the

16 Representatives of the United States.

17  
18  
19 351. In so doing, DEFENDANTS SDCBA, ODO, SDSO, and SAC kidnaped,

20 assaulted with a dangerous weapon, committed assault resulting in serious bodily

21 injury upon, or threatens to commit a crime of violence to PLAINTIFFS in violation

22 of the laws of any State or the United States, or attempted or CONSPIRED so to do—

23 in exchange for (i) consideration, a promise or agreement to pay, pecuniary value,

24 from the ENTERPRISES, or (ii) the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or

25 increasing position in the ENTERPRISES.

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27  
28 COMPLAINT

1 352. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.

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4 **Racketeering Claim for Relief 5**

5 **18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d)**

6 **Tampering with a witness, victim, or informant**

7 **18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(A)**

8 **Against Defendants Simi, Batson, SDCBA, ODO, SAC**

9 353. DEFENDANTS, by the STUART ASSAULT, CULPABLY used

10 physical force, including confinement and physical action, against STUART, and the  
11 threat of physical force against PLAINTIFFS and their affiliates, at the SDCBA  
12 SEMINAR, and attempted to do so, with intent to influence, delay, or prevent the  
13 testimony of PLAINTIFFS and their affiliates, in their FFRRESA in THE DUE  
14 COURSE OF JUSTICE.  
15

16 354. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.

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18  
19 **Racketeering Claim for Relief 6**

20 **18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d)**

21 **Tampering with a witness, victim, or informant**

22 **18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(B), (C)**

23 **Against Defendants Simi, Batson, SDCBA, ODO, SAC**

24  
25 355. DEFENDANTS, by the STUART ASSAULT, CULPABLY caused or  
26 induced PLAINTIFFS and their affiliates to CHILL, and hindered, delayed, and  
27  
28

COMPLAINT

1 prevent PLAINTIFFS' and their affiliates' FFRRESA to a FEDERAL LAW  
2 ENFORCEMENT OFFICER.  
3

4 356. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.  
5

6 **Racketeering Claim for Relief 7**

7 **18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d)**

8 **Witness Tampering**

9 **18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)**

10 **Against Defendants Simi, Batson, SDCBA, ODO, SAC**

11 357. DEFENDANTS, by the STUART ASSAULT, CULPABLY used and  
12 attempted to use intimidation, threatened, and corruptly persuaded PLAINTIFFS and  
13 their affiliates, to  
14

15 (1) influence, delay, or prevent PLAINTIFFS' FFRRESA in the DUE COURSE  
16 OF JUSTICE;

17  
18 (2) cause or induce PLAINTIFFS and their affiliates to CHIILL, and

19 (3) hinder, delay, or prevent PLAINTIFFS FFRRESA communications to  
20 FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, the Grand Jury, or a Judge of  
21 the United States District Court for the Southern District of California the DDIJO  
22 Complaints, Doyne Complaints, and other violations of the CRCCS.  
23

24 358. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.  
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28

COMPLAINT

1 **Racketeering Count 8**

2 **Witness Tampering**

3 **18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)**

4 **Against Defendants Simi, Batson, SDCBA, ODO, SAC**

5 359. DEFENDANTS, by the STUART ASSAULT, CULPABLY corruptly  
6 obstructed, influenced, or impeded the DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE and attempted  
7 to do so.

8  
9 360. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.

10  
11 **Racketeering Claim for Relief 9**

12 **18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d)**

13 **Tampering with a witness, victim, or informant**

14 **18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)**

15 **Against Defendants Simi, Batson, SDCBA, ODO, SAC**

16 361. DEFENDANTS corruptly and CULPABLY obstructed, influenced, or  
17 impeded the DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE and attempted to do so.

18  
19 362. DEFENDANTS acted corruptly in making the fraudulent statements  
20 attributed to them above, thereby acting with an improper purpose to obstruct, thwart  
21 or mislead STUART into diverting his contact with the U.S. Attorney's Office, F.B.I,  
22 and other FFRRESA would be handled appropriately, fully, and competently by the  
23 CJP, thereby causing STUART to continue ENGAGEMENT primarily with the CJP  
24 rather than primarily pursuing the matter in federal district court, thereby obstructing,  
25 influencing, or impeding the DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE and attempting to do so.  
26  
27  
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COMPLAINT

1 363. DEFENDANTS' false, misleading, deceptive, concealing, or destroying  
2 behavior included;

3  
4 A. That the DDIJO COMPLAINT allegations would be fully and fairly  
5 investigated;

6 B. That the CJP has no jurisdiction over DEFENDANT DOYNE INC. because he  
7 is not an elected or appointed judicial official;

8  
9 C. That the DDIJO COMPLAINTS would be maintained in confidence and not  
10 disclosed to DDIJO DEFENDANTS;

11  
12 D. That STUART need not pursue the `DDIJO COMPLAINT I in federal court as  
13 the CJP process was the "first step" in the chain of obtaining relief from a federal  
14 court.

15  
16 364. In fact, the CJP is not an unbiased organization as it largely ignores  
17 complaints by litigants when compared with attention paid to complaints by  
18 prosecutors and judges. The CJP takes action in less than 2% of all complaints by the  
19 public, allowing tens of thousands to go without response. A true and correct copy of  
20 CJP's 2011 Annual Report is attached at Exhibit 39; a chart corroborating these  
21 allegations is in DEFENDANTS' possession and is referenced as part of Exhibit 39  
22 as if set forth at length herein.  
23

24  
25 365. As such, the CJP largely misrepresents itself as a legitimate supervisor  
26 of judicial misconduct, creating a false sense of public confidence in the CJP  
27 investigative an disciplinary process, tying up litigants who would otherwise seek  
28 COMPLAINT

1 relief in federal court, placing them in a years-long maze of investigation until the  
2 time for filing a complaint in a legitimate forum has expired. As such, the CJP  
3 misrepresents itself as a legitimate dispute resolution body when in fact it operates as  
4 a dead letter office to hinder, delay, thwart, obstruct, and mislead STUART and other  
5 citizens, effectively depriving STUART of rights to due process, access to courts,  
6 right to trial by jury, and other rights, privileges and immunities.  
7

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9 366. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.  
10

11  
12 **Racketeering Claim for Relief 10**

13 **18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d)**

14 **Tampering with a witness, victim, or informant**

15 **18 U.S.C. § 1512(d)**

16 **Against Defendants Simi, Batson, SDCBA, ODO, SAC**

17 367. DEFENDANTS CULPABLY by the STUART ASSAULT harassed  
18 PLAINTIFFS and their affiliates thereby hindering, delaying, preventing, dissuading  
19 PLAINTIFFS and their affiliates from FFRRESA, and THE DUE COURSE OF  
20 JUSTICE, seeking further FFRRESA with the intent to arrest or seek the arrest of  
21 DOYNE INC., ALKSNE, SCHALL, WOHLFEIL, and other DDIJO entities  
22 identified herein.  
23

24 368. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.  
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**Racketeering Claim for Relief 11**

**18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d)**

**Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant**

**18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)**

**Against Defendants Simi, Batson, SDCBA, ODO, SAC**

369. DEFENDANTS CULPABLY threatened, attempted to, engaged in the STUART ASSAULT thereby causing bodily injury with intent to retaliate against PLAINTIFFS for PLAINTIFF’S role in FFRRESA and the DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE.

370. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.

**Racketeering Claim for Relief 12**

**18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d)**

**Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant—other harm**

**18 U.S.C. § 1513(e)**

**Against Defendants Simi, Batson, SDCBA, ODO, SAC**

371. DEFENDANTS CULPABLY, with the intent to retaliate, committed the acts ascribed to them in the STUART ASSAULT, thereby causing DAMAGES to PLAINTIFFS and their affiliates, their lawful employment, PUBLIC BENEFIT EFFORTS, for FFRRESA and the DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE.

372. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.



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**Racketeering Claim for Relief 13**

**18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d)**

**Conspiracy to Retaliate against a witness, victim, or an informant**

**18 U.S.C. § 1513(f)**

**Against Defendants Simi, Batson, SDCBA, ODO, SAC**

373. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, CULPABLY conspired with each

other DEFENANT to commit each act described above.

374. As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.

**VII. PROSPECTIVE RELIEF**

375. For each count seeking prospective relief below, PLAINTIFFS allege:

**FICRO COUNTS 1-34:**

**Fraud; Deprivation of Rights, Privileges and Immunities Pursuant to**

**42 U.S.C. Sections 241, 242, 371**

**Against COLD**

376. This is an allegation that Defendants in committing the acts alleged in Counts 1-21 and RICO Claims for Relief 1-13, above, concurrently committed one ore move deprivations of PLAINTIFFS' rights, privileges, and immunities in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 241, and 371. These allegations are relevant to DEFENDANTS' ENTERPRISE, conspiracy, and racketeering activity, and are the

COMPLAINT

1 basis for PLAINTIFFS' claims for prospective relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. As  
2 such violations are indictable federal offenses, and shall hereinafter be referred to as  
3  
4 FEDERAL INDICTABLE CIVIL RIGHTS OFFENSES (FICRO).

5 377. As part of their ongoing CIVIL and CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES to  
6 deprive PLAINTIFFS and others similarly situated of FFR, CFC, FFRRESA, and  
7  
8 other civil rights, DEFENDANTS have CULPABLY committed each count and  
9 claim for relief alleged herein in furtherance of the conspiracies alleged hereinabove,  
10 establishing the existence of the crimes, conspiracies, and enterprises alleged herein.  
11

12 378. DEFENDANTS' activities described herein constitute a  
13 conspiracy to commit one or more violations of the FFR, CFR, actionable under the  
14 CRCCS (FICRO CONSPIRACY). The purpose of the FICRO CONSPIRACIES is to  
15 deprive PLAINTIFFS and those similarly situated of their rights, privilege, and  
16 immunities under the Constitution of United States by committing, causing, or  
17 contributing to, or ratifying each of the acts alleged against each DEFENANT.  
18  
19

20 379. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, acted with specific knowledge of  
21 PLAINTIFFS FFRRESA and PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES.  
22

23 380. On information and belief, upon learning of each fact relating to  
24 PLAINTIFFS' PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES, DEFENDANTS coordinated  
25 efforts, shared knowledge, and shared a common purpose with one or more of the  
26 other DEFENDANTS so as to be the agents of on another in FICRO CONSPIRACY  
27 to retaliate against, disparage, harm, injure, PLAINTIFFS because of the same.  
28

COMPLAINT

1       381.       In carrying out the FICRO CONSPIRACY, DEFENANTS committed,  
2 were aware of, acquiesced to, intended, and ratified each act and/or the acts and/or  
3 omissions of each and every other DEFENDANT.  
4

5       382.       DEFENDANTS are or were co-workers, collaborators, co-owners, co-  
6 operators, affiliates, colleagues, members of one another's personal and professional  
7 networks of one or more other of DEFENDANTS.  
8

9       383.       Defendants C. GOLDSMITH and unnamed entity Mr. Jan Goldsmith all  
10 times identified herein, were husband and wife, common parents of children, former  
11 co-workers / Judges of the Superior Court of the State of California, cohabitants,  
12 friends, collaborators, and formerly common parties to a martial dissolution  
13 proceeding.  
14

15       384.       DEFENDANTS, and each of them, in committing or conspiring to  
16 commit the acts ascribed to them CULPABLY acted in furtherance of the  
17 CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, including the ENTERPRISES, entities, color of law,  
18 misfeasance and malfeasance ascribed to them herein.  
19

20       385.       As an actual and proximate result, PLAINTIFFS have been HARMED.  
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**Prospective Relief Count 1**  
**Motion for Harassment Protective Order**  
**18 U.S.C. § 1514(b)**

386. PLAINTIFFS hereby move and request that the Court issue “temporary restraining order prohibiting harassment of a victim or witness in a Federal criminal case” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1514(b).

387. PLAINTIFFS are victims and witness to FICRO Counts 1-34, and numerous civil rights offenses committed by DEFENDANTS as described herein. PLAINTIFFS continue to interact with FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENTS in the DUE ADMINISTRATON OF JUSTICE, including in ongoing criminal investigations involving DEFENDANTS herein and exercise FFRRESA.

388. DEFENDANTS have undertaken a course of conduct to harass, interfere with, intimidate, harm, and retaliate for PLAINTIFFS protected activities, and continue to do so.

389. PLAINTIFFS have experienced and are in fear of further harassment, threats, and intimidation, and submit that from the allegations set forth in this Verified Complaint.

390. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1514(b), PLAINTIFFS respectfully submit that there are reasonable grounds for the court, on its own motion, to (1) believe that such harassment exists, and (2) an Order is necessary to prevent and restrain DEFENDANTS from further and ongoing offenses under section 1512 of this title,  
COMPLAINT

1 other than an offense consisting of misleading conduct, or under section 1513 of this  
2 title.

3  
4 391. PLAINTIFFS respectfully request that the Court issue, on its own  
5 motion, an Order:

6  
7  
8 A. Restraining and enjoining DEFENDANTS and each of them from further acts of  
9 HARRASSMENT AND ABUSE in connection with this matter and any ongoing  
10 DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE and FFRRESA in which PLAINTIFFS  
11 are involved;

12  
13 B. That the Order shall be in effect when made;

14  
15 C. That PLAINTIFFS shall give notice to DEFENDANTS within three business  
16 days;

17 D. That the Order shall expire within 14 days from issuance

18  
19 E. That PLAINTIFFS may Petition the Court that good cause exists to extend the  
20 Order as provided in subsection (c) of this section (18 U.S.C. § 1514(c));

21  
22 F. That a motion for a protective order shall be set down for hearing at the earliest  
23 possible time;

24 G. That the temporary restraining Order is based on:

25  
26  
27 i. The DEFENDANTS' past harassment, obstruction, tampering, and retaliation as  
28 set forth herein,

COMPLAINT

- 1 ii. The civil rights HARASSMENT AND ABUSE described STUART Assault  
2 and the DDIJO COMPLAINTS; and  
3  
4 iii. PLAINTIFFS' ongoing FFRRESA and the DUE ADMINISTRATION OF  
5 JUSTICE,  
6

7 **Prospective Relief Count 2**

8 **Declaratory Judgment Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201**

9 **Against All Defendants**

10 392. A case of actual controversy between DEFENDANTS and PLAINTIFFS  
11 exists with regard to PLAINTIFFS' free exercise, reform and support and advocacy  
12 of Family Federal Rights, laws, and Constitution of the Unites States, and the validity  
13 of state law conflicting therewith.  
14

15 393. Specifically, PLAINTIFFS, by virtue of their FFRRESA detailed herein,  
16 have asserted, and DEFENDANTS, by virtue of their acts the acts and operations  
17 CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES and ENTERPRISES with which they are affiliated,  
18 including their illegal, abusive, retaliatory, depriving, and obstructive behavior  
19 toward PLAINTIFFS and others described herein have contested and denied, the  
20 following FFRRESA rights:  
21

22 A. FFR Rights detailed at Table 1.0;

23 B. CALIFORNIA FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS; and  
24  
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1 C. The Supremacy of the constitution and laws of the United States to the laws of  
2 the State of California.

3  
4  
5 394. Further, by similar means, DEFENANTS have asserted, and  
6 PLAINTIFFS have denied, that certain laws of the State of California which have or  
7 pose a clear and present danger of injuring, inhibiting, depriving, interfered with,  
8 PLAINTFFS FFRRESA are valid and enforceable:  
9

10  
11  
12 A. The DVILS;

13 B. The DVILS ORDERS;

14 C. The processes, procedures, rules, customs, and practices of the FL-IACE and  
15 their offices statewide;

16  
17 D. The processes, procedures, rules, customs, and practices of Child Custody  
18 Evaluations and Evaluators.  
19

20  
21 395. PLAINTIFFS respectfully request an Order declaring PLAINTIFFS'  
22 rights and other legal relations vis-à-vis DEFENDANTS' HARRASSMENT AND  
23 ABUSE and other deprivation of FFR and CFR, as follows:  
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25 A. That the FFR, and CFR are  
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- a. valid and enforceable rights of U.S. Citizens residing or located in the State of California and their advocates in all State Courts within the State of California; and
- b. superior to any state laws which conflict, hinder, or deprive PLAINTFFS of the same;

B. That no COLD is entitled to deprive any U.S. Citizen residing or present in the State of California of either the CFR or FFR by reliance on conflicting state law, even in good faith;

C. That COLD are not entitled to immunity under federal law for acts not specifically authorized by their constitutions, charters, or other foundational documents;

D. That all laws, rules, policies, regulations, and forms based thereon which conflict, hinder, or deprive PLAINTFFS of their FFR and CFR, including those specified herein, are unconstitutional;

E. That the EQUAL PROTECTION CLASSES are valid classes of persons entitled to heightened protection under the 5<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> Amendments to the United States Constitution with regard to all DEFENDANTS;

F. That DEFENDANTS have violated each of the FICRO COUNTS as alleged against each of them herein; and

G. That SUPERVISING DEFENANTS and MUNICIPAL ENTITIES behaviors, policies, and procedures depriving of or infringing on FFR and CFR are illegal,



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unconstitutional, and deliberately indifferent to the likelihood of Constitutional injury to PLAINTIFFS, and that SUPERVISING DEFENDANTS have a duty to prevent or aid in preventing further deprivations of the FFR by those within their to influence or control pursuant to each of the EQUAL PROTECTION CLASSES of which PLAINTFFS are members or advocates.

396. Plaintiff further requests that the court exercise its equitable powers pursuant to the CRCCS and F.R.C.P. Rules 57 and 65 to enjoin defendants from:

- A. Further violations of the FFR, CFR, CRCCS;
- B. Further HARRASSMENT AND ABUSE;
- C. Further commission of any FICRO;
- D. Further actions to solicit, prepare, file, petition for, issue, grant, or enforce the DVILS an DVILS ORDERS, forms, rules, advice, practices related thereto; and
- E. Further interference with any PLAINTIFFS' and any United States Citizen's exercise and enjoyment of FFRRESA.

**WHEREFORE** PLAINTIFFS pray for judgment as follows:

- 1. An award of compensatory damages and interest thereon according to proof at trial;

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2. An award of reasonable costs and expenses incurred in this action, including counsel fees and expert fees as allowable under the Title 18, 28, and 42 sections asserted;

3. Declaratory, Injunctive, and Prospective Relief as requested including injunctive remedies provided under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964 (a), (c), and (d);

4. That The Court exercised its initiative to Order DEFENDANTS be restrained as requested in Prospective Relief Count 1 forthwith, and set hearing for extending such Order during the pendency of this litigation;

5. That a preliminary and permanent injunction be issued enjoining Defendants, and any employees, agents, servants, officers, representatives, directors, attorneys, successors, affiliates, assigns, and entities owned or controlled by Defendants, and all those in active concert or participation with Defendants, and each of them who receives notice directly or otherwise of such injunction from making any further misrepresentations in COMMERCIAL SPEECH as described above; and

6. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

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**JURY TRIAL DEMANDED**

Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury.

DATED: August 27, 2013

By: /s/ Colbern C. Stuart

Colbern C. Stuart, III, President,  
California Coalition for Families and  
Children  
in Pro Se



1 **VERIFICATION**

2 I, Plaintiff Colbern C. Stuart, III, do hereby state, declare, and affirm that I  
3 have read Plaintiffs' Complaint and the factual statements contained therein and  
4 know the contents thereof to be true and correct except as to those matters stated on  
5 information and belief, which I believe to be true.  
6

7 I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the United States that the foregoing  
8 is true and correct.  
9

10  
11 DATED: August 20, 2013

By: /s/ Colbern C. Stuart

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13 Colbern C. Stuart, III, President,  
14 California Coalition for Families and  
15 Children  
16 in Pro Se  
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1 **Endnotes**

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5 <sup>i</sup> *American Fascists: The Christian Right and the War on America*, Hedges, C  
6 (Free Press 2006) ISBN-10 978-0-7342-8443-1.

7 <sup>ii</sup> *United States v. Windsor*, 570 U.S. \_\_\_\_ (2013) (Docket No. 12-307)

8  
9 <sup>iii</sup> *Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges*, Bork, Robert H., (American  
10 Enterprise Institute 2002), ISBN 0-8447-4162-0

11 <sup>iv</sup> “Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you  
12 can. As a peacemaker the lawyer has superior opportunity of being a good man.

13  
14 There will still be business enough.” ~ *Abraham Lincoln*

15 <sup>v</sup> “California law expressly imposes liability on a public employee for his own act  
16 or omission. (Cal.Gov't.Code § 820 (a public employee is "liable for injury caused by  
17 his act or omission to the same extent as a private person," except as otherwise  
18 provided by statute).) In the same statute that relieves a public employee of liability  
19 for an injury caused by the act or omission of another person, the Legislature  
20 declared: "Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for  
21 injury proximately caused by his own negligent or wrongful act or omission."  
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25 (Cal.Gov't.Code § 820.8.)” *Johnson v. Duffy*, 588 F.2d 740 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.1978). “A person  
26 deprives another of "a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he  
27 does an affirmative act, [or] participates in another's affirmative acts ... that causes the  
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COMPLAINT

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4 deprivation of which [the] complaint is made." *Johnson v. Duffy*, 588 F.2d 740, 743  
5 (9th Cir.1978). However, personal participation is not necessary to establish Section  
6  
7 1983 liability. *Id.* "Anyone who `causes' any citizen to be subjected to a constitutional  
8 deprivation is also liable." *Id.* The requisite causal connection can be established "by  
9 setting in motion a series of acts ... the actor knows or reasonably should know would  
10  
11 cause others to inflict the constitutional injury." *Vierria v. California Hwy Patrol*,  
12 644 F.2d 1219 (ED Ca 2009).

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14 <sup>vi</sup> "To state such a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) she  
15 was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and  
16 (2) the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law. *American Mfrs.*  
17 *Mut. Ins. Co.*, 526 U.S. at 50, 119 S.Ct. 977. A person deprives another of "a  
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19 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act,  
20 [or] participates in another's affirmative acts ... that causes the deprivation of which  
21 [the] complaint is made." *Johnson v. Duffy*, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1978).

22  
23 However, personal participation is not necessary to establish Section 1983  
24 liability. *Id.* "Anyone who `causes' any citizen to be subjected to a constitutional  
25 deprivation is also liable." *Id.* The requisite causal connection can be established "by  
26 setting in motion a series of acts ... the actor knows or reasonably should know would  
27  
28 cause others to inflict the constitutional injury." *Johnson*, 588 F.2d at 743-44."

COMPLAINT

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*Vierria v. California Highway Patrol*, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (E.D. Cal. 2009)

<sup>vii</sup> *Butz v. Economou*, 438 U.S. 478, 519 (1978) (Rhenquist, J., concurring).

<sup>viii</sup> *Butz*, supra at \_\_; *Stump v. Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).